The principle of voluntary membership is a central value of the EU project, but it is also a source of many of its problems. How can the member states address those problems in order to repair the EU's integration architecture?
An analysis of macroecnomic developments shows that Central and Eastern European (CEE) EU member states fared much better in the aftermath of the crisis compared to euro-area periphery countries. Furthermore, they have a better chance to avoid the problems that the euro-periphery countries faced before the crisis.
With the UK referendum on EU membership on 23 June, Europe is contemplating the practical consequences of a vote to leave.
Doubts about the fiscal sustainability of various member states have led Europe to enact greater coordination and surveillance. But are these policies effective? And what fiscal framework can best support Europe back to growth?
In France, the US and elsewhere, populist parties are growing in popularity. Such parties radically challenge the consensus of traditional parties and their representatives. This year traditional parties must give informed answers to the problems identified by populists.
The fundamental problem of economic policy coordination in the EU is that national policymakers are accountable to their national parliaments and focus on national interests, which in many cases differ widely in different member states. It is therefore not all that surprising that economic policy coordination in the EU hardly works.
This event will address topics of central interest in current EU policy debates: fiscal and competitiveness coordination, financial union and the divergent needs of member states inside and outside the euro area.
Further democratic legitimacy is a pre-requisite to economic union. This article explores how economic policies in the euro area should be coordinated, but this cannot be done in a mechanical rules-based manner. Arguing the contrary suggests a cavalier understanding of the complexity of economic policymaking.
Speech held at Bruegel Annual Dinner, Brussels 7 September 2015
This event was organised in the frame of the 10th Anniversary of Bruegel. It brought together a panel of high level economic experts to discuss the competitive gains achievable through reinforcing the Internal Market and structural reforms.
Olivier Blanchard has, with his customary clarity and candor, addressed criticisms of the IMF’s role in Greece’s financial rescue. His is a personal statement. But in writing it, he also presents the IMF’s operating philosophy and mandate. Blanchard’s statement will, therefore, not only shape our thinking on the evolution of the Greek crisis but it could define how we view the proper role of the IMF. His blog post deserves careful reading and consideration.
This blog draws two lessons from the failed Greek programme. Olivier Blanchard is right that the fiscal adjustment of the last 5 years was unavoidable. An earlier debt restructuring could hardly have prevented it. (1) However, an earlier debt restructuring would have allowed significantly lower primary surpluses from now on and it would have made the programme more credible. (2) Equally important, the IMF failed to prioritise a strategy for Greece to regain competitiveness.