External authors

Christopher Gandrud

Researcher at the Hertie School of Governance

Twitter: @ChrisGandrud

Christopher Gandrud is a Lecturer in Quantitative International Political Economy at City University London and Post-Doctoral Researcher at the Fiscal Governance Centre, Hertie School of Governance. His research focuses on the international political economy of public financial and monetary institutions, as well as applied social science statistics and software development. His work has been published in peer reviewed journals including the Journal of Common Market Studies, Journal of Peace Research, Research and Politics, Review of International Political Economy, Political Science Research and Methods, Journal of Statistical Software, and International Political Science Review. He has been a Lecturer in International Relations at Yonsei University and a Fellow in Government at the London School of Economics where in 2012 he completed a PhD in quantitative political science.

Contact information

gandrud@hertie-school.org

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Policy Contribution

How not to create zombie banks: lessons for Italy from Japan

How can Italian banks address the issue of non-perfoming loans? What lessons can they learn from Japan?

By: Christopher Gandrud and Mark Hallerberg Topic: Finance & Financial Regulation Date: March 8, 2017
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Blog Post

The European Union remains a laggard on banking supervisory transparency

Financial supervisors must provide the public with more information about the European banking sector in order to ensure financial stability. The level of transparency in national supervision of banks has dropped since 2013.

By: Christopher Gandrud, Mark Hallerberg and Nicolas Véron Topic: Finance & Financial Regulation Date: May 10, 2016
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Blog Post

Opaque Europe: financial supervisory transparency, why it’s important, and how to improve it

“Financial supervisory transparency” has been on the agenda of international financial institutions for some time. It concerns the public availability of data supervisors have on the financial industry. Using a new measure of data reporting to international financial institutions like the IMF and World Bank, we show that financial supervisory transparency is particularly lacking in Europe. We make recommendations for EU institutions to improve it.

By: Mark Copelovitch, Christopher Gandrud and Mark Hallerberg Topic: Finance & Financial Regulation Date: December 11, 2015
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Policy Contribution

Financial regulatory transparency: new data and implications for EU policy

This paper introduces a new international financial regulatory data transparency index - the Financial Regulatory Transparency (FRT) Index - in order to address the exisiting gap in measuring regulatory transparency.

By: Mark Copelovitch, Christopher Gandrud and Mark Hallerberg Topic: Finance & Financial Regulation Date: December 10, 2015
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Blog Post

Not SIFIs but PIFIs

The EU bank resolution framework deals in principle with risks from SIFIs, or systemically important financial institutions, but might have overlooked PIFIs - politically important financial institutions.

By: Christopher Gandrud and Mark Hallerberg Topic: European Macroeconomics & Governance, Finance & Financial Regulation Date: March 6, 2015
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Working Paper

Bad banks in the EU: the impact of Eurostat rules

 At least 12 European Union member states used publicly created asset management companies (AMCs), otherwise known as a ‘badbanks’ to respond to the recent financial crisis. This tool remains an option for future bank resolutions under the EU Bank Recovery andResolution Directive. This working paper assesses the design of AMCs in the recent crisis and why their form has changed.

By: Christopher Gandrud and Mark Hallerberg Topic: European Macroeconomics & Governance Date: December 16, 2014
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Policy Contribution

Supervisory transparency in the European banking union

Current and planned European Union requirements on bank transparency are either insufficient or could be easily sidestepped by supervisors. A banking union in Europe needs to include requirements for greater supervisory transparency.

By: Christopher Gandrud and Mark Hallerberg Topic: European Macroeconomics & Governance, Finance & Financial Regulation Date: January 3, 2014
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Policy Contribution

Who decides? Resolving failed banks in a European framework

When public support is provided to failed institutions it should come from a bankfunded resolution fund. This would reduce taxpayers’ direct costs, and would make banks less likely to take risks and advocate for bailouts

By: Christopher Gandrud and Mark Hallerberg Topic: European Macroeconomics & Governance Date: November 29, 2013