Improving the Responses to the Migration and Refugee Crisis in Europe
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Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation
Lisbon, 21 – 22 November 2016
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Preface

Artur Santos Silva President of the Board of Trustees, Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, Lisbon, Portugal

Formed in January 2015, Vision Europe is a joint project of leading European foundations and think tanks — Bertelsmann Stiftung, Germany; Bruegel, Belgium; Chatham House, UK; CASE, Poland; Compagnia di San Paolo, Italy; Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, Portugal; Jacques Delors Institute, France; and the Finnish Innovation Fund Sitra, Finland —, that work together to investigate, debate and, thus, inform and influence policy makers and the public opinion on some of the most pressing public policy challenges that Europe faces today. Through research, publications and an annual summit, we aim to be a forum for debate and a source of recommendations to improve policy-making at both a national and EU level and to foster as appropriate European integration.

In 2015, Vision Europe worked together on “the future of the welfare state”, creating and developing recommendations for a set of innovative public policies capable of ensuring the long-term sustainability of the national social security systems.

In the last few months, the network formed by four Foundations and four think-tanks, relying on the invaluable support of several experts, academics and policy makers, has strived for an effective contribution to overcome this difficult moment of the European project, aggravated by the insufficient response to the recent flow of refugees and migrants. We believe that we can rise to the challenge through a thorough reflection and tangible proposals capable of mobilizing and inspiring to action, in order to successfully overcome these difficult times. The Vision Europe Summit aims to contribute to this mission.

We are departing in fact from a complex reality. The European Union as such, and particularly some of its member states, are struggling with a crisis in the uncontrolled response to the arrival of hundreds of thousands of refugees and migrants.

To the incapacity of anticipating a challenge that could have been predicted since the beginning of the war in Syria and the collapse of the “Arab Springs” — given the number of refugees and migrants produced by these crisis — was added the failure to generate a quick, supportive and effective response when the flow of arrivals grew. The fractures and the conflicts within the European Union deteriorated due to the fragmentation and lack of cohesion between different policies and programs in this area.

The xenophobic and nationalist movements within Europe on one hand, and terrorist groups acting inside and outside the European territory on the other, were quick to exploit these weaknesses. The “industry of fear”, exacerbated by some media and social media, has fueled a hostile public reaction both towards the refugees/migrants and the European project itself.

This cycle of events brings us to the end of 2016 with causes for concern, not only for the management of this migration crisis, but also for the future of the European project.
In order to address these problems, the Vision Europe Summit aims to identify their basic issues and point out the possible and necessary responses.

Therefore, this document seeks an answer to this problem’s Gordian knot: what must be done to overcome the intra-European conflict and achieve a balance that produces common ground allowing for a political and social consensus on migration? This option has a political meaning, reflecting the conscience that this crisis is, first and foremost, a crisis of the values of solidarity between member states — with serious humanitarian situations — and of the “unity in diversity” principle. This isn’t just an exogenous crisis, with external origins and inside effects. It is us Europeans who are in crisis, and only we will overcome it.

In order to do so, we must do more than simply manage this crisis, in a reactive and delayed way. The VES will therefore endorse a sound approach to a roadmap allowing for the development of an effective, pro-active and fair policy for migration management. This path must be based in the first place on safe and legal migration channels, especially for the refugees fleeing conflict zones, both through resettlement processes and humanitarian visas. It must also consider the gradual improvement of asylum systems and conditions for integration in the receiving societies, as well as an effective support and temporary protection in the refugee camps. This roadmap must also have the courage to address the roots of forced migration and offer solutions.

Finally, because this challenge is not to be addressed only by the European Union states and institutions, the VES looks further and will suggest, against fragmentation, an integrated governance outlook to welcome newcomers in the European Union countries. The whole society is summoned to this mission. It is a project that calls not only for the cooperation of different government departments to efficiently promote the social inclusion of refugees and migrants, but also for the cooperation of the whole society, specifically through civil society organizations, companies, foundations, and naturally the citizens, who are invited to be an effective part of the solution. Building a cohesive and inclusive society depends on everybody’s response, without exception.

For all these reasons, the VES is a very important moment for our common future. We must now thank the efforts of all those who contributed to this moment and the dedication of those who will be responsible for taking further the results of this Conference.

We know how serious the problems facing us are. But we are sure that the strength of the European project, especially its founding values and the civilizational heritage we built together, can overcome these difficulties. If we are able to mobilize society and inspire it toward necessary change, this crisis will be an opportunity for affirmation and improvement of the European ideal. As always, our future depends on us.
Recommendations

From Conflict to Equilibrium: The Construction of a Common Ground for Social and Political Consensus on Migration

Yves Pascouau Director of migration and mobility policies at the European Policy Centre (Brussels); Senior Research Fellow at the Jacques Delors Institute (Paris); Editor of the website www.EuropeanMigrationLaw.eu

1. Delivering on commitments for rebuilding trust: If stakeholders wish to rebuild trust among states and citizens, it is no longer possible to agree on actions and fail to implement them.

1.1 Member States Should:
• Implement existing rules, in particular those related to registering and identifying people at the external borders.
• Fully participate to solidarity mechanisms, i.e. sending experts, officials and equipment to run the hotspots as well as fulfilling relocation obligations.
• Not breach purposefully EU rules.
• Where necessary in collaboration with EU institutions, convince, via dialogue, or even force, via the use of legal and financial means, reluctant partners to abide by the rules.

1.2 Member States and the EU Institutions Should:
• Continue legal and operational improvement of border management.
• Increase rate of returns, whether voluntary or forced, to maintain or restore trust between states and political accountability.
• Ensure the full protection of human rights obligations in border management and return actions.

1.3 EU Commission Should:
• Accompany states in the immediate implementation of EU rules and in the coordination of operational actions with the contribution of EU agencies.
• Perform its “Treaty keeper” mission and monitor whether states implement correctly EU rules in law and practice and take action where breaches are identified.
• Limit its immediate legislative initiatives to the adaptation of the Schengen area, including “Dublin” rules.
• Better evaluate whether a revision of all asylum rules is needed, on the basis of thorough impact assessments, and necessary regarding the likelihood of rules to be adopted by the legislator.
• Better assess the practical implications of regular modifications of asylum rules. Too many revisions of EU rules may render the legal framework unreadable for legal professionals and practitioners and weaken the protection of asylum seekers and refugees’ rights.
1.4 Media Should:
• Portray the reality of political actions and challenge states when they nationalise EU successes and Europeanise national failures.
• Enhance accuracy and avoid misleading shortcomings between refugees or (un)authorised migrants to set the debate on the appropriate legal and political basis.
• Look beyond national borders and internal politics and give greater place to Commissioners and MEP’s in mainstream programmes to explain their missions and responsibilities.

