BALANCING THE PUBLIC INTEREST-DEFENSE IN CARTEL OFFENSES

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Abstract

In some jurisdictions, horizontal agreements may be exempted from the cartel law if they advance certain public interests, such as public health or environmental benefits, enough to compensate the consumers damaged by their anti-competitive effects. In this paper, we formalize the balancing of cartel unit price overcharges on a private good against the willingness of its consumers to pay for an accompanying public good, using a standard model of public good provision with voluntary private contributions. A cartel may improve upon the under-provision in competitive equilibrium, even though it crowds out private contributions. However, a public interest-cartel is not sustainable beyond a small critical mass of consumers who combine a preference for private consumption with a low willingness to pay for the public good. By self-selection, the policy targets particularly those consumers for taxation. The information requirements for a competition agency to identify a genuine public interest-defense are prohibitively large by all standards.

JEL-codes: H41, K21, L40, Q01

Keywords: cartel, public interest, public good, overcharge, exemption

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1 Introduction

A concern that certain public interests, such as environmental protection, public health, animal well-being or sustainability, may not be well served by competition, has directed several antitrust agencies to weigh in their decisions other public interests as well. Agreements among competitors with an anti-competitive nature that claim to promote such wider public interests may be exempted from the competition laws. The US antitrust authorities resist weighing wider public policy arguments on welfare merits against combinations in restraint of trade.\(^1\) Yet the European Treaty provides that the prohibition of all agreements between undertakings which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market, may be declared inapplicable if it "...contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit."\(^2\) The efficiency gains intended by the drafters have been stretched beyond R&D spillovers from joint-ventures, to include the advance of wider public interest such as more sustainable production.

While in \textit{CECED}, a noted decision from 1999, the European Commission exempted horizontal agreements between manufacturers of washing machines to discontinue the production of their least energy-efficient models from the European cartel law, on the conclusion that the agreements would on balance bring about energy savings and environmental benefits for society in excess of their negative effects from reduced competition, the Commission has since been reluctant to grant such cartel exemptions.\(^3\) Yet in recent years, the Dutch Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) became receptive to claims of anti-competitive horizontal agreements promoting sustainability. North Sea shrimp fishermen, who were fined in 2003 for colluding to restrict shrimp catches, argued on appeal that their cartel made sustainable fishing methods possible that were less damaging to the seabed.\(^4\) The Dutch Royal association 'The Frisian Horses Pedigree' in 2008 asserted that its stallions breeding quota system was exempted from the cartel law, for it served the public interest of conserving the Frisian pedigree by preventing inbreeding.\(^5\) Pig farmers in 2009 alleged they needed a sector-wide agreement

\(^1\)Werden (2014). See also Adler (2004), in which it is argued that antitrust interventions in the California sardine fishery led to over-fishing and environmental damage.

\(^2\)Article 101 TFEU.

\(^3\)Commission Decision, Case IV.F.1/36.718. \textit{CECED}, 24 January 1999. The exemption was given under paragraph 3 of Article 101 TFEU. It was shortly after stretched to include dishwashers and water heaters as well. See European Commission, Commission approves agreements to reduce energy consumption of dishwashers and water heaters, IP/01/1659, Brussels, 26 November 2001. The Commission gave no further exemptions on sustainability grounds since. Also, whereas the Commission's 2001 Guidelines on Horizontal Agreements contained a separate chapter on assessing environmental agreements for exemption under 81(3), the revised 2011 Guidelines mention environmental benefits only briefly in passing, as one example of standards in general. Several legal scholars, including Townley (2009) and Kingston (2011), nevertheless argue that the EU Treaties and case-law of the European courts allow, or even demand consideration of wider public interests. Note that although legally a horizontal agreement that is exempted under Article 101(3) is not a cartel, to be concise we refer in this paper to a horizontal agreement with anti-competitive effects in the meaning of Article 101\(^{1}\) as a 'cartel', 'cartel agreement' or 'collusion'.

\(^4\)NMa (2011). While the Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa), the ACM's predecessor before 1 April 2013, took a positive view towards the sustainability claims, the argument was unsuccessful.

\(^5\)NMa (2009), page 45. The authority asked the association to find less restrictive means to control inbreeding.
to ban the widespread practice of castrating piglets without anesthetics. Even though the Dutch competition agency initially was dismissive to these general interest claims, public pressure around the cases induced it to pioneer the exempting of cartel agreements aimed at improving sustainability.

In 2014, the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs obliged the Netherlands competition authority to weigh any claim of countervailing "sustainability benefits" under the Dutch equivalent of Article 101(3). In response, the agency published a vision document on how it would make such assessments. In keeping with the conditions in paragraph 3, it clarified the following conditions to qualify for a cartel exemption on public interest grounds: (i) the benefits must be objective and clearly visible; (ii) consumers must receive a fair share of the resulting benefits, i.e. minimally be compensated by them for the anti-competitive harm resulting from allowing the horizontal agreement, (iii) the restrictions must be indispensable to obtain the benefits, and (iv) sufficient residual competition must remain in the market in question. To mount a successful public interest defense, all four conditions would need to be fulfilled.

A primary case concerned an agreement between Dutch energy companies to close down five coal burning power plants, as part of the Dutch Energy Agreement for Sustainable Growth, a nation-wide contract to switch to green energy, initiated by the Ministry. The ACM gave an informal view that the closure of these plants, which accounted for approximately 10% of the Dutch generating capacity, would harm consumers by leading to higher energy prices. The environmental benefits for the Dutch consumers were deemed insufficient to compensate their harm from increased energy prices, in particular because the lower CO2 emissions the closure would bring about would be offset by higher emissions by other parties acquiring the closed plants’ emission allowances through the EU system of emissions trading (ETS).

Another informal view, the agency gave in the 'Chicken of Tomorrow' case. It involved poultry farmers, broiler meat processors and Dutch supermarkets, who responded to a public outcry against the poor living conditions of chicken in factory farms - referred to by an animal rights organization as ‘exploding chicken’ ("plofkip") - by making arrangements to sell chicken meat produced under enhanced animal welfare-friendly conditions. Among other things, supermarkets agreed to remove regular chicken meat from their shelves. The ACM concluded from questionnaires that although consumers' willingness to pay for more sustainable chicken meat was 0.82 euro/kilo on average, on

\footnotesize{6}NMa (2009). The NMa allowed this agreement on animal welfare grounds, provided that painless castration would not be obligatory.
\footnotesize{7}ACM (2013b).
\footnotesize{8}Besluit van de Minister van Economische Zaken van 6 mei 2014, nr. WJZ / 14052830, houdende beleidsregel inzake de toepassing door de Autoriteit Consument en Markt van artikel 6, derde lid, van de Mededingingswet bij mededingingsbeperkende afspraken die zijn gemaakt ten behoeve van duurzaamheid (in Dutch). In Article 2 (our translation): "[T]he ACM considers in its assessment of the conditions whether [...] in agreements that restrict competition made in order to promote sustainability, a fair share of the improvements benefits "users" in the long run."
\footnotesize{9}ACM (2014).
\footnotesize{10}See SER (2013).
\footnotesize{11}See ACM (2013a) and Kloosterhuis & Mulder (2015).}
balance with a 1.46 euro/kilo price rise consumers would not benefit from the initiative.  

Cartel coordination may in theory reduce negative externalities and improve upon the classic under-provision of public goods in unregulated economies that is the result of free-riding. A reduction in output alone may take away negative externalities, such as industrial pollution, or ease a commons problem, like over-fishing. Arguably also the industries concerned will have superior knowledge and special skills to actively promote public interests in their sectors through self-regulation. They would know best air pollution control systems, cradle-to-cradle designs or humane farm animal care, as well as any latent willingness to pay with consumers for more socially responsible and sustainable production, such as green energy or fair trade products. Private companies may therefore be the most efficient producers also of certain public interest.  

However, allowing a public interest-defense for cartel offenses raises some immediate concerns. While corporations may want to be seen taking social responsibility, the actual effects thereof need not exceed what suffices for self-promotion. It is by no means clear that allowing collusion indeed creates private incentive to promote sustainability sufficiently, even when consumers do have a willingness to pay for it. Furthermore, consumers cannot be expected to appraise in their private consumption all wider possible public interest benefits, such improvements in public health from a reduced use of antibiotics in meat production, that slow down the build-up of resistance against antibiotics. Also, many general interests are not tied to private consumption and so require independent provision.  

Moreover, horizontal agreements are known to carry direct and indirect risks of collusion, including higher prices and lower quality of product and variety. Many, if not most public interest benefits

\[12\] See ACM (2015). Formally, an individual’s willingness to pay for a public good is defined as the amount of expenditures the individual is willing to give up for one additional unit of the public good, keeping utility constant, see Batina (1990). The ACM asked consumers to compare two discretely different market situations, one with and one without the exploding chicken on offer in supermarkets, thus including a collective switch to more animal friendly chicken meat production for the Dutch market. In this paper, we will also use the term ‘willingness to pay’ in a more loose manner. We return to measuring it briefly in Section 4.

\[13\] Crane (2005) argues that United States Tobacco’s monopolization attempts of the snuff tobacco market increased welfare through health improvements and health-care costs savings from lower tobacco consumption.

\[14\] Coase (1974) claimed that lighthouses, which Paul Samuelson had made a textbook example of services that could only be provided by the government, were in fact in late 19th century Britain efficiently built and operated by private individuals that were granted the right by the government to levy tolls on passing ships calling at British ports. While Coase’s lighthouse case has been criticized as a pure example of efficient private production of a public good because of the government backing, a cartel exemption would be comparable. However, as Bertrand (2006) documents, the statutory authority at the time, Trinity House, also imposed strict quality requirements for the building, maintenance and operation of lighthouses, while excludability from port services enforced the levying of the tolls. Also, several privately owned lighthouses needed to be taken over by the authority when their proper service was neglected.

\[15\] See Delmas & Montes-Sancho (2010).

\[16\] Schinkel & Spiegel (2015) shows that when consumers value sustainable products and firms choose investments in sustainability before choosing output or prices, coordination of output choices or prices boosts investments in sustainability and may even enhance consumer surplus, whereas coordination of investments in sustainability directly hinders investments and harms consumers. A production cartel can improve consumer welfare only when products are sufficiently close substitutes and the marginal cost of sustainability investment is relatively low, or the sustainability benefits are lower than the harm from reduced output. If a production cartel is required to compensate consumers, investments in sustainability are reduced below the competitive level.

\[17\] See Duso et al. (2013), which reports that networks between competitors participating in R&D joint ventures in the US are conducive to collusion.
are hard to quantify as a mitigating factor. Sustainability appears to be sufficiently widely interpretable a concept to invite overly rosy contribution claims. Objectionable cartels may misuse the policy in an attempt to get away with hard core collusion under the guise of sustainability, or some other public interest. The policy burdens antitrust agencies with a complex monitoring and balancing task. Agencies will find it difficult to assess cartel contribution claims on their merits, in ex ante notifications such as the coal and chicken cases that the Dutch authority considered, and certainly also ex post, after the discovery of a cartel in operation when the defense would also be available. As a result, opening up the public interest-defense can undermine deterrence.

