Download publication

Working Paper

The dynamics of leniency application and the knock-on effect of cartel enforcement

This paper shows that antitrust investigation in a market increases leniency applications in related markets. The authors used a novel application of multi-spell discrete-time survival analysis for a sample of cartels prosecuted by the EC between 1996 and 2014.

By: Date: February 29, 2016 Topic: Innovation & Competition Policy

Highlights

  • The authors study the timing of leniency applications using a novel application of multi-spell discrete-time survival analysis for a sample of cartels prosecuted by the European Commission between 1996 and 2014.
  • The start of a Commission investigation does not affect the rate by which conspirators apply for leniency in the market investigated, but increases the rate of application in separate markets in which a conspirator in the investigated market also engaged in collusion.
  • The revision of the Commission’s leniency programme in 2002 increased the rate of pre-investigation applications. Our results shed light on enforcement efforts against cartels and other forms of
View comments
Read article More on this topic

Blog Post

Huawei vs ZTE judgement: a welcome decision?

Today the European Court of Justice (ECJ) will rule on a dispute between Chinese tech companies Huawei and ZTE regarding a patent “essential” to the “Long Term Evolution” (LTE) wireless broadband technology standard. 

By: Mario Mariniello and Francesco Salemi Topic: Innovation & Competition Policy Date: July 15, 2015