2. Getting prepared for the future to provide for sound and timely policy responses

2.1 The Operationalisation of the Policy Should Invite the EU and Member States to Reflect on:
• The European Commission’s ability to manage the operationalisation process and question whether it has appropriate know-how in this regard. Managing operations is of specific nature and knowledge, which stays mainly in the member states’ remit. The Commission must get familiar with this process with the support of member states.
• The strong financial impact of the operationalisation process. The widening gap between the increasing need of financial resources and the limited EU budget should lead states and EU institutions to reflect on how to finance EU’s and states’ operational tasks.

2.2 EU Institutions Need to Define a Long Term Strategy Regarding Human Mobility. Therefore EU Institutions Should:
• Reckon that the way people will move in the next decades will most probably be fundamentally different from todays and that migration management will require different answers.
• Predict migratory movement worldwide for the next 25 years to set up scenarios and possible responses to them.
• Acknowledge that conflicts and demography are not the only drivers of migration and factor in future scenarios other drivers of mobility like the increasing urbanisation of the world, the rise of the middle class, the effect of scarce resources, the cost of energy, the impact of climate change, the creeping phenomenon of radicalisation and extremists, the digitalisation of people’s life, etc.
• Involve a wide range of experts starting with the “usual suspects” (migration experts, political scientists, economists, demographers, foreign policy experts, etc.) but also more unusual players like urbanists, designers, philosophers as well as architects whose vision of tomorrow’s world and future forms of human mobility can help in shaping policy responses.
• Improve the connection between EU policy fields having an impact on migration management like development, foreign policy, humanitarian aid, trade, integration, etc. The EU should break the current “Home affairs/silo approach” to better organise the policy response.
Beyond Crisis Management: The Path Towards an Effective, Pro-active and Fair European Refugee Policy

Matthias M. Mayer, Project Manager, Bertelsmann Stiftung
Mehrdad Mehregani, Project Manager, Bertelsmann Stiftung

1. Create safe passages to protection

1.1 Resettlement: EU member states should increase the numbers of resettlement places available – according to their individual capacities.

1.2 Humanitarian visa: Humanitarian visa offering a safe passage to protection could be provided by individual states unilaterally, or within the framework of an EU-wide solution.

1.3 Private Sponsorship of Refugees: EU member states should investigate the implementation of private sponsorship programmes. Private sponsorship allows private citizens to play a role in national refugee policies and can supplement traditional refugee resettlement programmes.

2. Improve National Asylum Processing and Integration Systems

2.1 Effective National Asylum Systems: In the absence of a fully-fledged EU-asylum procedure, EU member states need effective national systems for processing asylum claims and dealing with asylum seekers. It is important to keep asylum systems flexible to cope with fluctuating demand.

2.2 Labour Market Integration of Refugees: EU member states should establish support measures to help refugees to find an employment commensurate to their qualifications and skills, such as, language training and skill assessment. Such measures should be part of a coherent process of labour market integration and start early.

2.3 Voluntary Return: While the focus of recent policy proposals has been on the return of persons who are not eligible for a protection status, also the return and reintegration of persons with protection status needs to be part of a forward-looking European refugee policy.

2.4 Reform of the Dublin System: The EU and member states need to work towards the establishment of a serious EU-distribution mechanism; even though this is likely to proceed in small steps and to entail concessions to countries carrying the largest burden under the current Dublin system.

3. Establish Further Legal Pathways for Mixed Migration: In order to separate economic from refugee migration, the establishment of new migration channels for unskilled workers needs to be discussed.
4. Enable Protection in the Region of Origin

4.1 Temporary Protection in Refugee Camps in the Regions of Origin: Well-funded refugee camps can offer individuals in need of protection a safe place in relative vicinity to their home country. Refugee camps should only serve as intermediate solutions and provide education, qualification measures and work opportunities.

4. Local Integration in the Region of Origin: European governments need to work with countries in crisis regions to improve and legalise the status of refugees. This will necessitate significant investments. A further option comprises the support of civil society initiatives that can provide food or education.

5. Tackle the Root Causes of Forced Migration through a Sustainable Foreign, Economic and Trade Policy: The conflict in Syria and the terror of the Islamic State group have to be ended. Moreover, refugees’ and migrants’ home countries need to develop. This requires a rethinking of development cooperation, trade and economic policy as well as significant investments.

6. Final Remark: Establish Political Will for Reform: Member states need to align their national interests and find common ground to work together in managing refugee flows. There is no silver bullet and this will be a lengthy process. Constant dialogue between and within member states as well as a forward-looking and coherent strategy instead of short-term and reactive crisis management are imperative.
From Fragmentation to Integration: Towards a “Whole-of-Society” Approach to Receiving and Settling Newcomers in Europe

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Meghan Benton, Senior Policy Analyst, MPI

1. Governments should adopt a work-focused approach to integration that also supports social integration

1.1 Policymakers should design integration services that encourage newcomers to enter employment as soon as possible, filling skill gaps from within work (through part-time, flexible, and distance learning options where appropriate).

1.2 Policymakers should focus more actively on self-employment as a route to self-employment, by addressing challenges would-be entrepreneurs face accessing credit and understanding regulations.

1.3 Policymakers should focus more actively on volunteering and alternative opportunities for people to meaningfully contribute, to avoid the social exclusion of people who are unable to find work.

1.4 Government agencies and service providers should collaborate to ensure that labour market integration policies further social integration and vice versa.

2. Governments should systematically engage the “whole-of-society” in integration efforts

2.1 Policymakers should encourage employers to move beyond seeing integration as a matter of “corporate social responsibility”, by building lasting partnerships that are in the long-term economic interests of private companies.

2.2 Policymakers should capitalise on the recent wave of social and technological innovation by helping the best ideas scale and ensuring they integrate with mainstream integration services.

2.3 Governments should engage a wider constituency of social partners, both old and new, to bring in greater innovation and collective problem-solving.

3. Governments should work to restore public trust and ensure publics feel the pace of change is manageable

3.1 Governments of all levels should provide space for members of the public to discuss their concerns about immigration.