Nevertheless, the antitrust balancing of cartel damages against cartel-specific public interest benefits is the law now, and so it is worthwhile to examine it. Suppose indeed that particular public interest contributions can and will only be had by a horizontal industry-wide agreement, objectively and measurable. Consider a public interest-cartel that applies linear commodity pricing. Abstract also from simple direct volume reduction effects from collusive price increases of consumption goods that generate negative externalities, which are not central to our leading cases. Instead, restrict public interests to public goods, which are non-excludable and non-rivalrous, as in our leading examples: no individual can be excluded from feeling better about an improved seabed, biodiversity in horses, public health or animal well-being, nor does anyone’s enjoyment thereof take away from someone else’s.

The policy then amounts to government mandating an industry to collude to impose a unit tax on the private consumption good it produces, provided that part of the proceeds are contributed to the production of a public good that compensates the consumers of the private good for the harm caused by the cartel price overcharge.\(^{18}\)

Samuelson (1954) determined that the efficient level of public good provision is where sum of the marginal rates of substitution of all individuals is equal to the economy’s marginal rate of transformation between the public good and an arbitrarily chosen private good. Without coordination, public goods will be under-provided. Lindahl (1958) suggested individuals be taxed personalized prices, so as to contribute their marginal utility from the consumption of the optimal level of the public good, times that level. In practice, it is complex to implement optimal public goods production, as it requires private information about preferences that people would have an incentive not to reveal, and taxes are distortive. Even though incentive-compatible implementation schemes do exist, government policy can only be second-best.\(^{19}\) Optimal taxation theory seeks to design tax-subsidy schemes for financing public goods that achieve efficiency without specific knowledge about the individual preferences, including by targeting revealed consumption patterns.\(^{20}\)

\(^{18}\)Note that, while we focus on horizontal agreements, the basic trade-off analysis applies equally to abuse of dominance and merger control with public interest gains as well. In merger cases, there is a longer tradition in weighing in public interests, in particular also in developing countries, see Capobianco & Nagy (2016) and Reader (2016). The South African competition agency dealt with general interests in a number of abuse of dominance cases, see Buthelezi & Njisane (2016).


\(^{20}\)See Boadway & Keen (1993) on the use of observables, including revealed preferences and self-selection, to determine who to tax what for which type of public good.
In this paper, we examine the trade-off between the cartel’s public interest benefits against a unit price overcharge, using a standard public economics model with private consumption and voluntary public goods contributions. Heterogeneous individuals spend their endowment on a private good, a public good, and a composite commodity. Depending on relative preferences and the wealth distribution, no, some or all consumers of the private good also contribute to the public good. The cartel price rise has various substitution and income effects. These in turn generate crowding-out effects, as individuals free-ride on the public good contributions by others. Additionally, the public interest-cartel’s compensating contribution further crowds out private contributions. Improvements in the energy efficiency of appliances can be offset by lax morals in their use. In response to a substantial reduction by industry in emissions, households may reduce their own efforts, for example in separating waste materials. In Chicken of Tomorrow, in response to improved living conditions for chicken overall, some consumers would switch from buying high-end free range chicken to a generic biological brand.

The European Commission’s guidelines explain that allowing ‘consumers a fair share’ is the pass-on of benefits that "at least compensate consumers for any actual or likely negative impact caused on them by the restriction of competition." That is, "the net effect of the agreement must at least be neutral from the point of view of those consumers directly or indirectly affected by the agreement." Further, it is stated that: "The decisive factor is the overall impact on consumers of the products within the relevant market and not the impact on individual members of this group of consumers." While it is clear that the public interest to be promoted by the cartel needs to benefit consumers - and not, for example in the cases about animal well-being, animals directly - no further guidance is offered on how to interpret "consumers" as a group. From case law, it becomes clear that "the average consumer" is meant. Excluding the Pareto-criterion that each and every individual consumer in the relevant market would minimally need to be compensated widens the space for the policy, as it avoids that a single individual with no willingness to pay for the public good blocks any public interest-cartel. Yet, it implies interpersonal utility comparisons, which require a cardinal utility measure. As a result, there is no unambiguous welfare measure to implement the policy. In addition, it does not compensate consumers with a lower than average valuation for the required public good contribution, which can be many.

A public interest-cartel is sustainable only if it can pay for the required compensating public good level from its price overcharge proceeds. Using the sum of generally weighted utility functions as

\footnote{European Commission [2004], recital 85.}

\footnote{European Commission [2004], recital 87. The grounds for excluding the Pareto-criterion are in Case T-131/99, Shaw, 21 March 2002, in which the Court of First Instance ruled that compensation (of a group of tied lessees) has to be assessed "within the same analytical framework, that of the effect of the notified agreements on the functioning of the market, and hence on the situation of the tied lessees taken as a whole, not on each lessee considered in isolation." That not every individual consumer needs to be compensated individually was confirmed by the European Court of Justice in Case C-338/05, Asnef-Equifax, 23 November 2006, recitals 68-70.}

\footnote{In Shaw, recital 163 the Court of First Instance explained that: "it is not material that the benefits produced by the notified agreements do not entirely compensate the price differential suffered by a particular tied lessee if the average lessee does enjoy that compensation and it is therefore such as to produce an effect on the market generally."}
a welfare function, we find that a public interest-cartel is not sustainable beyond a critical mass of consumers who combine a preference for private consumption with a low willingness to pay for the public good. The size of this mass depends on the utility measure. The individuals that will be the hardest to compensate with a cartel contribution to the public good for a cartel price increase are those who consume a lot of the private good and also value the public good little. Their exposure to damage from even a small cartel price increase is large, and they require a lot of public good contribution by the industry to offset it. Also, to the extent that they did contribute to the public good in the competitive equilibrium, consumers will respond with relatively large reductions, possibly to zero, and so crowed out the cartel provision.

The public interest-defense policy in essence asks exactly those individuals who have self-selected themselves, through their private good consumption, as types with a relatively low willingness to pay for the public good types, to pay most for the provision of a compensating public good that they value least. As a result, in most economies the industry cannot afford the required compensation from the cartel proceeds. Only in quite special circumstances, in which sufficiently many consumers have a relative willingness to pay for the private and the public good that stays constant within narrow bounds, may a sustainable public interest-defense exist. In addition, the information requirements for a competition agency to identify a genuine public interest-defense it can award are prohibitively large, even if the Pareto-criterion for compensation would apply.

Our analysis builds on a literature that studies how tax financed government provision of the public good is (partly) neutralized by individual reductions in their voluntary private contributions. Pareto improvements can be obtained through commodity taxation in such economies, and efficiency in public good provision via lump-sum taxation. However, if consumers anticipate that the government will use the tax revenue to finance purchases of the public good, they adjust their own public good spendings. Bergstrom et al. (1986) show that for income redistributions smaller than the initial individual voluntary contributions to the public good, crowding out of government spending on the public good by lump sum taxation is full. Bernheim (1986) establishes a similar neutrality result for distortionary commodity taxation as well, when allowing negative private contributions to the public good, and provided that taxes do not exceed private contributions in the prior equilibrium. Only with larger taxes and subsidies, and therefore certainly by taxing non-contributors, can government actually improve welfare by levying taxes to finance public goods in these models. Andreoni & Bergstrom (1996) point out that local neutrality depends crucially on the structure of the game. If the government commits to no change in taxes and balances the budget by adjusting its contribution to the public good, consumers can keep their private consumption constant, no matter what the other consumers do, and off-set the policy. In different setups, including one-shot public goods games, that do not allow consumers to see through the veil of distortionary taxes, government can unambiguously increase total contributions.24

Closest to our application, the public goods model with private contributions has been used to

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24See Broadway et al. (1989).
study the extent to which corporate social responsibility may contribute to public interests. Bagnoli & Watts (2003) show that firm contributions to a public good when consumers are socially responsible are positive and vary across market structures. Besley & Ghatak (2007) find that corporate social responsibility does not improve upon private voluntary contributions. Kotchen (2006) confirms that in "green markets", which offer bundled private and public goods, company contributions to more sustainable production are neutralized by reduced consumer donations. Only in sufficiently large economies can green technology increase the general level of provision, despite crowding out all private provision of the associated environmental public good.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formalize the trade-off involved in compensating consumers for price increases in the private good industry by firm-provided public goods. In Section 3, we use a simple example to examine what scope of welfare-enhancing policies exists. In Section 4 we discuss alternative welfare measures to the policy. In Section 5 we conclude on some policy implications and extensions. Derivations are provided in an appendix.

2 Public Goods Provision by a Private Cartel

2.1 A Model of Private Consumption and Public Good Contributions

Consider an economy with \( n \) individuals. Each individual \( i \) has a choice between consuming a private good \( x_i \) that is produced by an industry that is considered for a public interest-cartel exemption, a composite commodity \( y_i \), representing all other consumption of goods supplied on markets that are unchanged, and making a private contribution \( g_i \) to the total public good spend

\[
G = \sum_{i=1}^{n} g_i + g_N + g_F,
\]

in which \( g_N \geq 0 \) is the initial provision of the public good by nature or government and \( g_F \geq 0 \) is the joint contribution by the firm producing the private good \( x \). The total \( G \) constitutes the public good: enjoying its value is non-excludable and non-rivalrous. If the public good is clean air, private contributions can be investments in the installation of solar panels, soot filters on cars or a more sustainable consumption pattern. In the following, we denote by \( G_{-i} \) the amount of public good contributions by other individuals than individual \( i \). For simplicity, we assume that the private consumption goods do not generate production externalities, so that the public interest is measured entirely by \( G \) and volume effects from the cartel price increase do not themselves serve a public interest.\(^{25}\)

\(^{25}\)As they do in some of the examples mentioned in the introduction, such as over-fishing in Adler (2001) and tobacco smoking in Crane (2005). Note that it may as well be that the production of substitutes to the cartelized good, i.e. of products in \( y_i \), has offsetting negative externalities that we also ignore with this assumption.
Individual $i$’s preferences are represented by utility function $U_i(x_i, y_i, G)$, which satisfies standard conditions: $U_i$ is twice continuously differentiable and increasing in each argument, and marginal utilities of consumption are positive and decreasing in each argument.\(^{26}\) Prices are $(p_x, 1, p_g)$, in which the price of the composite commodity is normalized to one and $p_g$ can be thought of as the cost of producing the public good from contributions. Individual $i$ decides on how he optimally allocates his wealth endowment $w_i$ over private consumption and contributing to the public good as follows:

$$\max_{g_i, x_i, y_i} U_i(x_i, y_i, G),$$

s.t. $p_x x_i + y_i + p_g g_i \leq w_i$,

$$g_i \geq 0.$$

It suffices to offer a partial equilibrium analysis to capture the main effects at play. Note that the optimal individual contribution to the public good may well be zero or negative, in particular when there is already a high initial provision of the public good by nature. If the air was pure and pollution-free, it would be unlikely that people invested into making it even cleaner. Similarly, low wealth endowments or simply a low preference for the public good can prevent individuals from spending their own resources on it. Substantial individual diminutions of the public good are not natural to our concerns: while individual consumers may for example, in the knowledge that others invest in clean air, increase their own emissions somewhat, it is not obvious how to convert such choices into cash. We therefore constrain the individual contributions to be non-negative.

