The dynamics of leniency application and the knock-on effect of cartel enforcement
This paper shows that antitrust investigation in a market increases leniency applications in related markets. The authors used a novel application of multi-spell discrete-time survival analysis for a sample of cartels prosecuted by the EC between 1996 and 2014.
- The authors study the timing of leniency applications using a novel application of multi-spell discrete-time survival analysis for a sample of cartels prosecuted by the European Commission between 1996 and 2014.
- The start of a Commission investigation does not affect the rate by which conspirators apply for leniency in the market investigated, but increases the rate of application in separate markets in which a conspirator in the investigated market also engaged in collusion.
- The revision of the Commission’s leniency programme in 2002 increased the rate of pre-investigation applications. Our results shed light on enforcement efforts against cartels and other forms of