3.2 Countries should frame immigration as a core part of the national narrative.

3.3 Policymakers should ensure policies are not perceived to favour newcomers, by designing policies and programmes that work for everyone.
4. Governments should use this period of the lull in flows to develop a forward-looking strategy

4.1 Policymakers need to decide what their priorities are, and what ‘good enough’ strategies for integration look like – including what the opportunities are for realising social integration in the likely absence of full economic integration.

4.2 Policymakers should clearly develop and articulate goals, and identify collective milestones to evaluate progress across different policy areas and on different timescales.

4.3 Everyone involved in integration – from the European institutions to service providers – needs to invest in generating higher quality evidence on integration. Collecting and evaluating evidence—and, critically, adapting systems based on this—must become an integral part of the policymaking ethos.
Improving the Responses to the Migration and Refugee Crisis in Europe

1. European governments should maintain an overall common approach to the crisis

1.1. Border control, security, defence, unified management of refugees, are obvious public goods for an integrated area such as the EU that has abolished internal borders and created an internal market.

1.2. It is also very unlikely that national countries acting independently could offer these public goods efficiently. However, failing to do so would weaken European social cohesion and the political consensus towards the European project.

1.3. A common welcoming and integration policy, coupled with mechanisms to share the costs, are essential to avoid opportunistic behaviour by member countries.

1.4. An integrated approach also requires the establishment of an effective European-level evaluation process of refugees’ skills and competences. This is currently lacking, but it is a pre-requisite for successful integration.

2. Further attempts to share the burden across EU countries should be pursued.

2.1. If there is no enough consensus to revise the Dublin regulations, and if furthermore there is no consensus on relocation of refugees, then adequate financial support must be given to first entry countries, both in terms of welcoming and integration policy.

2.2. This should also take into account the characteristics of the refugees in terms of skills, education and more general cultural elements, as these features also affect the cost of (effective) integration policies.

3. An integrated European approach should address both shorter term challenges and longer term problems.

3.1. The recent crisis is likely to continue in the next decades, given the persistent divergence in birth rates and economic conditions between Europe and its neighbours. This requires a long term strategy.

3.2. The EU has already taken a number of important steps in these respect in recent years—the reform of Common European Asylum policy, the establishment of the European Border Guard—that need to be developed further, in particular with agreements and financial exchanges with potential origin countries.

3.3. The issue of specific and permanent funding, backed by European tax sources, and of a double approach combining protection of the external borders with financial help for the de-
development of the countries of origin, should be highly regarded in this context.

4. In communication, governments and the EU should not overstress the extent of the crisis and focus instead on the potential benefits for the aging European societies

4.1. For Europe as a whole, both the numbers of refugees with respect to the population, and the resources involved in providing welcome and integration, are entirely manageable.

4.2. Flows of people have indeed increased, but they are still in the same order of magnitude of the immigration flows that different European countries have successfully faced in the last decade.

4.3. As perceptions influence voter’s attitudes and therefore policies, an effort, backed by the Union, should be made in order to explain citizens the real dimension of the phenomenon.

4.4. The integration of refugees may also pay on the economic grounds, particularly for the aging European societies, both in terms of supporting public finance and welfare expenditure and in terms of labour market specialization.

4.5. However, the level of skills and cultural attitudes of refugees might be very different from the economic immigrants that Europe has welcomed in recent years. This must be acknowledged, requiring an additional effort in terms of integration policies.

5. All levels of governments should follow the best available standards for a successful integration policy and the Union should carefully monitor the application of standards

5.1. Long waiting times should be avoided, particularly for those asylum seekers that are more likely to stay (i.e. coming from countries with a high rate of success in obtaining the asylum permit).

5.2. Asylum seekers should be provided as soon as possible language training and integration support (i.e. skills assessments and civic integration courses). They should also be allowed to work as soon as possible, as not working quickly deteriorate their skills.

5.3. Refugees’ segregation should be prevented. This can be firstly done by means of a thoughtful and well-designed allocation across the country. Three areas seem critical: education; housing; employment.

5.4. Early attention to vulnerable refugees’ categories should be paid. In particular, unaccompanied minors, other minors and refugees with mental and physical health issues, minorities within minority ethnic groups, women or elderly refugees.

5.5. It should be maintained a long term monitoring of refugees’ integration path. Integration might take a long time, particularly for people with low levels of education. While long-term support is expensive, it pays off in the long run, even benefiting the refugees’ offspring who might have integration problems themselves.
Improving the Responses to the Migration and Refugee Crisis in Europe

Over the last decade and more particularly the last couple of months, the EU has faced the development of increasing conflicts on migration related issues. The situation has raised such a level of struggles that bringing back equilibrium in such a conflicting environment will be a hard task for all players and at all stages. However, if EU leaders are unable to take the appropriate political decisions and actions, the EU integration process will simply be at risk.

In its first part, the paper tries to sketch the picture of the breadth of creeping conflicts currently taking place within the EU. While current tensions occurring at political level highlight the existence of conflicts between the EU member states, another conflict—more worrying—is taking place and concerns the widening distance or distrust between citizens and the EU project. In this situation of developing conflicts, the role of the media deserves also to be questioned.

On this basis, the second part of the paper argues there is still space to regain consensus and bring back the EU as a source of prosperity rather than a nest of problems. However, the paper takes the view that a European Council/“top-down” type of approach cannot suffice and will not work out. It is necessary to relaunch a pedagogical approach so as to rebuilt citizens’ understanding and trust in the EU’s actions and project. This implies two set actions:

• In the short run, all players at EU and national levels have to deliver on their promises to show that decisions taken are implemented and produce effects.

• In the medium run, the same players have to kick-start a strategic process to understand, prepare and adopt appropriate answers to the migration phenomenon for the long-term future.

From Conflict to Equilibrium: The Construction of a Common Ground for Social and Political Consensus on Migration

Yves Pascouau Director of migration and mobility policies at the European Policy Centre (Brussels); Senior Research Fellow at the Jacques Delors Institute (Paris); Editor of the website www.EuropeanMigrationLaw.eu

Executive Summary

Over the last decade and more particularly the last couple of months, the EU has faced the development of increasing conflicts on migration related issues. The situation has raised such a level of struggles that bringing back equilibrium in such a conflicting environment will be a hard task for all players and at all stages. However, if EU leaders are unable to take the appropriate political decisions and actions, the EU integration process will simply be at risk.

