How can Italian banks address the issue of non-perfoming loans? What lessons can they learn from Japan?
The Trump administration seems more than willing to break with liberal orthodoxy on trade. Could this lead them to introduce a "destination tax", essentially penalising imports? If the USA moves ahead with this idea, Mark Hallerberg argues that the EU should seriously consider doing the same. Not only would it balance out some of the trade effects of the US move, it might also have positive political implications for Europe.
Financial supervisors must provide the public with more information about the European banking sector in order to ensure financial stability. The level of transparency in national supervision of banks has dropped since 2013.
“Financial supervisory transparency” has been on the agenda of international financial institutions for some time. It concerns the public availability of data supervisors have on the financial industry. Using a new measure of data reporting to international financial institutions like the IMF and World Bank, we show that financial supervisory transparency is particularly lacking in Europe. We make recommendations for EU institutions to improve it.
This paper introduces a new international financial regulatory data transparency index - the Financial Regulatory Transparency (FRT) Index - in order to address the exisiting gap in measuring regulatory transparency.
The EU bank resolution framework deals in principle with risks from SIFIs, or systemically important financial institutions, but might have overlooked PIFIs - politically important financial institutions.
At least 12 European Union member states used publicly created asset management companies (AMCs), otherwise known as a ‘badbanks’ to respond to the recent financial crisis. This tool remains an option for future bank resolutions under the EU Bank Recovery andResolution Directive. This working paper assesses the design of AMCs in the recent crisis and why their form has changed.
This Policy Brief was prepared for the European Parliament's Monetary Dialogue with the President of the European Central Bank Mario Draghi. The authors assess the impact of the Monetary Dialogue. They describe the ECB’s accountability practices, compare them to those of other major central banks and provide an assessment of the dialogue in the last five years.
Current and planned European Union requirements on bank transparency are either insufficient or could be easily sidestepped by supervisors. A banking union in Europe needs to include requirements for greater supervisory transparency.
When public support is provided to failed institutions it should come from a bankfunded resolution fund. This would reduce taxpayers’ direct costs, and would make banks less likely to take risks and advocate for bailouts
For markets, European economic governance faces a crisis of policy effectiveness, while for citizens the European Union faces a democratic legitimacy crisis. The introduction of the European Semester economic policy surveillance system has not resolved these problems. Policy guidance deriving from the Semester is not focused enough on areas of significant spillovers and on problem countries, and national compliance is often procedural rather than actual. This brings into question both the Semester’s effectiveness and the democratic legitimacy of the EU’s new intervention rights, which allow intrusion into national policy-making.
This study assesses the European Semester’s effectiveness and legitimacy. We provide evidence based on a survey sent to all 27 National Parliaments, which are found to be active in debating central elements of the Semester and thereby providing national legitimacy. The role of the European Parliament was strengthened with the Six-pack's introduction of an Economic Dialogue. We propose a non-binding vote by the European Parliament on the Annual Growth Survey and on final recommendations. For euro area countries, only MEPs of these countries should vote. Currently discussed steps towards a banking, fiscal and political union may require Treaty changes, which would provide greater legitimacy at the EU level.