### 2.2 Competitive Equilibrium

In the competition benchmark equilibrium, the firm’s provision is zero by construction, i.e. $g_F = 0$. Rewriting individual utility as

$$U_i(x_i, y_i, G) = U_i\left(\frac{w_i - y_i - p_g g_i}{p_x}, y_i, g_i + G - i + g_N\right),$$

the first-order conditions readily become

$$\frac{\partial U_i(\cdot)}{\partial G} (1 + \frac{dG}{dg_i}) - \frac{\partial U_i(\cdot)}{\partial x_i} p_x = 0,$$

\(^{26}\)For analytical convenience, it is assumed that $U_i$ satisfies: $\lim_{z \to 0^+} \frac{\partial U_i}{\partial z} = \infty$ and $\lim_{z \to \infty} \frac{\partial U_i}{\partial z} = 0$ for all $z \in \{G, x, y\}$. Note that while these assumptions on preferences ensure that $x_i > 0$ and $y_i > 0$ in the optimum, it may still be optimal for the consumer to want to purchase negative amounts of the public good if his total public goods consumption remains positive thanks to contributions from other sources. For this reason, it is assumed that $g_i \geq 0$. It is often binding amounting to important corner solutions.
\[- \frac{1}{p_x} \frac{\partial U_i(\cdot)}{\partial x_i} + \frac{\partial U_i(\cdot)}{\partial y_i} = 0, \quad (2)\]
in which conjectural variation \( \frac{dG^e_{i}}{dg_{i}} \) is individual \( i \)'s expectation about the change in the contribution to the public good purchases by other sources as a consequence of the change in the size of his own contribution.

Conditions (1) and (2) determine individual \( i \)'s optimal purchase bundle \((x^*_i, y^*_i, g^*_i)\), and so jointly \( G^* = \sum_{i=1}^{n} g^*_i + g_N \). While individuals are price takers, they react to each others' behavior because of the presence of the public good. Note that condition (1) is relevant only for non-binding levels of the public good \( g_i > 0 \), in which case individual \( i \) is a contributor to the public good. Should the resulting purchase bundle include negative levels of \( g^*_i \), the only relevant condition is (2) together with \( g^*_i = 0 \), and the individual is a non-contributor. An individual is more likely to be a contributor if his wealth is sufficiently high, public good contributions from other sources are low, if he gains more utility from the public good as compared to the other goods, or if the prices of the other goods are high. Some combination of these conditions is required to overcome his incentive to fully free-ride on the public good provided by others.

Consistently assuming that everybody takes the contributions of others as given when optimizing, i.e. conjectural variations \( \frac{dG^e_{i}}{dg_{i}} = 0 \) for all \( i \), that all the goods are normal goods and that there is a single-valued demand function for the public good, a competitive Nash equilibrium where each consumer plays his best-response strategy exists and has a unique quantity of the public good and unique sets of contributors and non-contributors.\(^{27}\) The structure of the utility functions assures that if \( g_N = 0 \) and there is no provision by firms either, at least some consumers will purchase the public good. In fact, if \( G = 0 \), every consumer has an incentive to invest in the public good. For positive initial levels of public good \((g_N > 0)\), it can be that no individual privately contributes. In any event, in the competitive equilibrium there is under-provision of the public good.\(^{28}\)

In equilibrium, individual \( i \)'s indirect utility is given by

\[
V^*_i(p_x, p_g, W, g_N) = U_i \left( \frac{w_i - y^*_i(\cdot) - p_g g^*_i(\cdot)}{p_x}, y^*_i(\cdot), g^*_i(\cdot) + G^*_{-i}(\cdot) + g_N \right), \quad (3)
\]
in which \( W \) is a vector of the wealths of all consumers, which are all relevant through the determination of \( G^* \).

\(^{27}\)The existence proof is analogous to that in Bergstrom et al. (1986), with the only additional aspect being the composite commodity \( y_i \) which does not affect the proof materially.

\(^{28}\)See Bergstrom et al. (1986).


2.3 Cartel Provision of the Public Good

The public-interest justification for a cartel offense amounts to allowing the industry a price increase $p^c_x > p_x$, in exchange for the industry contributing to the public good, $g_F > 0$. The price increase may just cover the cost of the public good contribution, but can also fall short of that or exceed it. Assuming that prices otherwise remain unchanged, the partial comparative statics analysis is of the two unique Nash equilibria to the two policy options: $(p_x, g_F = 0)$ versus $(p^c_x > p_x, g_F > 0)$. The public good is sufficiently widely appreciated so that at least all consumers in the cartelized market have it as an argument in their utility functions. Since we are considering cartel agreements that would be legal if exempted, we can ignore issues of cartel stability by assuming the agreements are contractable if necessary.

In principle, cartel provision of the public good has the potential to improve upon the under-provision in competitive equilibrium and therefore compensate the price increase. The extent to which it can depend on the interplay of several substitution effects. In response to the cartel price increase of $x_i$, three things will happen. First, consumers will substitute away from the cartelized private good, either to the composite commodity or by making a larger public good donation, or both. These substitution effects mitigate their individual harm from the price increase directly, and larger contributions to the public good also benefit others. Second, the increase in $p_x$ has negative real income effects, which reduce the consumption of $x_i$, $y_i$, and $g_i$, which are all assumed to be normal goods. Third, there may be crowding out effects with contributors, as increases in $G_i$ may induce lower own contributions, including stopping to contribute at all. Non-contributors enjoy the increased level of public good provided, and in border cases can be induced by the increase in $p_x$ to start purchasing the public good. Generally, however, the substitution effect towards the public good are at least partially offset by the income and crowding out effects. In addition, the industry’s compensation contribution $g_F > 0$ will further crowd out private contributions to the public good and increase the demand for the private and composite commodity in the collusive equilibrium.

On balance, the net utility change for individual $i$ from allowing a public-interest cartel is

$$\Delta U_i = V^*_i(p^c_x, p_y, W, g_N + g_F) - V^*_i(p_x, p_y, W, g_N),$$

$^{29}$We restrict analysis to unit price overcharges. Note that if the cartel would apply nonlinear pricing, the fixed price components would be comparable to lump sum taxation, while also demanding compensation as a cartel damage. Since the neutrality result of Bergstrom et al. (1986) applies to the fixed fee part, so that compensation is ever more expensive, it is unlikely that a cartel would opt for non-linear pricing in the context of a public interest-defense.

$^{30}$With respect to the composite commodity and the cost of producing the public good, ignoring general equilibrium price effects can be interpreted as the market for the private good being small relative to the rest of the economy. With respect to the relevant market for the private good, it is less innocuous. In particular would the decrease in the demand for the private good resulting from the cartel price increase in general equilibrium decrease $p_x$, so that it depends on the model specifications whether the net effect on the price of the private good will indeed be positive, and compensation be required. This demand effect is second-order, however, and countenanced by the crowding-out effect. Typically, a cartel will raise prices above competitive levels and the various effects identified in the text apply. As we seek to characterize a welfare status quo, we need not account for any surplus cartel profit net of compensation.
which increases in $g_F$. Interpreting the compensation requirement to mean that the consumers of the private good are to be compensated on average, assuming a cardinal comparison and weighing all individuals alike, in linear approximation, it is

$$
(p^c_x - p_x) \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{-\partial U_i(x^*_i(\cdot), y^*_i(\cdot), G^*(\cdot))}{\partial p_x} \leq g_F \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{\partial U_i(x^*_i(\cdot), y^*_i(\cdot), G^*(\cdot))}{\partial g_F},
$$

(4)

since all consumers will consume a positive amount of the private good. The competition authority’s task would be to identify the level of public good $\hat{g}_F$ such that condition (4) is satisfied as equality, and only accept the public interest-defense if the level of the public good actually provided by the firms is at least $\hat{g}_F$. As firms have no incentive to contribute more than minimally required, compensation condition (4) will be binding with equality.

Even with a welfare function assumed, the information requirements for a competition agency to assess whether or not to approve the anti-competitive conduct on the public interest grounds seem prohibitively large, as they include perfect information of all individuals’ preference structures. Note also that the individuals that are hardest to compensate, i.e. that need the highest cartel contribution to the public good to offset their utility loss from the cartel price increase, need not be those who have suffered the most harm by the price increase. There may well be a group of consumers in the economy that derive too little utility from $G$ to be compensated effectively, even if they have not suffered much damage from the price increase at all. In this respect, public good compensation is very different from monetary compensation, which will never need to go above making the old bundle affordable. In compensations via public interests, that is, there is no effective upper limit on how much of the public good is needed to compensate everyone, individually or on average. The choice set of each individual is affected, as no one can choose to consume less public good than $G^{*\text{lower}} + g_n$. The public interest compensation scheme thus proves to be both cumbersome and potentially costly, quite possibly too costly to be financed from the cartel price overcharge on the private good.

In the following, the examine the implicit definition of $\hat{g}_F$ in more detail to see what space for a public interest-defense may be. With $n$ individuals in the economy, there are $4^n$ combinations of each of them contributing or not contributing to the public good before and after allowing a public interest-cartel, all with different consumer harms and benefits. We restrict attention to analyses of an economy with no contributors to the public good in Section 2.3.1, and the case where some (possibly all) individuals are contributors in Section 2.3.2. In Section 2.4 we turn to the issue of the cost of compensating.