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• In the medium run, the same players have to kick-start a strategic process to understand, prepare and adopt appropriate answers to the migration phenomenon for the long-term future.
1. Introduction

Over the last decade and more particularly the last couple of months, the EU has faced the development of increasing conflicts on migration related issues. The situation has raised such a level of struggles that bringing back equilibrium in such a conflicting environment will be a hard task for all players and at all stages.

It will also impact the future of the EU’s integration process. Indeed, and to put it in simple terms, if EU leaders are unable to take the appropriate political decisions and actions, the EU integration process will simply be at risk.

Putting into motion the right political options requires having a picture of the breadth of creeping conflicts currently taking place (I). While ever larger in scope, conflicts can nevertheless be addressed if common grounds for consensus are defined and actions put in place (II).
2. A Situation of Growing Conflicts

The EU has faced many challenges and conflicts since its inception. However, the level of conflicts and also distrust deriving, in particular but not only, from the migratory phenomenon is particularly high. While it concerns first of all EU member states (A) it touches upon citizens (B) to the extent that the role of the media is put into question (C).

A. Growing Conflicts Between Member States

Since the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, migration and asylum related issues have always been key subjects discussed at the EU level. From Tampere to the strategic guidelines adopted in June 2014 and the Lisbon Treaty, these issues have rarely left the top of the political agenda. Because of the sovereign dimension of the issue but also because of the fact that they regularly appear on newspapers headlines.

However, current migration situation and discussions have a different tune for two main reasons. First, the magnitude of migration flows arriving in the EU has reached an unprecedented peak. With more than 1 million people entering the EU in 2015, the phenomenon has been considered and qualified as a “crisis”. Secondly, this “crisis” comes in addition to previous serious ones which remain for many unanswered.

The Euro and the Greek crisis have polarised debates since 2008 without leading to a clear solution in particular in Greek case. The “Arab Spring” has transformed EU’s immediate neighbourhood and brought a high level of instability all across the Southern region. The Syrian conflict is still unresolved. The situation in Ukraine is all but stabilised and no solution is expected in the short run. Last but not least, the decision of British citizens to leave the EU has added another unprecedented disruption whose effects remain all but settled.

While this situation of “polycrisis” puts enormous pressure on leaders, it is accompanied by various and unprecedented divisions between EU states. Where the Euro crisis has created the conditions of an opposition between Northern and Southern EU states regarding solutions to implement, the migratory “crisis” has led to a division between the Western and the Eastern EU states.

Nonetheless, divisions regarding the migration issue are more profound than in previous crisis. They oppose states on the principles and values and on solutions to address life and death of human beings fleeing war zones and persecutions. Where some states, and more particularly Germany, have shown great commitment in offering unconditional protection to Syrians and other refugees, like the Visegrád countries, have shown reluctance to welcome refugees and asylum seekers.

Such reluctance and divergences have been particularly salient regarding the relocation mechanism. Aimed at helping Greece and Italy, which are struggling with the arrival of large numbers of people on their shores, the adoption and implementation of this mechanism have been highly difficult. Due to extreme tensions and divisions between the states regarding the relocation mechanism, the Luxembourgish Presidency of the Council decided to ask for a formal vote in the September 2015 Justice and Home Affairs Council. While three states voted against—Hungary, Slovakia and Romania—the relocation mechanism got the majority for its adoption. However, Hungary and Slovakia went further and introduced an action for annulment against the Council’s Decision2 and

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1 - As qualified by the European Commission’s President Jean-Claude Juncker.
decided not to apply it. In addition, Hungary convened in October 2016 a referendum on this issue.

This strong opposition between states has reached a new an unprecedented stage when Luxemburg’s Foreign Minister, Jean Asselborn, said Hungary has treated refugees almost like “wild animals” and should be kicked out of the EU over its stance on the refugee crisis (Kroet, 2016). While divergences are part of the EU negotiation process, the magnitude of current oppositions has reached such a level that makes it extremely difficult to find consensus in many migration related topics.

This is portrayed in the Bratislava declaration adopted by the European Council in September 2016. Participants agreed on actions related to border management and return but failed to find consensus regarding long-term migration policy and on the application of the principles of responsibility and solidarity.

These divisions touch upon core commitments to the EU, i.e. values, and concern fundamental questions regarding EU member states moral, political and legal obligations towards people fleeing for their lives. As long as divisions will concern this specific but crucial point, finding common solutions to address the migratory crisis will remain difficult.

B. From a Citizen’s Perspective: Increasing Distances

Alongside political quarrels and divisions between states, another source of concern derives from the growing distance taking place between the EU’s project and citizen’s support to the project. Such distance should be addressed and reduced, as it is a central component of current and forthcoming decisions to take.

First of all, and in the specific field of migration, citizens’ perception of the migratory phenomenon is not grounded in reality. Citizens tend to overestimate the real numbers of migrants residing in their State. Such misperception is critical as it impedes in practice the development and the implementation of a public policy on migration based on real perceptions.

In addition, the difficulty to find appropriate solutions between states has a strong impact on people’s perception. Because citizens think EU states are not able to manage the situation, the migration phenomenon is increasingly perceived as a threat. This perception also creates disappointment regarding the capacity of the EU to act and undermines the whole EU integration process.

As rightly underlined by Janis Emmanouilidis “A growing number of people have turned their backs on Europe in recent years because of dissatisfaction with the current state of the Union. Although many citizens continue to support the basic notion of European integration, there is a widespread perception that the EU as it stands is less and less able to cope with the immediate problems they are facing. Many dispute the notion that European cooperation is still a ‘win-win’ for all its members and citizens. Instead, there are growing doubts not only among the public but increasingly also among political, economic and intellectual elites about the EU’s added value” (2015, p. 10)

In the end, citizens feel ever more distant from the EU as they feel it is not able to provide policy responses to their current needs and fears. Whether true or not, this growing distance increases distrust towards


5 - “For instance, British respondents, on average, estimated a foreign-born population of 31.8%, while just 11.3% of the population is actually foreign born. This was consistent with findings in previous years” (Caponio & Cappiali, 2016, p. 11).

6 - According to a recent poll, 61% of citizens tend to agree that, “there are terrorists pretending to be refugees who will enter my country to cause violence and destruction” (Ipsos, 2016). See: https://www.ipsos-mori.com/Assets/Docs/Polls/ipsos-global-advisor-immigration-and-refugees-2016-charts.pdf.
EU institutions and trust in national institutions. All this playing in favour of populist and anti-EU political parties as successive elections illustrates it.

