Non resident scholars

Mark Hallerberg

Mark Hallerberg

Mark Hallerberg has been a non-resident fellow at Bruegel since September 2013. He is Professor of Public Management and Political Economy at the Hertie School of Governance and is Director of Hertie's Fiscal Governance Centre.  

He is the author of one book, co-author of a second, and co-editor of a third. He has published over twenty-five articles and book chapters on fiscal governance, tax competition, and exchange rate choice.

He has held professorships previously at Emory University, the University of Pittsburgh, and the Georgia Institute of Technology. He has done consulting work for the Dutch and German Ministries of Finance, Ernst and Young Poland, the European Central Bank, the German Development Corporation (GIZ), the Inter-American Development Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank.

Contact information

hallerberg@hertie-school.org

Read article

Blog Post

Christopher Gandrud
Mark Hallerberg

Not SIFIs but PIFIs

The EU bank resolution framework deals in principle with risks from SIFIs, or systemically important financial institutions, but might have overlooked PIFIs - politically important financial institutions.

By: Christopher Gandrud and Mark Hallerberg Topic: European Macroeconomics & Governance, Finance & Financial Regulation Date: March 6, 2015
Read article Download PDF More on this topic

Working Paper

Bad banks in the EU: the impact of Eurostat rules

Bad banks in the EU: the impact of Eurostat rules

 At least 12 European Union member states used publicly created asset management companies (AMCs), otherwise known as a ‘badbanks’ to respond to the recent financial crisis. This tool remains an option for future bank resolutions under the EU Bank Recovery andResolution Directive. This working paper assesses the design of AMCs in the recent crisis and why their form has changed.

By: Christopher Gandrud and Mark Hallerberg Topic: European Macroeconomics & Governance Date: December 16, 2014
Read article Download PDF

Policy Contribution

European Central Bank accountability: how the monetary dialogue could be improvedEuropean Parliament

European Central Bank accountability: how the monetary dialogue could be improved

This Policy Brief was prepared for the European Parliament's Monetary Dialogue with the President of the European Central Bank Mario Draghi. The authors assess the impact of the Monetary Dialogue. They describe the ECB’s accountability practices, compare them to those of other major central banks and provide an assessment of the dialogue in the last five years.

By: Grégory Claeys, Mark Hallerberg and Olga Tschekassin Topic: European Macroeconomics & Governance, European Parliament Date: March 3, 2014
Read article Download PDF

Policy Contribution

Supervisory transparency in the European banking union

Supervisory transparency in the European banking union

Current and planned European Union requirements on bank transparency are either insufficient or could be easily sidestepped by supervisors. A banking union in Europe needs to include requirements for greater supervisory transparency.

By: Christopher Gandrud and Mark Hallerberg Topic: European Macroeconomics & Governance, Finance & Financial Regulation Date: January 3, 2014
Read article Download PDF More on this topic

Policy Contribution

Who decides? Resolving failed banks in a European framework

Who decides? Resolving failed banks in a European framework

When public support is provided to failed institutions it should come from a bankfunded resolution fund. This would reduce taxpayers’ direct costs, and would make banks less likely to take risks and advocate for bailouts

By: Christopher Gandrud and Mark Hallerberg Topic: European Macroeconomics & Governance Date: November 29, 2013
Read article Download PDF

Policy Brief

On the effectiveness and legitimacy of EU economic policiesFrench Assembly

On the effectiveness and legitimacy of EU economic policies

For markets, European economic governance faces a crisis of policy effectiveness, while for citizens the European Union faces a democratic legitimacy crisis. The introduction of the European Semester economic policy surveillance system has not resolved these problems. Policy guidance deriving from the Semester is not focused enough on areas of significant spillovers and on problem countries, and national compliance is often procedural rather than actual. This brings into question both the Semester’s effectiveness and the democratic legitimacy of the EU’s new intervention rights, which allow intrusion into national policy-making.

By: Mark Hallerberg, Benedicta Marzinotto and Guntram B. Wolff Topic: European Macroeconomics & Governance, French Assembly, Parliamentary Testimonies Date: November 9, 2012
Read article Download PDF

External Publication

An Assessment of the European SemesterEuropean Parliament

An Assessment of the European Semester

This study assesses the European Semester’s effectiveness and legitimacy. We provide evidence based on a survey sent to all 27 National Parliaments, which are found to be active in debating central elements of the Semester and thereby providing national legitimacy. The role of the European Parliament was strengthened with the Six-pack's introduction of an Economic Dialogue. We propose a non-binding vote by the European Parliament on the Annual Growth Survey and on final recommendations. For euro area countries, only MEPs of these countries should vote. Currently discussed steps towards a banking, fiscal and political union may require Treaty changes, which would provide greater legitimacy at the EU level.

By: Benedicta Marzinotto, Guntram B. Wolff and Mark Hallerberg Topic: European Macroeconomics & Governance, European Parliament Date: October 1, 2012
Read article Download PDF

Working Paper

How effective and legitimate is the European semester? Increasing role of the European parliamentEuropean Parliament

How effective and legitimate is the European semester? Increasing role of the European parliament

This study was conducted for the European Parliament's Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs: In this working paper the authors assess how a strong role for the European Parliament within the framework of the European Semester can increase the effectiveness of EU economic governance.

By: Benedicta Marzinotto, Guntram B. Wolff and Mark Hallerberg Topic: European Macroeconomics & Governance, European Parliament Date: September 22, 2011
Read article Download PDF More on this topic

External Publication

How effective and legitimate is the European Semester? Increasing the role of the European Parliament

How effective and legitimate is the European Semester? Increasing the role of the European Parliament

The European Semester is a new institutional process that provides Member States with ex-ante guidance on fiscal and structural objectives. The Semester’s goals are ambitious and it is still uncertain how it will fit into the new EU economic governance framework. We find that Member States are only slowly internalising the new procedure. Furthermore, the […]

By: Mark Hallerberg, Benedicta Marzinotto and Guntram B. Wolff Topic: European Macroeconomics & Governance Date: September 8, 2011