31 Note that while the term $\frac{\partial U_i(x^*_i(\cdot), y^*_i(\cdot), G^*(\cdot))}{\partial p_x}$ in (4) for many will be negative, it may be positive for individuals who care little for the private consumption good, yet benefit from other people’s substitution effects toward the public good.
2.3.1 An Economy with No Private Contributions

If \( g_N \) is high enough, no individual contributes to the public good in either of the periods and \( g^*_i(\cdot) = \frac{\partial g^*_i(\cdot)}{\partial p_x} = \frac{\partial G^*_i(\cdot)}{\partial p_x} = 0 \). The equilibrium purchases of each consumer depend only on own wealth and prices of the private good and the composite commodity. The indirect utility function becomes \( V^*_i(p_x, p_g, w_i, g_N + g_F) \), since only the firms and nature provide the public good. The increase in \( p_x \) then causes a simpler marginal harm of

\[
\frac{\partial U_i(x^*_i(\cdot), y^*_i(\cdot), G^*(\cdot))}{\partial p_x} = \frac{\partial U_i(x_i, y_i, G)}{\partial x_i} \frac{1}{p_x^2} \left( \frac{\partial y^*_i(\cdot)}{\partial p_x} p_x + w_i - y^*_i(\cdot) \right) + \frac{\partial U_i(x_i, y_i, G)}{\partial y_i} \frac{\partial y^*_i(\cdot)}{\partial p_x} . \tag{5}
\]

From accompanying increases in \( g_F \), individual \( i \) gains a straightforward marginal benefit of

\[
\frac{\partial U_i(x^*_i(\cdot), y^*_i(\cdot), G^*(\cdot))}{\partial g_F} = \frac{\partial U_i(x_i, y_i, G)}{\partial G} .
\]

The utility losses will be distributed unevenly. Unsurprisingly, those who like the private good the most will suffer the highest utility decline. Moreover, wealthy consumers are damaged more. This damage is, however, partially mitigated by the possibility to substitute towards the composite commodity.

Compensation condition (4) for a discrete price change for which all individuals remain non-contributors becomes

\[
-(p^c_x - p_x) \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left( \frac{\partial U_i(x_i, y_i, G)}{\partial x_i} \frac{1}{p_x^2} \left( \frac{\partial y^*_i(\cdot)}{\partial p_x} p_x + w_i - y^*_i(\cdot) \right) + \frac{\partial U_i(x_i, y_i, G)}{\partial y_i} \frac{\partial y^*_i(\cdot)}{\partial p_x} \right) = g_F \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{\partial U_i(x_i, y_i, G)}{\partial G} , \tag{6}
\]

which implicitly defines \( \hat{g}_F > 0 \).

Note that while it may appear at first glance that in an economy with only non-contributors apparently there is no willingness to pay for more public good than the status quo, and so that by revealed preference it would be impossible to compensate an increase of the price of the private good, this is not necessarily so. There may well be under-provision of the public good in the competitive non-contributors equilibrium that coordination can improve upon. If a sufficiently large proportion of individuals has a high enough willingness to pay for the public good, even though apparently too low to contribute, it can still be possible to compensate consumers on average. For a discrete rise in the price of the private good, in fact some consumers may substitute towards contributing, raising the well-being of everybody.
2.3.2 An Economy with Contributors

In an economy with contributors, there obviously is a willingness to pay for the public good. The change in a contributing consumer $i$’s equilibrium utility brought about by a small increment in $p_x$ then becomes \(^{32}\)

$$\frac{\partial U_i(x_i^*, y_i^*, G^*)}{\partial p_x} = \frac{\partial U_i(x_i, y_i, G)}{\partial x_i} \left( \frac{\partial y_i^*}{\partial p_x} + p_g \frac{\partial g_i^*}{\partial p_x} \right) p_x + w_i - y_i^* - p_g g_i^* + \frac{\partial U_i(x_i, y_i, G)}{\partial y_i} \left( \frac{\partial g_i^*}{\partial p_x} + \frac{\partial G_{-i}^*}{\partial p_x} \right). \tag{7}$$

Individual $i$’s marginal equilibrium utility gain from firm provision of the public good is

$$\frac{\partial U_i(x_i^*, y_i^*, G^*)}{\partial g_F} = \frac{\partial U_i(x_i, y_i, G)}{\partial G} \left( \frac{\partial g_i^*}{\partial g_F} + \frac{\partial G_{-i}^*}{\partial g_F} \right) + \frac{\partial U_i(x_i, y_i, G)}{\partial x_i} \left( \frac{\partial y_i^*}{\partial g_F} - p_g \frac{\partial g_i^*}{\partial g_F} \right) + \frac{\partial U_i(x_i, y_i, G)}{\partial y_i} \frac{\partial y_i^*}{\partial g_F}, \tag{8}$$

where the set of arguments (.) are the terms exogenous to the individual, i.e. $(p_x, p_g, W_i, g_N + g_F)$. Substituting (7) and (8) into (4) holding with equality yields an implicit function of $g_F > 0$ that is long and unwieldy.

It should be more easy to compensate individuals that are already contributing to the public good. In fact, some individuals may actually gain utility if the price of the private good increases, from increases in the public good contributions by others as they substitute away from the private good. This is reflected in the term $\frac{\partial G_{-i}^*}{\partial p_F}$ in (7), which is non-negative and effectively represents a mitigation of consumers’ harm. With changes in the price of the private good, there can also be new contributors emerging. Since the private good price increase and the industry’s compensating public good provision occur simultaneously, some individuals may benefit from both. However, there will always be contributing consumers in the economy harmed by the price increase as well. In addition, among contributors the term $\frac{\partial G_{-i}^*}{\partial y_F}$ in (8) is non-positive, so that there is crowding out of their private contributions by the cartel provision. Some contributors may even become non-contributors in response to the cartel’s contribution. The crowding out need not be complete, however, and the marginal benefit from the cartel’s public good provision is always positive.

\(^{32}\)Recall that $U_i(x_i^*, y_i^*, G^*) = U_i(x_i - y_i^*(p_x, p_g, W_i, g_N) - p_g g_i^*(p_x, p_g, W_i, g_N), y_i^*(p_x, p_g, W_i, g_N), g_i^*(p_x, p_g, W_i, g_N) + G_{-i}^*(p_x, p_g, W_i, g_N))$. 

\[14\]
### 2.4 Sustainability of a Compensating Cartel

While it is possible to compensate consumers for a cartel price rise through the public good, it is not obvious that the required compensation can be paid for out of the cartel profits. The individuals that will be the hardest to compensate with a cartel contribution to the public good for a cartel price increase are those who consume a lot of the private good, have a small substitution and income effect for it towards the rest of the economy, and also value the public good little. Their exposure to damage from even a small cartel price increase is large, and they require a lot of public good contribution by the industry to offset it. Also, to the extent that they did contribute to the public good in the competitive equilibrium, they will respond with a relatively large reduction, possibly to zero. Naturally, a relative preference for the private good over the public good manifests itself in a lot of private good consumption and little private contribution to the public good. Hence, the public interest-defense policy in fact asks exactly those individuals who have self-selected themselves, through their private good consumption, as relatively low willingness to pay for the public good types, to pay most for the provision of a compensating public good that they value least. The industry may therefore not be able to afford the required compensation: if the cartel attempted to increase revenues in order to pay for its compensation requirement with higher prices, an even larger compensating contribution would be required.

In order for the compensation scheme to be incentive compatible for the cartel, each firm’s costs of contributing to the public good cannot exceed the extra profits it yields by the higher price. Assuming that the colluding firms have efficient means of splitting the cost of producing it, the industry’s incentive compatibility condition is

\[
p_g \hat{g}_F \leq \Pi(p^c_x, p_y, W, g_N + \hat{g}_F) - \Pi(p_x, p_y, W, g_N),
\]

where \(\Pi(.)\) are the joint profits of firms engaged in the collusive agreement and paying for the public good.\(^{33}\) Note that condition (9) will not generally hold with equality, for the cartel whenever possible will raise profits more than the cost of producing the compensating level of public good. Any surplus cartel profits net of compensation will increase welfare in an unspecified way, due to the partial equilibrium nature of the model. Arguable, the fourth condition of sufficient residual competition in the market remaining may imply that condition (9) does hold with equality, if any surplus profit would be competed away by the competitive fringe. However, enforcement of this condition appears to remain soft, if only because such competition would undermine the possibility for a (partial) cartel to provide

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\(^{33}\)Alternatively, we may ask if the cartel is able to pay for the required public good provision out of its price overcharge, that is whether \(p_g \hat{g}_F \leq (p^c_x - p_x) \sum_{i=1}^{n} x^c_i\), in which \(x^c_i\) is the level of consumption of the private good under the cartel regime. Holding with equality, this formulation is analogous to the balanced budget requirement in the taxation literature. It is equivalent to condition (9) in the case of perfect competition at constant marginal costs, which we will study closer in Section 4.
the public good altogether. In practice, any residual competition remaining would not be directly on the cartellized product.

For a public interest defense to pass, conditions (4) and (9) need to be satisfied simultaneously. Without further specification of the market structures generating \( p_x \) and \( p_c \), very little can be said about the circumstances under which (9) is satisfied. The next section analyses an example and shows that while there exist spaces in which sustainable public interest defenses exist, they are small in the set of all economies.

3 Sustainable Public Interest-Defenses

More structure on preferences and production is required for an explicit analysis of the scope for mounting a public interest-defense. Suppose preferences can be represented by well-behaved constant elasticity of substitution utility functions, that is, let the preferences of individual \( i \) be represented by

\[
U_i = a_i G^{1-\theta} + b_i x_i^{1-\theta} + c_i y_i^{1-\theta},
\]

in which \((a_i, b_i, c_i)\) are positive parameters expressing the relative strength of preferences for the public good, the private good \( x_i \) and the composite commodity \( y_i \), and \( \theta = 1/\rho \in (0, 1) \), satisfying the general conditions imposed in the previous section. The optimal private contribution to the public good is

\[
g_i = w_i - \frac{(p_x(b_i p_a) \rho + (c_i p_a) \rho)(G_{-i} + g_N)}{p_g + p_x(b_i p_a) \rho + (c_i p_a) \rho},
\]

so that consumer \( i \) is a contributor if and only if

\[
w_i > \left( p_x(b_i p_a) \rho + (c_i p_a) \rho \right) (G_{-i} + g_N),
\]

and \( g_i = 0 \) otherwise. A wealthy enough individual will contribute to the public good, and at lower wealth levels if \( a_i \) is high and \( g_N \) is low.

