Separating ‘legacy assets’ from banks’ core business is central to the rehabilitation of Europe’s banking system. How can Europe progress in its ongoing effort to rid the financial system of legacy assets, and equip it with renewed growth?
The global financial crisis allegedly led to the end of global banking. However, Dirk Schoenmaker finds that reports of the demise of global banking are premature.
Brexit offers EU-27 countries a chance to take some of London’s financial services activity. But there is also a risk of market fragmentation, which could lead to less effective supervision and higher borrowing costs. To get the most out of Brexit, the EU financial sector needs a beefed up ESMA.
The EU27 needs to upgrade its financial surveillance architecture to minimise the financial market fragmentation resulting from Brexit and the corresponding increase in borrowing costs for firms.
The European European financial system is too strongly bank-based. How can it be rebalanced to become favourable to growth and employment again? (This paper is only available in French).
How can we fix the deficiencies in the EU financial system? Bank-state-nexus, business models and the missing level playing field
As a consequence of the global financial crisis, various initiatives have been taken in different jurisdictions to ensure the future resolvability of banks without massive use of public funds. In Europe, the BRRD introduced the concept of MREL, which is in the process of being defined.
Spain is among the countries still recovering from the financial crisis. While misjudged investments were part of the cause, these past mistakes could offer lessons for the European banking union.
Spain once again missed its deficit target in 2015 and it seems unlikely that 2016 will be any better. The central government has pointed to regional deficits as being the cause of the fiscal slippage. However, regional governments claim that their deficit is due to under-financing and overly strict deficit targets.
G20 leaders must address major issues like the distribution of income and the structure of our financial systems in order to combat the deeper underlying causes of weak global demand.
The ECB and its response to crises in the euro area have been in the spotlight recently. But how does EU membership affect the central banks of non-Euro member states? This question is especially pertinent in the UK, whose relationship with the EU is at a vital crossroads.
In a recent paper, I looked at the evolution of financial cycles in the euro area and at their link with capital flows. Here, I focus on how those findings inform our understanding of euro-area macroeconomic imbalances, revisiting the analysis of national savings and investment correlation.