The deal reached on euro-zone reform at the December 4th Eurogroup is not ground-breaking. However, it contains a number of incremental but potentially key technical reforms – in particular regarding the ESM toolkit. Some constitute an improvement, but there are also clear flaws that should be corrected at the Euro Summit.
What are the challenges for implementation of the new EIP?
Banks deemed to be failing or likely to fail in the banking union are either put into insolvency/liquidation or enter a resolution scheme to protect the public interest. After resolution but before full market confidence is restored, the liquidity needs of resolved banks might exceed what can be met through regular monetary policy operations or emergency liquidity assistance. All liquidity needs that emerge must be met for resolution to be a success. In the euro area, this can only be done credibly for systemically important banks by the central bank.
Since the European Central Bank’s announcement of its quantitative easing (QE) programme in January 2015, national central banks have been buying government and national agency bonds. In this post the authors look at the effect of QE on sectoral holdings of government bonds, updating the calculations published initially in May 2016.
In this Policy Contribution prepared for the European Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) as an input to the Monetary Dialogue, the authors clarify what excess liquidity is and argue that it is not a good indicator of whether banks’ have more incentives in risk-taking and look at indicators that might signal that bank lending in the euro area creates undue risks.
Bruegel scholars Zsolt Darvas and Guntram Wolff contributed to the September 2018 edition of the OeNB's Focus on European Economic Integration.
Eurozone membership (or the use of a fixed exchange rate) was not a factor determining economic success in Central Europe. There were both good and bad macroeconomic performances in both the flexible and the fixed exchange rate regimes of Central European countries. The implication is that Central European “outs” could be economically successful both with and without the euro, yet the EU is not only about economic benefits.
Is the time for refining recommendations and for a serious political debate on how best to overcome bottlenecks and improve the economic prospects of Italians.
The authors investigate the ECB’s profit-making activity of the last 20 years, assessing how this was achieved and the reasons why we should care more broadly about central banks generating profits.
The ECB should refine its collateral framework in order to continue protecting its balance sheet without putting at risk the safe-asset status of sovereign bonds of the euro area.
Strengthening the ESM can help to prevent crises and enhance deeper financial integration in the euro area. Yet, mislabelling the ESM as “European Monetary Fund” will not do the trick. Instead, a revamp of its precautionary credit line could create a meaningful instrument, built on the existing policy framework, by incentivising strong economic policies and guarding against financial market turbulence. However, the devil is in the details. The design of such a facility has to be well thought through, to navigate difficult trade-offs.
Dans cette chronique, l'auteur estime qu’une renationalisation graduelle de certaines politiques pourrait utilement contribuer à la nécessaire redéfinition du modèle agricole français..