Economic incongruities in the European patent system

Publishing date: 13 January 2009
Authors: Bruno van Pottelsberghe

Bruno van Pottelsberghe argues that the consequences of the fragmentation of the European patent system are more dramatic than the mere prohibitive costs of maintaining a patent in force in many jurisdictions. The authors first show that heterogeneous national litigation costs, practices and outcome induce a high level of uncertainty. But also that a high degree of managerial complexity results from systemic incongruities due to easier parallel imports, possible time paradoxes and the de facto paradox of having EU-level competition policy and granting authority, ultimately facing national jurisdictional primacy on patent issues.

About the authors

Bruno van Pottelsberghe

Bruno van Pottelsberghe joined Bruegel as a Senior Resident Fellow in November 2007. His research for Bruegel focuses on the effectiveness of several policy tools (R&D subsidies, R&D tax credits, intellectual property, public research and regulatory policies) aimed at stimulating innovation in Europe.

He was the Chief Economist of the European Patent Office (EPO) from November 2005 to the end of 2007. Since 1999 he has been a professor at the Brussels University (U.L.B.). As holder of the Solvay S.A. Chair of Innovation, he teaches courses related to the economics and management of innovation and intellectual property.

He is also an adviser of the President and the Rector of the U.L.B. for technology transfer issues.