C. Questioning the Role of Media

Misperceptions in people's understanding of the current migratory phenomenon may also be attributed to the media. This leads to the question as to whether media are playing properly their role. Without entering into a deep and complex analysis about the role of media in shaping peoples' perceptions, few elements deserve nevertheless to be pointed out.

It is clear that the situation in Europe’s neighbourhood and at its borders is all but simple and has become even more difficult to grasp from a geopolitical point of view. The different and changing roles played by Russia and Turkey at different levels are an example of this difficulty. However, it is the duty of the Media to give citizens the information key to understand the ins and outs.

While this is a task media will now have to perform, previous actions have not created the necessary conditions for the establishment of an informed public debate. First of all, there has not been any clear *modus operandi* among media to systematically differentiate between migrants, asylum seekers and refugees. Each of these people fall into different legal categories and may have a right to migrate or not. Some are protected by international and human rights rules—like refugees and family members—others are not—like so-called “economic migrants”. If refugees or asylum seekers are migrants because their cross a border, all migrants are not refugees or asylum seekers. Hence, portraying people under the generic term of “migrants”, as it has been the case in many media, is misleading.

The UNHCR has shown that a large majority of people arriving at Europe’s borders in 2015 were coming from countries where they were at risk of being persecuted.7 EU states had the duty under international and EU law to process their asylum applications and to grant a refugee status where the examination led to consider them as beneficiaries of international protection.

Secondly, the migratory phenomenon has also been overly represented, or misrepresented, by the use of ever-bigger figures about migrants arriving on Europe’s shores, asylum seekers, people intercepted or even dead at sea. While these figures are necessary to portray trends, they have three limits. First, used on a continual and evolving basis, it has become extremely difficult to keep track and distinguish between irregular migrants, asylum seekers, refugees, etc. Second, big or even “record” numbers increase the “fear factor” of mass movement and support the assumption the issue is unsolvable. Third, such figures dilute individual stories in a global phenomenon instead of putting a face on a phenomenon, which is per nature an individual decision and project.

Thirdly, on seldom occasion media coverage has played a positive role in public perception of the phenomenon. But this more human approach did not last. The example of picture of the poor three-year-old boy lying dead on a beach is significant in this regard. While it has created a “shock” in peoples’ mind, this shock did not last and did not create the conditions for a significant political change regarding common approaches and common solutions to opt for.

Finally, as noted by T. Caponio and T. M. Cappiali mainstream European media have over the past two decades had “the tendency to produce a narrative that associates immigration with negative threats, such as illegality, crisis, crime, etc (…) in recent years, a greater coverage of Islamic terrorism and an associ-
ation between European of Muslims origin and terrorism can be observed. For this reason, media are often believed to be “an additional factor” in shaping hostile public attitudes and in producing negative narratives that construct immigrants as ‘threats’ to receiving societies (Caponio & Cappiali, 2016, p. 18). While media coverage differs from country to country and adapts to positive or negative political environment towards migrants and migration, the role of the media remains key in shaping public perceptions and creating the conditions of a political change supported by citizens.

Considering the current situation, it is obvious that the EU and its member states face a great deal of conflicts. As already said, these conflicts makes it very difficult to define, adopt and implement common solutions to address current crises among which the migratory one is of great concern. While the “polycrisis” situation may lead some to consider that the EU is in a deadlock, it is still possible to break it down. To do so, leaders, citizens and media have the duty to restore trust and the conditions for common solutions to be founded.
Despite the magnitude of the crisis and its exploitation by anti-migrant and anti-EU advocates, including some EU leaders, there is still space to regain consensus and bring back the EU as a source of prosperity rather than a nest of problems. However, such consensus should be backed up by citizens. A European Council/"top-down" type of approach cannot suffice and will not work out since citizens and media do not read European Council’s statements and conclusions. It is necessary to relaunch a pedagogical approach so as to rebuild citizens’ understanding and trust in the EU’s actions and project. This implies two set actions. In the short run, all players at EU and national levels have to deliver on their promises to show that decisions taken are implemented and produce effects (A). In the medium run, the same players have to kick-start a strategic process to understand, prepare and adopt appropriate answers to the migration phenomenon for the long-term future (B).

A. Delivering on Commitments as a Key Political Priority for Rebuilding Trust

If stakeholders wish to rebuild trust among states and citizens, it is no longer possible to agree on actions and fail to implement them. This concerns not only member states but also EU institutions. The role of the media is in this domain also key.

1. Member States

From the member states perspectives, failing to implement EU rules is not new. The failure of Greece and Italy to fully implement EU rules at the external borders has been recorded for a long time by the Commission. Faced with increasing difficulties since 2015, these two states have accepted to play their role, i.e. registering and identifying people, as a counterpart to increased financial and operational support provided by the EU and other member states. However, lack of commitment does not only come from the “usual suspects”. As part of the response to the crisis, the Council has decided to set up hotspots in Italy and Greece to help “frontline” states to register, identify and process people arriving on their shores. Established as a solidarity mechanism, hotspots cannot only function with national (Greek or Italian) or European staff. Other EU states are requested to send experts and officials as well as material to run the hotspots. But here, member states fall short, as national officials are not deployed at the level expected.8

As a consequence, objectives heralded in 2015 to relocate 160,000 asylum seekers over two years are not met. On 2 September 2016, one year after the process started, 1,020 persons out of 39,600 have been relocated from Italy and 3,493 out of 66,400 from Greece, respectively 2.5% and 5% of those initial goals. The process is a failure and its political impact from a citizens’ perspective is dreadful; the EU and member states are not able to deliver.

Alongside this collective lack of commitment, Hungary and Slovakia went a step further. For political reasons, they simply rejected the EU mandatory relocation mechanism and used all tools at their disposal to jeopardize its implementation. First, they introduced an action for annulment of the Decision before the Court of Justice. Second, they refused to put the EU Decision into effect opening therefore the door for a violation EU law. Finally, the Hungarian Prime Minister decided to challenge the EU Decision via a national procedure by convening a referendum on the issue on 2 October 2016.

From a citizens’ perspective, such behaviours are detrimental. They promote the idea that it is possible to reject of EU rules and principles just because states

8 - As an example, among 400 interpreters requested on Greek hotspots, only 70 have been deployed beginning of September 2016. The same applies to asylum officials, 475 were requested and only 94 deployed.
disagree. The rule of law enshrined as a principle of EU membership becomes therefore irrelevant as well as the whole EU project.