Considering the weighted sum of individual utilities, using weight \( \alpha_i \) for the utility of individual \( i \) - or its type - as a welfare function, we can assess the consequences of an increase in \( p_x \) and identify the compensating cartel contribution to the public good \( \hat{g}_F \). We assume a large number of identical firms producing good \( x \) at constant marginal costs \( c \) in perfect competition, that is, \( p_x = c \) and all firms make zero economic profits. The rest of the economy stays constant at a unit price. Denoting market demand for good \( x \) at price \( p_x \) as \( D_x(p_x) \), under the compensation requirement to produce \( \hat{g}_F \) collusion is profitable for the industry only if

\[
\Pi = (p_x^c - c)D_x(p_x^c, \hat{g}_F) - p_g \hat{g}_F(p_x^c, c) \geq 0,
\]
where the demand at price $p^e_2$ naturally depends also on the level of the industry-financed public good as it enters the consumer’s optimization problem. The cartel should be able to afford the public good requirement from its price overcharge or it would not form.

Figure 1 illustrates the problem of sustainability with the public interest-defense policy in an economy with two types of individuals. On the horizontal axis increases the cartel price from the competitive level $p_x = c = 1$. The vertical axis displays public good contributions, as well as cartel profits. The triangulated lines show both individuals’ private contributions to the public good in the absence of compensation, the circled lines when the cartel compensates. The upper lines belong to individual 1, who values both the private and the public good more than individual type 2 does, with a relatively larger increased valuation of the private good. When the price of the private good increases, individual 1 substitutes towards public good contributions to such an extent that he induces individual 2 to lower his contributions somewhat.

![Figure 1: No sustainable public interest-defense.](image)

The dashed line shows $\hat{g}_F^e$, the amount of public good required to compensate the consumers on average for each cartel price increase. Allowing a cartel with a compensation requirement leads both consumers to reduce their own voluntary contributions in response, on the balance of a substitution effect from the private good to the public good and the composite commodity, a negative income effect.

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Parameter values are: $\alpha_1 = \alpha_2 = 1$; $(a_1, b_1, c_1) = (8, 10, 1)$; $(a_2, b_2, c_2) = (1, 1, 1)$; $\theta = \frac{1}{3}$; $(w_1, w_2) = (10, 10)$; $g_N = 2$; $(p_x = c, p_y, p_g) = (1, 1, 1)$.
from the cartel price rise, and a crowding out effect from the cartel provided public good contribution. While both consumers just remain net contributors for the cartel prices displayed, they reduce their private contributions steeply, in particular individual 2, who likes the private good more. Eventually, individual 2 will become a non-contributor. Industry profit is given by the lower solid line: no price rise exists for which the cartel can actually afford the compensating public good level required. Even though both consumers have a revealed willingness to pay for the public good, no sustainable public interest-defense can be mounted.

This example captures that the policy targets consumers with a high consumption of the private good to pay for the public good, for which they will have a relatively low willingness to pay, while the cartel provision crowds out private contributions in addition. There are also specifications for which the cartel profit function, which is concave, is positive for some price range and identifies a unique viable optimal cartel strategy under the compensation requirement.\footnote{In the example in Figure 1, if we lower $g_N = 0.2$ and $b_1 = 8.5$, there is a positive profit maximum at price $p_x = -$ and both consumers stay contributors.} In the following, we study the set of parameters for which a sustainable public interest-defense is possible. Section 3.1 considers the case without private contributions to the public good, while in Section 3.2 there are private contributions.

In order to determine analytically whether $\hat{g}_F$ can be sustainably contributed by the cartel, we investigate for a marginal cartel overcharge the sign of $\left.\frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial p_x} \right|_{p_x = p^c}$, since if a positive deviation from the cost-price $p_x = c$ yields a positive profit, there naturally exists a price $p_x^c > p_x$ at which firms make profit and consumers are compensated, while if it does not, no sustainable compensation exists, given that utility functions are of the constant elasticity of substitution type. At $p_x = p_x^c = c$

$$\left.\frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial p_x} \right|_{p_x = p^c} = \left.\frac{\partial (p_x^c - p_x) \times D_x(p_x^c, \hat{g}_F)}{\partial p_x^c} \right|_{p_x^c = p_x} - \left.\frac{\partial p_g \hat{g}_F}{\partial p_x} \right|_{p_x^c = p_x} = D(p_x, \hat{g}_F) - \left.\frac{\partial p_g \hat{g}_F}{\partial p_x} \right|_{p_x^c = p_x},$$

since

$$\left.\frac{\partial (p_x^c - p_x) \times D_x(p_x^c, \hat{g}_F)}{\partial p_x^c} \right|_{p_x^c = p_x} = \left(\left.\frac{\partial (p_x^c - p_x)}{\partial p_x^c} \right|_{p_x^c = p_x}\right) D(p_x, \hat{g}_F) + (p_x - p_x) \left(\left.\frac{\partial D_x(p_x^c, \hat{g}_F)}{\partial p_x^c} \right|_{p_x^c = p_x}\right) = D(p_x, \hat{g}_F) + 0.$$
### 3.1 No-contributors Economy

Suppose condition (10) is not satisfied for each individual $i$, so that $g_i = 0$ for all $i$ and only $G = g_N + g_F$ enters into every individual’s utility. The compensating amount of public good then is

$$
g_F = \left( g_N^{1-\theta} + \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \alpha_i a_i} \left[ Z(c) - Z(p_F^c) \right] \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}} - g_N,
$$
in which

$$Z(p) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \alpha_i \left( b_i \left( \frac{w_i}{p + (\frac{g_F c}{b_i})^p} \right)^{1-\theta} + c_i \left( \frac{w_i}{1 + (\frac{b_i}{c p})^{p}} \right)^{1-\theta} \right),$$

for $p = c$ and $p = p^c$, respectively.

With both $D_x(p^c_F, g_F)$ and $p_g g_F$ fully characterized, using the fact that locally $p_g g_F |_{p^c = p^c_x} = 0$, we find that $\frac{d\Pi}{dp_c} |_{p^c = c} \geq 0$ for infinitesimal cartel price rises if and only if

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n} \alpha_i a_i \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{w_i}{c + (\frac{g_N c}{b_i})^p} \geq \frac{p^c_n}{c} g_N^{\theta} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \alpha_i b_i \left( \frac{w_i}{c + (\frac{g_N c}{b_i})^p} \right)^{1-\theta}. \tag{12}$$

This sustainability condition is insightful. Note that the right hand-side of (12) increases in both $p_g$, as producing the public good is more expensive, and $g_N$, reflecting that the willingness to pay for additional public goods provision decreases in the existing public good level. In fact, if $g_N$ is low enough, it will become possible to sustainably collude and compensate - yet it will also induce individuals to contribute privately for lower wealth levels by (10). Also, if a large proportion of consumers has a high willingness to pay for the public good, that is, if $a_i$ is large for sufficiently many (or heavily weighted) individuals, the left hand-side of (12) increases, making compensation more sustainable. In addition, the closer $\theta$ is to 0, the less constraining condition (12) is, reflecting that utility becomes near linear in all goods.

Figure 2 shows the space for a sustainable public-interest defense for a no-contributors economy with two types. Type 1’s preferences for the public and the private good are studied, relative to a fixed non-contributing type 2, at $I_2$. The cartel marginally increases the price from $p_c = c$. The dashed line marks the preferences for which type 1 will not contribute to the public good either, satisfying condition (10), so as to stay within the no-contributors economy. The solid line depicts condition (12). Together, the two lines mark a bandwidth in which the ratio of $a_1$ to $b_1$ should stay

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36Parameter values are: $\alpha_1 = \alpha_2; c_1 = 1; (a_2, b_2, c_2) = (1, 1, 1); \theta = \frac{1}{2}; (w_1, w_2) = (10, 10); g_N = 10; (p_x, p_g, p_y) = (1, 1, 1)$. 

19
for a public-interest defense to be sustainable in this economy. That is, type 1's preference weights for the public and the private good should jointly increase and not diverge much. While possibilities for compensation requires a sufficiently high value of $a_1$, relative to $b_1$, $a_1$ should not become too high, or type 1 becomes a contributor. If, on the other hand, $b_1$ increases above the solid line, type 1 prefers the private good to such an extent that he is damaged beyond possible compensation by allowing the cartel.

![Figure 2: Sustainable public interest-defense space in a no-contributors economy.](image)

The specific shape and location of the space of $\frac{a_1}{b_1}$ values for which a public interest-defense is sustainable depends on all other parameters of the economy, yet generally the relative willingnesses to pay for the private and public good should stay within narrow bounds.

### 3.2 Contributor Economies

In an economy in which at least some individuals are private contributors to the public good, the crowding out effect comes into play. Suppose condition (10) is satisfied for all individuals, by assuring they all have high enough wealth endowments. The level of public good in equilibrium then is
\[ G = \left( \frac{p_g(g_N + g_F) + \sum_{i=1}^{n} w_i}{p_g + \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left( p_x \left( \frac{b_i p_F}{a_i} \right)^\rho + \left( \frac{c_i p_D}{a_i} \right)^\rho \right)} \right), \quad (13) \]

in which the numerator is the total value of the endowment in the economy. Note that indeed, consistent with the findings in Bergstrom et al. (1986), reallocations of wealth have no effect on the total level of public goods in equilibrium.

The compensation cartel is sustainable in an all-contributor economy for an infinitesimal cartel price rise if and only if

\[ \sum_{i \neq j} \left( \alpha_j a_j \left( \frac{b_i}{a_i} \right)^\rho + \alpha_i a_i \left( \frac{b_j}{a_j} \right)^\rho \right) \geq p_g^{\rho - 1} \sum_{i,j} \alpha_j a_j - \alpha_i a_i \frac{a_j^\rho}{a_i^\rho} \left( (b_j c_i)^\rho - (b_i c_j)^\rho \right), \quad (14) \]

in which \( \sum_{i \neq j} \) is the sum over all unique pair of two different individuals \((i,j)\) in the total of \(n\) consumers.

Sustainability condition (14) depends critically on the relationships between the willingness of individuals to pay for the private, the public and the composite commodity. Note that it does not depend on prices, apart from \(p_g\), the price of the public good, for which, since \(\rho > 1\), it naturally holds that the more expensive it is to compensate consumers, the harder it is to do so from the cartel proceeds. Given welfare weights, since the left-hand side of condition (14) is positive and the right-hand side is a subtraction, note that condition (14) can be satisfied for a wide variety of parameter values. What matters is the ‘distance’ in preferences between pairs of individuals, in all three goods. Certainly, supposing all individuals receive the same weight (i.e. if \(\alpha_i = \alpha_j\) for all \((i,j)\)), if everybody values the public good equally (i.e. if \(a_i = a_j\) for all \((i,j)\)), it will always be possible to compensate all consumers in a contributor economy profitably. The same is true if all individuals value both the public good and the composite commodity equally (i.e. if \(b_i = b_j\) and \(c_i = c_j\) for all \((i,j)\)). In both cases, the right-hand side of condition (14) is zero.

