Deposit insurance, like any insurance scheme, raises moral hazard concerns. Such concerns arising from European deposit insurance can be alleviated through a country-specific component in the risk-based premium for deposit insurance and limits on sovereign bond exposures on bank balance sheets. This column argues, however, that proposals to maintain national compartments in a new European Deposit Insurance Scheme are self-defeating, as such compartments can be destabilising in times of crisis.
In this week’s Director’s Cut of ‘The Sound of Economics’ podcast, Bruegel director Guntram Wolff talks with Nicolas Véron, senior fellow at Bruegel, about the implementation of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), one of the three pillars needed for the completion of banking union.
Many EU-level reports have highlighted a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) as a necessary component of banking union, but none of these options has met sufficient consensus among euro-area countries. The authors of this blog propose to end the deadlock with an EDIS design that is institutionally integrated but financed in a way that is differentiated across countries.
Europe’s banking union has been central to the resolution of the euro-area crisis. It has had an encouraging start but remains unfinished business. If it remains in its current halfway-house condition, it may eventually move backwards and fail. EU leaders should seize these opportunities
On 19th June, we are hosting an invitation-only workshop on sovereign exposure limits.
After the financial crisis, the EU has taken measures to create conditions for a safer banking sector. One of the key measures to do that is the creation of the banking union. How successful has the implementation of the new framework been so far? How will issues in the Italian banking sector be addressed? And how will Brexit change the European banking sector?
Dirk Schoenmaker's chapter in 'The Palgrave Handbook of European Banking', a handbook that collates the expertise and research of leading academic and senior policy makers in the field of European banking
Statement prepared for the European Parliament’s ECON Committee Public Hearing of 23 May.
Nicolas Véron argues that there are two major oversights in Dr Schuknecht’s anti-European Deposit Insurance outburst, respectively about deposit insurance and about banking union.
EU-wide security of savings must be considered in order to take banking union seriously. Banks' holdings of government bonds must be limited.
The aim of this blog post is to clarify different options of how to organize European deposit insurance without yet settling on the best option. We aim to explain and to highlight what different options can and cannot achieve. We end by drawing some tentative conclusions on potentially adequate quid-pro-quo measures for different forms of deposit insurances given the problem of transition.