Delivering in this case implies a strong commitment from states and institutions to convince, via dialogue, or even force, via the use of legal and financial sanctions, reluctant partners to implement EU rules. While President Juncker’s State of the Union address in September 2016 doesn’t seem to go down that route regarding the principle of solidarity. Some leaders have nevertheless raised their voice like Jean Asselborn, as mentioned earlier.

2. Member States and the EU Institutions

Border management has received increased attention and support over the recent period with the creation of the European Border and Coast Guard and ongoing negotiations on new operational tools to improve operational management of the external borders. In times of security related fears, fuelled by a series of terrorist attacks perpetrated on European soil, enhancing security at EU’s borders can be seen as a positive development for citizens.

Alongside border management policies, the EU and member states have also put actions into place to close migratory routes in the Balkans and more controversially between Turkey and Greece. They have proven to be effective as their goal, decreasing numbers of arrivals, looks for the time being to have been achieved. From a citizen’s perspective, EU institutions and states do deliver and demonstrate that common action can bring added value in the management of the external borders of the EU.

There is one domain however where the EU and member states can do better: return of migrants in an irregular situation. This paper does not aim at discussing the morality and merit of returning people. It seeks to locate this issue in its political dimension where return policy is considered as part of the whole migration policy spectrum. And from a policy or efficiency angle, this domain does not meet the expectations as according to the Commission “In 2014 less than 40% of the irregular migrants that were ordered to leave the EU departed effectively” (European Commission, 2015b).

If decision-makers wish to maintain or restore trust, it is necessary to ensure a greater rate of returns, whether voluntary or forced. This is a question of political accountability towards citizens and of mutual confidence between member states. Returning migrants not authorized to enter or to stay in the EU is a politically sensitive issue, which requires states and the EU to establish the right and difficult equilibrium between attaining political objectives and efficiency and safeguarding human rights commitments and obligations. The question is not one-sided and is a difficult one due to its high political impact in terms of mutual trust and confidence in (future) common actions.

3. EU Institutions

EU institutions have also their role to play in restoring trust and “order” in the current situation. While this entails acting at EU legislative level, delivering calls primarily for immediate action. Here, the Commission
and European Agencies can contribute to achieve results expected. European agencies established in immigration, asylum and security fields have a great role to play in accompanying states in the immediate implementation of EU rules and in the coordination of their actions on the ground.

The role of the Commission is different and two-fold. It has first and foremost the duty to perform its “Treaty keeper” mission and monitor whether states implement correctly EU rules in law and practice. At present, Commission’s action is not satisfactory. If it launched 40 infringement procedures in the field of asylum in September 2015 (European Commission, 2015a) many of these actions were of a formal nature, i.e. lack of communication of national measures to transpose EU law. Only one procedure concerned the “violation of certain provisions of the updated Reception Conditions Directive and updated Asylum Procedures Directive”. Mutual trust cannot be grounded only on communication, it implies real control.

On the legislative side, the Commission should limit its action to the immediate and necessary adaptation of the Schengen area to the migratory pressure. Linked to the asylum topic, this means that with the exception of the modification of the Dublin rules, which are closely linked to the Schengen system, other legislative proposals are not necessarily required. First, for the sake of the “better regulation principle” as asylum rules adopted between 2011 and 2013 have not produced their full effect and no evaluation on their implementation and impact has been carried out. Second, modifying EU rules regularly is the best way to make sure that practitioners will not use them and therefore that asylum seekers and refugees’ rights will be disregarded.

Restoring trust in the system calls for the Commission to act where needed and to get its hands dirty with the task of monitoring and where needed to re-dressing state actions or inactions in a politically sensitive domain. This is the dull part of the Commission’s job, compared to the “noble” one related to proposing legislation, but this is currently the one able meet the goals and rebuild confidence.

4. Media

Appropriate media coverage should accompany political actions. The media should portray the reality of political actions and challenge states when they nationalise EU successes and Europeanise national failures. Without sound “competence-checking”, states will continue to undermine European results and weaken citizens’ confidence in the common project. For instance, the EU is not able to set EU wide resettlement schemes because this competence remains into the states’ hands. Conversely, media should better highlight the significant humanitarian support provided by the European Union to help refugees in third counties.

In addition, an informed debate about immigration and asylum implies the accurate identification of those being discussed. Discussing refugees or (un)authorised migrants does not trigger the same legal situation and consequently legal and political responses. The media should seek for enhance accuracy and avoid misleading shortcomings to set the debate on the appropriate basis.

Finally, the mainstream media should look beyond national borders and the internal political arena. Citizens have a very poor knowledge of EU players in the Commission and the European Parliament. Commissioners and MEP’s are not “second class” decision-makers and should have a seat on major TV or radio shows and programmes to explain their missions and responsibilities.

All relevant players have the duty to deliver on what they agreed or what they are responsible for. This is a matter of priority to restore trust among states and citizens and confidence in the European project. These actions should then after be continued with a sound reflection on the strategy to set in motion regarding migration related issues for the future.

13 - As underlined by President Juncker “We have to stop with the same old story that success is national, and failure European. Or our common project will not survive”. “Towards a better Europe – A Europe that protects, empowers and defends”, Authorised version published by the European Commission, p. 19.
B. Getting Prepared for the Future

The way states and the EU have managed the current migratory situation highlights their level of unpreparedness. The possibility of tens of thousands of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants to arrive sooner or later on Europe’s shores was anything but unexpected. Official reports from Frontex and UN Agencies were openly indicating it. But states have turned a blind eye to warning signs and waited for the human and humanitarian chaos to take place. Instead of preparing for the situation, they faced it in an immediate “crisis mode”. Two lessons should be drawn from this regarding the immediate future (1) and in the long run (2).

1. The Immediate Future

The chaotic situation which is emerging as of in September 2015 has revealed deep-rooted flaws in the way states deal with EU migration policy. EU states still consider that migration issues remain a sovereign issue locked into a Home affairs logic. This has two main consequences.

States are not able to look beyond the national and European borders when it comes to migration management and ignore the foreign policy dimension of migration. On the other hand, the home affairs orientation, and its sovereign dimension, leads to oversee the increasing EU dimension of the policy and more particularly its growing operationalisation regarding border and visa policies. This strong EU integration process calls to reconsider the political and financial management of the policy.