Around these limit identity cases is a range of different preference structures for which compensation is possible as well, as long as consumers are sufficiently homogeneous in their valuation of the three goods in society. If the private willingnesses to pay for the public good \(a_i\) are far apart between pairs of individuals, the right-hand side of condition (14) will be larger and compensation not sustainable, unless the combined willingnesses to pay for the private goods \(x\) and \(y\) are very close, so that the last part of the right-hand side of the condition goes to zero. The cross-multiplications there of \(b_i\) and \(c_j\) reflect the fact that cartel damage is mitigated by substitution towards the composite commodity when \(p_x\) rises.

Figure 3 is an all-contributors economy with two types, induced by a lower level of \(g_N\) in otherwise
the same example as above.\footnote{Parameter values are: $\alpha_1 = \alpha_2$; $c_1 = 1$; $(a_2, b_2, c_2) = (1, 1, 1)$; $\theta = \frac{1}{3}$; $(w_1, w_2) = (10, 10)$; $g_N = 2$; $(p_x, p_y, p_g) = (1, 1, 1)$.} The region in which both types contribute, between the dashed lines, again has the property that the ratio $\frac{a}{b_1}$ stays relatively constant. Given that $\frac{a_2}{b_2} = 1$, if individuals are more different than quite alike in their preferences, it will not be possible to mount a sustainable public interest-defense. In the upper-left region, type 1 has insufficient liking of the public good to contribute, whereas in the lower-right region his contribution is so large that it crowds out type 2's. Compensation is sustainable within the region between the solid lines, by which $(a_1, b_1)$ are bounded away from zero and cannot be too high. Compensation is in principle possible close to the vertical axis, as long as type 1 is sufficiently wealthy, where the cartel would make sufficient profit on his large consumption of the private good. To the lower-right, type 1 likes the public good enough to be easy to compensate. The upper-limit on sustainability bounds the parameter space in which compensation is sustainable in an all-contributors economy, relative to the importance of the rest of the economy.

![Figure 3: Sustainable public interest-defense space in an all-contributors economy.](image)

The location of the sustainability upper-bound depends on the relative importance of the composite commodity in individual preferences: if it is sizable, compared to the private-public good trade-off, the parameter space is bounded as in Figure 3. Certain higher $(a_1, b_1)$ combinations then cannot benefit from mitigating substitution to the composite commodity enough. If the preference for the composite commodity is small to begin with, the sustainability condition need not restrict the absolute
values of \((a_1, b_1)\), as long as their ratio remains within bounds. While in an all-contributors economy, compensations tend to be cheaper and existence of a profitable compensation is governed by the rather insightful condition (14), still in most circumstances no sustainable compensation exists.

For intermediate economies with contributors and non-contributors, conditions are more complex and less clean, yet the main intuitions hold. Cartel provision of the public good can to some extent alleviate the problem of under-provision in competitive equilibrium and so bring an economy closer to efficient public good levels. This is the case even though consumers decrease their contributions in response to the policy. Hybrid economies in fact combine the presence of a high willingness to pay for the public good with some portion of the population, with non-contributors that aggregate the problem of under-provision. In addition, individual contributions to the public good in an economy in competition are further discouraged by free-riding when the number of individuals is larger. Together with the fact that the cartel provision benefits more people over which the cost of producing the public good can be spread, this widens the space for improvement by the policy. The exact composition of preferences and wealth endowments, however, remains crucial for the possibilities to mount a sustainable and effective public-interest defense. Also, the cartel provision, the accompanying increase in the price of the private good, and all responses to it will potentially turn consumers from contributor to non-contributor and vice versa. The finding remains that the existence of a critical mass of ‘outlier’ consumers who combine a low marginal utility for the public good with high purchases of the private good, can easily make an effective public-interest cartel impossible.

4 Alternative Welfare Measures

The construction of a welfare function to comply with the legal requirement that consumers in the same relevant market are compensated is cardinal, as noted. As a result, the policy does not offer an unambiguous welfare standard to guide the agency’s balancing exercise. In conditions (12) and (14), other things equal, the choice of weights in the welfare function \(\alpha_i\) directly affects the sustainability condition: it is always possible to weigh certain individuals in such a way that it will not be possible for a cartel to compensate the consumers without making a loss - and vice versa. In fact, the example of an unsustainable public interest-defense in Figure 1, in which both types have equal weight, becomes sustainable if individual 2 receives a weight in the welfare function that is three times or more higher than the weight of individual 1.

Alternative norms may allow for a more practical approach. While consumer surplus may come to mind as an empirically viable measure, even as an approximation of welfare is not well-defined in this matter, which concerns various and unrelated goods, including the public good - for which demand does not integrate even in the simple example in Section 4. Also, while aggregate demand for the private goods is observable, that for the public good is not. Certainly in economies with non-contributors, there is no expressed private demand for the public good.
As discussed in Section 2, the Pareto criterion to require that no individual consumer’s well-being is negatively affected by the cartel appears to be ruled out by case law. The Pareto criterion certainly is more strict, as only one individual with zero willingness to pay for the public good would hold up any possibilities for a public-interest defense. At the same time, it may be easier to assess for a competition agency. Consider an all-contributors economy in which one individual $j$ is the hardest to compensate. The linear approximation of minimal individual-specific level of public good required with general utility functions is

$$
(p^c_x - p_x) \frac{-\partial U_j(x^*_j(.), y^*_j(.), G^*(.))}{\partial p_x} = \hat{g}_{F,j} \frac{\partial U_j(x^*_j(.), y^*_j(.), G^*(.))}{\partial g_F}.
$$

In the example with constant elasticity of substitution utility functions, the cartel can afford the implies $\hat{g}_{F,j}$ if and only if

$$
a^g_j \geq p^g_{y}^{-1} \left( b^g_F \sum_{i \neq j} \left( \frac{c_i}{\rho_i} \right)^\rho \right) \right),
$$

in which $\sum_{i \neq j}$ is the sum over all individuals other than $j$. While this condition is considerably simpler than condition (14) for the average consumer case, it still requires information about the preferences of all consumers to know it, as a result of all individuals interacting through the public good contributions.

Also note that asking for potential Pareto improvements, for which those who are better off could compensate those who are worse off, as proposed in the Kaldor-Hicks-criteria, is not obvious either. While this criterion is less stringent than the Pareto-criterion, it would still require a full comparative statics analysis. Moreover, in the contributor economy, by the neutrality result in Bergstrom et al. (1986) that is reiterated in condition (14), any redistribution of wealth does not change individual utilities and so Kaldor-Hicks compensation offers no solution. In the non-contributor economy, the information required to establish whether potential compensations exist remain staggering. In addition, the relevant case law would probably extend to exclude the potential Pareto criterion as well.

Finally, a more practical approach, which was applied by the Dutch competition agency in the coal and chicken cases discussed in the introduction, is to try to measure the willingness to pay for the promised cartel public good contribution by consumers of the private good and compare it to the projected (discrete) cartel price increase. If the average willingness to pay is larger than the price increase, the public-interest defense would be allowed and otherwise not. This may be a practical comparison, albeit requiring potentially unreliable questionnaire methods, for it asks to compare discretely different regimes and includes therefore the cartel’s coordination benefits. However, such a test is generally not strict enough. The willingness to pay would be measured in the competitive equilibrium.

\[38\text{For marginal changes, the method is straightforward: for an increase in the public good provision in an all-contributors economy, the average willingness to pay is equal to the current price of the public good } p_g. \text{ However, for the non-contributors economy, we obtain the overall willingness to pay at a point } G = g_N \text{ as } p^{gN} = \]
while the price increase of the private good will lead to substitution towards private contributions to the public good, which will lower the willingness to pay for further contributions by the cartel. In addition, once some compensation is given, consumer’s willingness to pay for the public good will be lowered further. Therefore, even if the (average) willingness to pay for the public good, i.e. \( p_g \) in an all contributors economy or a complex \( p^N \) in a non-contributor economy, is found to be higher than the cartel price increase, i.e. \( p^*_c - p_x \), it is still very well possible that all consumers are damaged by allowing the collusion.

5 Concluding Remarks

We show that a public interest cartel is not generally sustainable beyond a critical mass of consumers who combine a preference for private consumption with a low willingness to pay for the public good. The individuals that will be the hardest to compensate are those who consume a lot of the private good and also value the public good little. Their exposure to damage from even a small cartel price increase is large, and they require a lot of public good contribution by the industry to offset it. Also, to the extent that they did contribute to the public good in the competitive equilibrium, they will respond with a relatively large reduction, possibly to zero. The public interest-defense policy asks exactly those individuals who have self-selected themselves, through their private good consumption, as relatively low willingness to pay for the public good types, to pay most for the provision of a compensating public good that they value least. In Chicken of Tomorrow, it is the vegetarians who are most likely to have the highest willingness to pay for more animal friendly broiling, not the consumers of cheap chicken meat. As a result, in most economies the cartel cannot balance the budget to produce the required compensation. The policy targets the wrong individuals for taxation.

Only when sufficiently many consumers have a relative willingness to pay for the cartellized private commodity and the public good that stays constant within narrow bounds, may a sustainable public interest-defense exist. In these special circumstances, even for small price increases and without changes in the contribution and non-contributor sets, crowding out is not full. Consumers do not see through the distortionary taxation strategy fully, as they do in Bernheim (1986). The cartel price increase and the required compensating public good are determined simultaneously in a one-shot game to preserve the status quo in utility terms. Our model does not allow for negative private contribution, it does not impose a balanced budget, as not all cartel profits need to be contributed to the public good, and our model includes a third, composite commodity, so that consumers can substitute away from the cartellized industry. As we show, the relative importance to consumers of the private good matters for the existence and space for sustainable compensation.

\[
\left( \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} w_i}{n \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left( p_x \left( \frac{r \cdot \rho}{1 - \rho} \right) + \left( \frac{r \cdot \rho}{1 - \rho} \right) \right)} \right)^{\frac{\rho}{1 - \rho}},
\]

which again is far from obvious to establish empirically.
As we do not specify the size of the price rise resulting from allowing a restriction of competition, our model applied to various forms of (partial) cartels that face remaining fringe competition - in accordance with the Treaty requirement that the exemption should not afford the companies concerned "the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question." Likewise does our analysis extend straightforwardly to companies in a position of dominance that are allowed to price excessively in return for promoting a public interest, or mergers that are cleared with public interest remedies, such as keeping or creating jobs - thus contributing to the preservation of social stability. In the latter case, the merging firms ability to raise prices and profits post-merger, in somewhat tighter oligopoly competition, will be limited, leaving an even narrower space for sustainable public interest mergers than under collusion.

