The global financial crisis allegedly led to the end of global banking. However, Dirk Schoenmaker finds that reports of the demise of global banking are premature.
Zsolt Darvas and Dirk Schoenmaker find strong support for the hypothesis that the larger the assets managed by institutional investors, the smaller the home bias and thereby the greater the scope for risk sharing.
Brexit offers EU-27 countries a chance to take some of London’s financial services activity. But there is also a risk of market fragmentation, which could lead to less effective supervision and higher borrowing costs. To get the most out of Brexit, the EU financial sector needs a beefed up ESMA.
Brexit will lead to a partial migration of financial firms from London to the EU27. This Policy Contribution provides a comparison between London and four major cities that will host most of the new EU27 wholesale market: Frankfurt, Paris, Dublin and Amsterdam. It gives a detailed picture of the wholesale markets, the largest players in these markets and the underlying clearing infrastructure. It also provides data on professional services and innovation.
The EU27 needs to upgrade its financial surveillance architecture to minimise the financial market fragmentation resulting from Brexit and the corresponding increase in borrowing costs for firms.
House prices in the Netherlands are on the rise again. But at the local level the pattern is very uneven: house prices in major cities are rising faster than in the rest of the country. Yet, macroprudential policies in Europe are based on trends in national housing price indices. With such divergence between Dutch regions, is that appropriate?
The purpose of this report is to provide a comprehensive overview of capital movements in Europe in a global context.
What are the arguments for and against centralisation of insurance supervision? What would be the scope of a possible insurance union, and what would the legal basis be? How rapid should the move to insurance union be? This Policy Brief sets out to answer these questions.
Following the financial crisis, the question of how to handle a big bank’s collapse has come to the fore. This Policy Contribution evaluates the obstacles to resolvability that the legal and operational structures of the large euro-area banks could pose to the European Union’s new resolution regime.
This paper evaluates the obstacles to resolvability that the legal and operational structures of the large euro-area banks could present, assuming that it is possible to liquidate smaller and medium-sized banks through a transfer of the relevant activities to other banks.