From a political and institutional point of view, this process has given more responsibility to agencies but also to the European Commission. But has the Commission the appropriate know-how to deal with operational issues since it acts mainly at a legislative level? Its lack of acquaintance regarding operational management was illustrated with the establishment of the hotspots. While the Commission has identified the number of national experts to be deployed in the hotspot, it has not planned the difficulties of such deployment from a state perspective. National administrations may have difficulties to provide for experts because they do not have them at their disposal or because experts simply refuse to perform their tasks elsewhere. Hence, managing operations is of specific nature and calls for a particular knowledge, which stays mainly in the member states’ remit. The operationalisation of policies means the Commission must get familiar with this process with the support of member states.

The operationalisation of the policy entails another issue related to its strong financial impact as it requires the mobilisation of equipment and human resources on a 24/7 basis. There is a widening gap between the increasing need of financial resources to set up operational tools and mechanisms and the limited budget allocated to the EU. A thorough discussion on how to finance EU’s operational tasks is therefore necessary.

2. Missing Long Term Strategy

The field of EU asylum and migration policy is characterised by the quasi absence of strategic thinking. With the exception of the October 1999 Tampere conclusions, Heads of State or Government did not draw any forward-looking plan on migration related issues. Five-year plans have been the only horizon upon which leaders have been able to agree since then. Despite decreasing capability to look ahead together, as demonstrated in Bratislava in September 2016, EU leaders should define a long-term strategy on the management of migration flows to show ownership and develop a sound and balanced public policy.

It goes without saying but establishing a public policy calls for the identification on how the future will

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look. This enables decision makers to get prepared and adopt sound, timely and appropriate measures to adapt to an environment, which in the field of immigration is likely to evolve. While pivotal, this exercise has never been launched at EU level.

None of the EU’s institutions has considered relevant to shape scenarios about the long-term future of human mobility. None of the EU’s institutions has gathered a group of experts in migration related or connected fields and asked them to give their projections about the evolution of the migratory phenomenon in the next years and decades. None of the EU’s institutions has reckoned that most probably, the way people are going to move in the next decades will be fundamentally different from the way they do today and consequently that migration management will differ from today’s one. The same criticisms apply to member states’ administrations.

Because states and EU bodies are locked into a five-year framework, their vision of tomorrow’s human mobility is narrowed down. The June 2014 strategic guidelines had a five-year horizon and referred to instability in the world and demographic trends as part of challenges regarding migration.15 While true, this approach is far too limited. Regarding the timeframe, predicting migratory movement worldwide should cover at least one generation, i.e. the next 25 years to set up several scenarios and possible responses to them.

Regarding the content, conflicts and demography are not the only drivers of migration. In an ever globalised and connected world other factors of migration should be included in future scenarios like the increasing urbanisation of the world, the rise of the middle class, the identification of scarce resources, the scenarios of differences in energy cost, the growing impact of climate change, the creeping phenomenon of radicalisation and extremisms, the digitalisation of people’s life etc.

All of these fields, and others, have or could have in the medium to long run a significant impact on the decision or obligation for people to move. Hence, it is of primary importance to gather experts from different disciplines and question them about future scenarios on migration over the next 5, 10, 15 and 25 years. This exercise should involve the usual suspects (migration experts, political scientists, economists, demographers, foreign policy experts, etc.) but also more unusual players including, but not limited to, urbanists, designers, philosophers as well as architects because they have a vision of tomorrow’s world and in particular regarding future forms of human mobility and how the world should adapt.

Alongside this new way of preparing for a changing future, decision makers should improve the connection between EU policy fields having an impact on migration management. Whereas migration issues have been primarily addressed within a Home affairs framework, the current migratory situation illustrates that this phenomenon involves many policies like development, foreign policy, humanitarian aid, trade, integration, etc., i.e. policies where the EU has or may have significant power. The EU should break the usual “silo approach” and connect the EU policy dots to better organise the policy response.

Migration management policy should move away from its initial “Home affairs silo” and embrace the full breadth of a phenomenon which does not start nor stop at the external border of the EU. Migration starts far beyond the EU’s borders, and contains a foreign policy/external dimension, and continues for a long period into the territory of member states, and has therefore an integration dimension. The topic calls for an enhanced linkage between several policy fields and the identification of the most appropriate service to take the lead on policy orientation and coordination.

15 “Faced with challenges such as instability in many parts of the world as well as global and European demographic trends, the Union needs an efficient and well-managed migration, asylum and borders policy, guided by the Treaty principles of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, in accordance with Article 80 TFEU and its effective implementation”, June 2014 European Council Conclusions concerning the area of Freedom, Security and Justice and some related horizontal issues, OJ C 240, 24 July 2014.
4. Conclusion

The “refugee/migrant” crisis reveals that more than 15 years after the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty and the adoption of the Tampere conclusions, EU states have not reached their goals. There is no common EU immigration and asylum policies. Immigration policy remains imbalanced with a deep focus on border management and irregular migration. Actions in the field of asylum did not lead to a common asylum procedure and a uniform status valid throughout the Union.

From a citizens’ perspective, the EU’s actions in the most integrated fields like border management trigger opposing views. For some, the EU is a “fortress” which has turned a blind eye to its values and human rights. For others, the EU implements an open-door policy which undermines Europe’s security. In any case, people are disappointed.

The migratory situation should act as a wakeup call for European leaders and decision-makers to deeply rethink their actions at EU level. This entails first of all the restoration of trust in EU’s actions between states and among citizens. This requires secondly the definition of long term policy responses based on long term scenarios involving the coordination of several EU policy fields.

Over the last 10 to 15 years, the world in and around Europe has fundamentally changed. The enlargement, the economic crisis, the geopolitical transformation of Europe’s neighbourhood, the progressive withdrawal of the US from the Middle East region as well as the ever changing and difficult role played by Russia and Turkey, all these elements have put the EU in a cumbersome situation. The EU has to continue implementing its policies, which are criticised, but has also to find new models and solutions without the possibility to find consensus among EU states.