We offer a basic public goods analysis. Our model abstracts from public interest benefits that result directly from a reduction in the consumption of private commodities that generate negative externalities, such as smoking or polluting production, that may result from a cartel price increase. Such effects can however be thought of as compensating cartel benefits, without changing our qualitative findings. In particular do we note that arguably those individuals who consume most of products that harm the public interest, are likely also to have a lower willingness to pay for the public benefits, or they wouldn't generate the externalities. The cartel overcharges in this context resemble Pigovian taxes aimed to internalize externalities in market prices - arguably a more equitable principle, as the polluter pays. Also, we model all public interests in the form of a single public good that enters independently into preferences, as a substitute for spending on private consumption. In many cases, for example cars and road safety, private and public good may be complementary, so that the demand for the private good increases as the provision of the public good rises. As long as the cartel produces the complementary public good in compensation, it can benefit from an increased demand effect that would relax the sustainability constraint. Finally, we note that public goods often have a local character. For the provision that consumers in the same relevant market are compensated, it is necessary that the cartel contributes to a compensating public good in that market, or otherwise possibly to various different local public goods that together span all consumers affected by the cartel price overcharge for compensation. The latter case would complicate enforcement accordingly. While public interest benefits may (far) exceed the relevant market, they must cover it by the European Treaty provisions.

The policy rule saddles competition authorities with a conflict of public interests. The conditions for compensation prove complex and the information requirements on an competition agency that is to practically implement the policy are prohibitively large. Even if an unambiguous welfare assessment were possible, or when the Pareto criterion would be applied, to identify whether a given market satisfies the compensation condition, perfect information is needed in principle of all consumers' preferences. While the market activities of consumers reveal some information about their valuation of public goods,

\footnote{Article 101(3)b TFEU.}

\footnote{See, for example, Bradford & Hildebrandt (1977). Complementarity is noted in the commodity taxation literature as reducing the social costs of the second-best policy.}
it is partial, in particular for non-contributors, of limited use and insufficient. Given the narrow set of economies and the precise sizes of compensating public good contributions required, a false assessment is quite probable. In addition, the exemption also allows future benefits, possibly including benefits for future generations - which would require a highly complex analysis of bequest motives to quantify properly within the principle of consumer sovereignty.

The same is true for companies that would want to self-assess whether their intended agreement would qualify for an exemption if it would ever become a concern. Even if corporations had the best intentions to meet the criteria set forth, the difficulty to self-assess the policy may leave too much legal uncertainty, or firms may attempt to obtain an ex ante exemption by notification, as in the Dutch cases discussed in the introduction. Companies would have an incentive to exaggerate their contribution or, if they would have bad intentions, possibility to deliberately abuse the policy. After all, the sustainability constraint is only binding under minimally the right compensation requirement. With the capacity of the competition agency to effectively check whether the firm contributions match the collusive harm lacking, government cannot reasonably be expected to guarantee that firms do not just take advantage of the policy and provide some cosmetic public good in exchange for a free pass to collude. A cartel exempted has all the incentives to raise prices by as much as it can, doing as little for the public interest as it can get away with.

The case law requirement that consumers are to be compensated on average, rather than all, also introduces a fundamental equity issue. The compensating public good provision that will preserve utility on average will still harm consumers with a low marginal valuation of the public good. The policy therefore is orthogonal to optimal Lindahl-pricing, which is an appealing concept of fairness in public finance. Consumers with a low preference for the private good and a relatively high willingness to pay for the public good are effectively paying less, in terms of damage suffered by the price increase, than the consumers targeted by the policy: those who buy substantial volumes of the private good. This heterogeneity in impacts is much more pronounced than it would be in a system of monetary compensations - which also is capped, unlike public interest compensation. The Pareto criterion does not suffer from these problems, yet if it cannot apply, matters involving equity enter the realm of political decision making.

The policy has the potential to tap into superior industry knowledge and capabilities that corporations may have to promote public interests most efficiently. It is questionable, however, whether to mandate the industry to produce public goods by private collusion is the best way to do this, given the many conceptual and practical implementation problems. Alternatives such as regulation, possibly co-regulation or enforced self-regulation, provide much more control over the process by specialized branches of government. In certain circumstances, such as jurisdictional or political barriers, effective lobbies and stubborn creative compliance, regulation may be inferior. Allowing a public interest-carTEL may then serve as a kind of workaround for a well meaning agency operating in an intergovernmental vacuum.
In the cases so far seen, however, the more traditional approaches were perfectly available. Anti-competitive restrictions do not appear to be indispensable, as required by the Treaty. Energy inefficient household appliances and coal burning electricity plants can simply be phased out by law, as cruelty to animals can be made illegal by putting minimum living conditions for chicken and pigs. Moreover, neither the taxes levied, nor the public goods provided by the cartel will generally be second-best. Government has better means of raising public good funds and can optimize taxing and spending over a spectrum of public goods. Public interests primarily call for government provision paid for by taxation, rather than private production financed through cartel pricing. More than a conviction that competition agencies be best placed to balance public interests, the introduction of the public interest-defense seems to reflect a lack of political will to regulate, or, more concerning even, a politicizing of antitrust.

References

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Appendix - Derivations of the Model in Sections 3 and 4

Consumer \( i \in \{1, \ldots, N\} \) has a wealth endowment \( w_i \) and a utility function

\[
U_i = a_i \frac{G^{1-\theta}}{1-\theta} + b_i \frac{x_i^{1-\theta}}{1-\theta} + c_i \frac{y_i^{1-\theta}}{1-\theta},
\]

where

\[
G = \sum_{i=1}^{n} g_i + g_F + g_N.
\]

For consumer \( i \) the budget constraint is (normalizing \( p_y = 1 \))

\[
w_i + p_g G_{-i} - p_g G - p_x x_i - y_i = 0,
\]

together with a natural condition \( g_i \geq 0 \). First-order-conditions for consumer \( i \) with no bounds for \( g_i \) are

\[
x_i = \left( \frac{b_i p_g}{a_i p_x} \right)^\rho G,
\]
\[
y_i = \left( \frac{c_i p_g}{a_i} \right)^\rho G,
\]

\[
g_i = \frac{w_i - \left( p_x \left( \frac{b_i p_g}{a_i p_x} \right)^\rho + \left( \frac{c_i p_g}{a_i} \right)^\rho \right) (G_{-i} + g_N)}{p_g + p_x \left( \frac{b_i p_g}{a_i p_x} \right)^\rho + \left( \frac{c_i p_g}{a_i} \right)^\rho},
\]

so that \( g_i > 0 \) iff

\[
w_i > \left( p_x \left( \frac{b_i p_g}{a_i p_x} \right)^\rho + \left( \frac{c_i p_g}{a_i} \right)^\rho \right) (G_{-i} + g_N).
\]

**No-contributors Economy**

If each consumer’s voluntary contribution is negative both under competition and collusion, \( g_1 = \ldots = g_N = 0 \) in both states. The public good does not enter the utility maximization, so that demands are

\[
x_i = \frac{w_i}{p_x + \left( \frac{c_i p_g}{b_i} \right)^\rho},
\]
\[
y_i = \frac{w_i}{1 + \left( \frac{b_i}{c_i p_g} \right)^\rho p_x}.
\]
Equilibrium utility is

\[ U^*_i = \frac{1}{1 - \theta} \left( a_i G^{1-\theta} + b_i \left( \frac{w_i}{p_x + \left( \frac{c_i p_x}{b_i} \right) \rho} \right)^{1-\theta} + c_1 \left( \frac{w_i}{1 + \left( \frac{b_i}{c_i p_x} \right) \rho p_x} \right)^{1-\theta} \right), \]

where \( G = g_N \), as no consumer contributes to the public good. Equilibrium utility under collusion is the same, with the higher price \( p^c_x \) and \( G = g_N + g_F \), including the industry’s compensation. Giving consumer \( i \) a weight \( \alpha_i \) in a welfare function, total welfare becomes

\[
W = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \alpha_i U^*_i = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{\alpha_i}{1 - \theta} \left( a_i G^{1-\theta} + b_i \left( \frac{w_i}{p_x + \left( \frac{c_i p_x}{b_i} \right) \rho} \right)^{1-\theta} + c_1 \left( \frac{w_i}{1 + \left( \frac{b_i}{c_i p_x} \right) \rho p_x} \right)^{1-\theta} \right).
\]

Equating welfare in the two equilibria \((p_x, G = g_N)\) and \((p^c_x, G = g_N + g_F)\),

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{\alpha_i}{1 - \theta} \left( a_i g_N^{1-\theta} + b_i \left( \frac{w_i}{p_x + \left( \frac{c_i p_x}{b_i} \right) \rho} \right)^{1-\theta} + c_1 \left( \frac{w_i}{1 + \left( \frac{b_i}{c_i p_x} \right) \rho p_x} \right)^{1-\theta} \right) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \alpha_i \left( a_i (g_N + g_F)^{1-\theta} + b_i \left( \frac{w_i}{p_x + \left( \frac{c_i p_x}{b_i} \right) \rho} \right)^{1-\theta} + c_1 \left( \frac{w_i}{1 + \left( \frac{b_i}{c_i p_x} \right) \rho p_x} \right)^{1-\theta} \right),
\]

which is equivalent to

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{n} \alpha_i a_i g_N^{1-\theta} + \sum_{i=1}^{n} \alpha_i \left( b_i \left( \frac{w_i}{p_x + \left( \frac{c_i p_x}{b_i} \right) \rho} \right)^{1-\theta} + c_1 \left( \frac{w_i}{1 + \left( \frac{b_i}{c_i p_x} \right) \rho p_x} \right)^{1-\theta} \right) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \alpha_i a_i (g_N + g_F)^{1-\theta} + \sum_{i=1}^{n} \alpha_i \left( b_i \left( \frac{w_i}{p^c_x + \left( \frac{c_i p^c_x}{b_i} \right) \rho} \right)^{1-\theta} + c_1 \left( \frac{w_i}{1 + \left( \frac{b_i}{c_i p^c_x} \right) \rho p^c_x} \right)^{1-\theta} \right),
\]

This condition yields the minimally required compensation level to keep total welfare constant.
\[
\hat{g}_F = \left( g_N^{1-\theta} + \frac{1}{\theta} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \alpha_i a_i \left[ Z(p_x) - Z(p_x^c) \right] \right) \frac{1}{1-\theta} - g_N,
\]

where

\[
Z(p) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \alpha_i \left( b_i \left( w_i \frac{p_x^{1-\theta}}{p + (\frac{c_i p}{b_i})^\rho} \right) + c_i \left( \frac{w_i}{1 + (\frac{c_i p}{b_i})^\rho} \right)^{1-\theta} \right),
\]

for \( p = p_x \) and \( p = p_x^c \), respectively.

