Relative prices of different energy carriers are affected by a number of fiscal instruments. At this event, we will hold a discussion on, how fiscal instruments can be adjusted to better accommodate the energy transition.
Endowed with half of the world’s known oil and gas reserves, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has become a cornerstone of the global energy architecture. This architecture is currently undergoing a structural transformation, prompted by two different forces: decarbonisation policies and low-carbon technology advancements. This book seeks to address the following research question: are MENA oil-exporting countries equipped to prosper in times of global decarbonisation?
Is the EastMed pipeline really a feasible project? The answer to this question is not simple, but the EastMed plan sounds unconvincing.
Many countries in the MENA region are heavily dependent on oil and gas for exports and taxes. But global decarbonisation could undermine revenues, even though MENA exports are globally competitive. This threatens the MENA region's social contract, so economic diversification needs to start now.
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) oil exporting countries are still not adequately equipped to prosper in a decarbonising world. Decarbonisation should therefore represent an incentive for MENA oil exporters to pursue structural processes of transition from rentier to production states.
On Wednesday, 30 November 2016, OPEC reached a milestone agreement to cut oil production by 1.2 million barrels a day in a long-awaited attempt to end the savage two-year downturn in prices that has shredded the budgets of its members. The deal will come into effect in January 2017 and it will mark a U-turn from the pump-at-will policy adopted by the group in November 2014.
With some sanctions temporarily lifted, now is the chance for Iran to reintegrate into the global economy and political system. But comprehensive economic and political reforms are needed.
Oil prices fell to a 12-year low at the beginning of 2016. We find that the drop in the past two years was primarily driven by expectations. In fact, changes in oil prices since 2008 are increasingly explained by expectations. In the past, expectation-driven oil prices drops were good news for the EU economy. However, the declining importance of actual changes in demand and supply for oil prices raises doubts about whether we can still expect a positive impact on EU GDP.
Like the price of financial assets, the market assessment of the capacity of central banks to achieve their price stability objective fluctuates between omnipotence and impotence. We do not agree with this binary view of the world and we examine in this post the case of the European Central Bank (ECB). We argue that the ECB still has some instruments left. It should consider moving beyond increasing sovereign debt purchases, which would be ineffective and pose risks. More important is to step up work on structural and fiscal policies.
Iran’s energy sector is vital for the country’s economy. Now that sanctions have been lifted, the government must reform the oil sector to encourage investment from international oil companies.
What’s at stake: The recent positive link between oil and stock prices has been puzzling for most observers. While a decrease in the price of oil was traditionally seen as a net positive for oil importing countries such as the United States, the concurrent declines in the price of oil and the US stock market suggest that the relationship may be different in the current environment.
The price of crude oil has fallen even further in recent weeks, as have financial market measures of inflation expectations in the euro area, the US and the UK. We show that low oil prices drag down inflation expectations up to 5-6 years ahead, which is puzzlingly long and suggests that financial market based inflation expectations should be assessed cautiously.