Trust in the EU and satisfaction with democracy are returning in southern European countries, where citizens’ confidence in European institutions was dented during the crisis years.
Zsolt Darvas and Dirk Schoenmaker find strong support for the hypothesis that the larger the assets managed by institutional investors, the smaller the home bias and thereby the greater the scope for risk sharing.
This paper applies the info-gap approach to the unconventional monetary policy of the Eurosystem and so takes into account the fundamental uncertainty on inflation shocks and the transmission mechanism.
An analysis of macroecnomic developments shows that Central and Eastern European (CEE) EU member states fared much better in the aftermath of the crisis compared to euro-area periphery countries. Furthermore, they have a better chance to avoid the problems that the euro-periphery countries faced before the crisis.
The recently published in-depth evaluation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s role in the euro area crisis highlights important contrasts in the area of financial services. The IMF provided highly valuable analysis and recommendations to the EU on its banking sector and related policies. In individual countries (leaving aside Cyprus and the second Greek programme, not covered by this evaluation), the financial-sector aspects of the IMF’s interventions were highly successful in Ireland and Spain, ambiguous in Greece, and a missed opportunity in Portugal.
The sovereign debt crisis shook the Euro to its foundations. It soon became clear that there was no mechanism to allow a tidy insolvency of a state wishing to remain inside the euro area. To face future crises, does the EU need a sovereign insolvency mechanism?
The Eurosystem’s regular open market operations consist of one-week liquidity-providing operations (MROs), and three-month liquidity-providing operations (LTROs). We have updated data on the use of these operations by country.
What can we do to improve Eurozone governance to prevent the next European crisis?
This event will look at shocks and adjustment in the euro area in the light of recent crises and analyse the functioning of a key internal adjustment process in EMU
So far, having more than one currency in the EU has not undermined the single market. However, attempts to deepen integration in the banking, labour and capital markets might require governance integration that involves only euro-area countries. Safeguards are needed to protect the interest of the UK and other euro-outs.
The financial crisis has prompted a renewed interest in macro-prudential policy as a framework to address the stability of the financial system as a whole. While being an objective of global relevance, preserving financial stability is even more important in contexts in which financial linkages are strong and deep, such as in the Euro area.
The financial crisis has prompted a renewed interest in macro-prudential policy as a framework to address the stability of the financial system as a whole, rather than only its individual components. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the European macro-prudential discussion by establishing empirically the special challenges that the set-up of macro-prudential policy in the euro area needs to confront.