Total industry profits in perfect competition are \( \Pi = (p_x - c) \times D_x(p_x) = 0 \), at \( p_x = c \). After raising the price to \( p_x^c \) and paying compensation \( \hat{g}_F \), industry profits become

\[
\Pi = (p_x^c - p_x) \times D_x(p_x^c) - p_g \times \hat{g}_F(p_x^c, p_x).
\]

Demand \( D_x(p_x^c) \) has the form

\[
D_x(p_x^c) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{w_i}{p_x^c + (\frac{c_i p}{b_i})^\rho},
\]

The derivative of industry income evaluated at point \( p_x^c = p_x(= c) \) is

\[
\left. \frac{(p_x^c - p_x) \times D_x(p_x^c)}{\partial p_x^c} \right|_{p_x^c=p_x} = \left[ \frac{\partial(p_x^c - p_x)}{\partial p_x^c} \times D_x(p_x^c) + (p_x^c - p_x) \times \frac{\partial D_x(p_x^c)}{\partial p_x^c} \right] \bigg|_{p_x^c=p_x} = D_x(p_x) + 0.
\]

The derivative of the costs of compensation evaluated at point \( p_x^c = p_x(= c) \), using the fact that \( \left. [Z(p_x) - Z(p_x^c)] \right|_{p_x^c=p_x} = 0 \), becomes

\[
\left. \frac{\partial p_g \hat{g}_F(p_x^c, p_x)}{\partial p_x^c} \right|_{p_x^c=p_x} = \frac{p_g \theta}{(1-\theta) \sum_{i=1}^{n} \alpha_i a_i} \left[ - \frac{\partial Z(p_x^c)}{\partial p_x^c} \bigg|_{p_x^c=p_x} \right],
\]

where

\[
- \left. \frac{\partial Z(p_x^c)}{\partial p_x^c} \bigg|_{p_x^c=p_x} \right. = \frac{(1-\theta)}{p_x} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \alpha_i b_i \left( \frac{w_i}{p_x + (\frac{c_i p}{b_i})^\rho} \right)^{1-\theta}.
\]

We thus finally get
\[ \frac{\partial p_g \hat{g}_F(p^*_c, p_x)}{\partial p^*_c} \bigg|_{p^*_c = p_x} = \frac{p_g \theta}{p_x} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \alpha_i b_i \left( \frac{w_i}{p_x + \left( \frac{c_i p_x}{a_i} \right)^\rho} \right)^{1-\theta}, \]

so that the sustainability condition (the sign of \( \frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial p^*_c} \bigg|_{p^*_c = p_x} \)) is as in equation (12) in the text.

**Contributors Economies**

Assuming the contributor condition is satisfied for every consumer in both states of the economy,

\[ g_i = \frac{w_i}{p_x + \left( \frac{b_i p_g}{a_i p_x} \right)^\rho + \left( \frac{c_i p_g}{a_i} \right)^\rho} \]

and thus

\[ G = \sum_{i=1}^{n} g_i + g_N + g_F = \left( \frac{p_g (g_N + g_F) + \sum_{i=1}^{n} w_i}{p_g + \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left( p_x \left( \frac{b_i p_g}{a_i p_x} \right)^\rho + \left( \frac{c_i p_g}{a_i} \right)^\rho \right)} \right), \]

with \( g_F = 0 \) before the price increase and \( p_x = p^*_x \) after. Using \( x_i = \left( \frac{b_i p_g}{a_i p_x} \right)^\rho G \) and \( y_i = \left( \frac{c_i p_g}{a_i} \right)^\rho G \), equilibrium utility is

\[ U_i = \frac{G^{1-\theta}}{1-\theta} \left( a_i + b_i \left( \frac{b_i p_g}{a_i p_x} \right)^{\rho(1-\theta)} + c_i \left( \frac{c_i p_g}{a_i} \right)^{\rho(1-\theta)} \right). \]

Giving consumer \( i \) a weight \( \alpha_i \) in a welfare function, total welfare becomes

\[ W = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \alpha_i U^*_i = \frac{G^{1-\theta}}{1-\theta} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \alpha_i \left( a_i + b_i \left( \frac{b_i p_g}{a_i p_x} \right)^{\rho(1-\theta)} + c_i \left( \frac{c_i p_g}{a_i} \right)^{\rho(1-\theta)} \right). \]

Welfare in the two equilibria equal,

\[ \frac{(g_N + \sum_{i=1}^{n} g_i)^{1-\theta}}{1-\theta} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \alpha_i \left( a_i + b_i \left( \frac{b_i p_g}{a_i p_x} \right)^{\rho(1-\theta)} + c_i \left( \frac{c_i p_g}{a_i} \right)^{\rho(1-\theta)} \right) = \]

\[ \frac{(g_N + g_F + \sum_{i=1}^{n} g_i)^{1-\theta}}{1-\theta} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \alpha_i \left( a_i + b_i \left( \frac{b_i p_g}{a_i p^*_x} \right)^{\rho(1-\theta)} + c_i \left( \frac{c_i p_g}{a_i} \right)^{\rho(1-\theta)} \right), \]
after expressing the equilibrium level of the public good yields the minimally required compensation

\[
\hat{g}_F = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} w_i + pgN}{pg} \times \left( \frac{pg + \sum_{i=1}^{n} (p_x(cx/p_x) + (c/P_g)\rho)}{pg + \sum_{i=1}^{n} (p_x(cx/p_x) + (c/P_g)\rho)} \right) \left( \sum_{i=1}^{n} \alpha_i \left( a_i + b_i\left( \frac{b_i P_g}{a_i p_x}\right)\rho(1-\theta) + c_i\left( \frac{c_i P_g}{a_i}\right)\rho(1-\theta) \right) \right)^{1-\theta} - 1 \right).
\]

Industry profits after raising the price to \(p_x^*\) and paying compensation \(\hat{g}_F\) are \(\Pi = (p_x^* - pg) \times D_x(p_x^*) - pg \times \hat{g}_F(p_x^*, p_x)\) and analogically to the no-contributors case we have that \(\frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial p_x} \bigg|_{p_x^*=p_x} = D_x(p_x)\) where

\[
D_x(p_x) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i = G \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left( \frac{b_i P_g}{a_i p_x} \right)^\rho = \left( \frac{pgN + \sum_{i=1}^{n} w_i}{pg + \sum_{i=1}^{n} (p_x(cx/p_x) + (c/P_g)\rho)} \right) \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left( \frac{b_i P_g}{a_i p_x} \right).
\]

The derivative of the costs of compensation evaluated at point \(p_x^* = p_x(=c)\) is

\[
\left. \frac{\partial p_{g}\hat{g}_F}{\partial p_x} \right|_{p_x^*=p_x} = \left( pgN + \sum_{i=1}^{n} w_i \right) \times \left( \frac{(1-\rho)p_x^{-\rho} \left( \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left( \frac{b_i P_g}{a_i} \right)^\rho \right)}{pg + \sum_{i=1}^{n} (p_x(cx/p_x) + (c/P_g)\rho)} + \frac{\rho p_x^{-\rho} \left( \sum_{i=1}^{n} b_i \left( \frac{b_i P_g}{a_i} \right)^{\rho-1} \right)}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \left( a_i + p_x^{1-\rho} b_i \left( \frac{b_i P_g}{a_i} \right)^{\rho-1} + c_i \left( \frac{c_i P_g}{a_i p_x} \right)^{\rho-1} \right)} \right).
\]

Some algebra reveals that the sustainability condition \(\left. \frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial p_x} \bigg|_{p_x^*=p_x} \right) \geq \left. \frac{\partial p_{g}\hat{g}_F}{\partial p_x} \right|_{p_x^*=p_x}\) becomes

\[
\sum_{i,j}^{i\neq j} \left( \alpha_j a_j \left( \frac{b_j}{a_j} \right)^\rho + \alpha_j a_i \left( \frac{b_i}{a_i} \right)^\rho \right) \geq p_{g}^{i-1} \sum_{i,j}^{i\neq j} \alpha_j a_j - \alpha_i a_i \left( \frac{b_j c_j}{a_j} \right)^\rho - \left( \frac{b_i c_i}{a_i} \right)^\rho,
\]

as (14) in the text, in which \(\sum_{i,j}^{i\neq j}\) is the sum over all unique pairs of two different individuals \((i, j)\).\(^{41}\)

**The Pareto Criterion**

Assume consumer \(j\) is the most difficult to compensate individual in society. In the all-contributor economy, the required compensation for consumer \(j\) is

\(^{41}\)For instance in the case of three consumers, the sum is over \((1, 2), (1, 3)\) and \((2, 3)\).
\[ \hat{g}_{F,j} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} w_i + p_g g_{N}}{p_g} \times \]

\[ \left[ \frac{p_g + \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left( p_x \left( \frac{b_x p_x}{a_i p_x} \right)^\rho + \left( \frac{c_i p_x}{a_i} \right)^\rho \right) \left( a_j + b_j \left( \frac{b_x p_x}{a_j p_x} \right)^\rho + c_j \left( \frac{c_i p_x}{a_j} \right)^\rho \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\vartheta}}}{p_g + \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left( p_x \left( \frac{b_x p_x}{a_i p_x} \right)^\rho + \left( \frac{c_i p_x}{a_i} \right)^\rho \right) \left( a_j + b_j \left( \frac{b_x p_x}{a_j p_x} \right)^\rho + c_j \left( \frac{c_i p_x}{a_j} \right)^\rho \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\vartheta}}} - 1 \right]. \]

By similar algebra as above, \( \frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial p_{x}} \bigg|_{p_{x}=p_{s}} \geq 0 \) iff

\[ a_j^\rho \geq p_g^{\rho-1} \left( \frac{b_j^\rho \sum_{i \neq j} \left( \frac{c_i}{a_i} \right)^\rho}{\sum_{i \neq j} \left( \frac{b_j}{a_i} \right)^\rho} - c_j^\rho \right). \]