While these changes and difficulties may play as obstacles, it is of paramount importance to overcome them by putting actions into effect immediately. This is an issue for the continuation of the European project which is at stake, but moreover this is a question of life and death. As long as EU leaders will perpetuate their suicidal inwards looking strategy, children, women and men will continue dying at home, on migration trails and at Europe’s doorstep. Is this really the civilisation project the founding father launched in the 1950’s? Is this really the legacy we wish to hand to our children?
References


About the Author

Yves Pascouau is Director of Migration and Mobility Policies at the European Policy Centre (EPC) in Brussels since 2011 and Senior Research Fellow at the Jacques Delors Institute (JDI) in Paris since 2015. He joined the EPC in 2011 as Senior Policy Analyst and Head of the European Migration and Diversity Programme. Before joining the EPC, he worked for 10 years as a Researcher at the University of Pau in France where he obtained a PhD in Law (“La politique migratoire de l’Union européenne”, LGDJ 2010). He has also been a Researcher at the Université Libre de Bruxelles, where he conducted a large-scale survey on migrants’ integration requirements. He has researched and published widely on the EU and national immigration, asylum and integration policies. He has participated in various EU projects and has also been a national expert for several networks. Alongside his positions at the EPC and the Jacques Delors Institute, Yves Pascouau has created and is the editor of a website devoted to EU immigration, asylum and freedom of movement law and policies: www.europeanmigrationlaw.eu.
From Conflict to Equilibrium: The Construction of a Common Ground for Social and Political Consensus on Migration
Beyond Crisis Management: The Path Towards an Effective, Pro-active and Fair European Refugee Policy

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Executive Summary

Europe urgently needs an effective, pro-active and fair refugee policy. Short-sighted policy-making and a narrow focus on what seemed to be in the immediate national interests have led to a conglomerate of European refugee policies. These policies are clearly ineffective and resulted in a large and partially uncontrolled refugee movement to and within Europe in 2015. Refugee flows to Europe are unlikely to subside soon, as many conflicts persist and the average duration of protracted refugee situations worldwide is on the rise. In a reaction to these circumstances, the European Commission has proposed a number of initiatives to reform the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). Consensus is more likely on the introduction of restrictions and sanctions rather than, for example, fair distribution systems or pooling sovereignty on the EU level by establishing a strong EU Agency of Asylum. Yet, especially pro-active solutions that meet Europe’s humanitarian responsibilities are necessary.

The paper puts forward policy-recommendations for a paradigm-shift from reactive to pro-active refugee policies. The overarching objective is to create further legal channels for refugees to seek protection in Europe. Measures include both national and EU-policies and are supposed to pave the way to a sustainable and coherent European refugee policy. The policy recommendations are clustered in five overarching themes: create safe passages to protection, improve national asylum processing and integration systems, establish further legal pathways for mixed migration, enable protection in the region of origin, and tackle the root causes of forced migration through a sustainable foreign, economic and trade policy. Finally, it has to be stressed that only if we can restore Europe’s political will to manage refugee flows together, there will be sustainable solutions in sight. Regular dialogue taking into account the different resources and histories of the countries are the way forward. If member states can incrementally alight their different national policies, a comprehensive European refugee policy may follow. Given the current political differences amongst member states, this will be a lengthy process—but certainly worth the effort.
Improving the Responses to the Migration and Refugee Crisis in Europe

1. Introduction

An increasing number of conflict situations and the temporary opening of new migration routes to Europe have led to a surge in the number of people seeking refuge in Europe. In 2015, 1,257,030 first time asylum applications were filed in the EU, and from January to June 2016, the figure amounted to 592,795 (Eurostat, 2016a; 2016b). The high numbers of refugees dramatically exposed the weaknesses of the current European Asylum System (CEAS) and showed that it is clearly dysfunctional in times of high refugee inflows. These circumstances may be here to stay, as, for instance, the number of protracted refugee situations worldwide is on the rise. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) defines protracted refugee situations as situations, where refugees are in exile for five or more years after their initial displacement, without immediate prospects for implementation of durable solutions (UNHCR, 2009). UNHCR indicates that in 2015, 41% of the refugees under its mandate were in protracted refugee situations and the average duration of a protracted refugee situation constituted 26 years (UNHCR, 2016a). A comparison with the year 1993 shows a significant increase of 17 years (Milner, 2014, p. 153). Hence, finding solutions that are both sustainable and implemented must be a key priority for EU member states—and for the international community in general. Short-sighted policy measures, such as closing national borders and underfunded refugee camps (without access to education, qualifications and work opportunities) are not apt to deal with refugees in the long-run and might backfire significantly as the events of 2015 have demonstrated. Many migrants have died in an attempt to cross the Mediterranean and uncontrolled refugee flows to Europe in combination with hasty attempts to organise European solidarity through relocation of asylum seekers from Italy and Greece as well as resettlement of refugees from the crisis region in the Middle East led to a massive resistance from countries, such as, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and added further strain to the political climate in Europe. Chancellor Merkel, for instance, admitted in a press conference in September 2016 that she had relied on the Dublin system for too long and, with hindsight, would have prepared Germany better for the refugee inflow of summer/autumn 2015 (Tagesschau, 2016).

Thus, it is only timely to discuss policy proposals on how refugee policy in Europe can be managed in an effective, pro-active and fair way. The UNHCR identifies three durable solutions for refugeehood: Resettlement to a safe country, integration in the receiving society and voluntary return (UNHCR, 2016c). However, these policy measures have failed to provide the envisaged durable solutions to a great number of refugees (Collett, Clewett, & Fratzke, 2016, p. 3; Long, 2014, p. 475). Focussing on the expansion of legal migration routes available to refugees, to supplement the three durable solutions, can help to improve the outcomes of refugee policy. For migration and refugee policy to be sustainable, it is important to be fair to all parties involved (migrants, origin countries, and receiving countries)—even if this is a very challenging undertaking (cf. Dräger & De Geus, 2015, p. 9-10).

The paper will first highlight the importance of legal migration routes for refugees and then outline a number of key challenges European refugee policy faces. Subsequently, it will briefly present the status quo of the CEAS and discuss the recent reform proposals of the European Commission. The paper will close with offering policy recommendations on the way towards an effective, pro-active and fair European refugee policy.
2. Towards Sustainable Solutions: The Importance of Legal Routes

Migrants have four kinds of legal categories to their disposal that allow them to migrate to another country. First, people may migrate for employment purposes; in practice, this is almost entirely restricted to skilled migration (seasonal workers programmes, for instance in the agricultural sector, can represent an exemption). Second, states allow the migration for education reasons, most notably for undertaking university studies. The third legal migration path is family reunification, which means that members of the core family are allowed to join a person who has the legal right to reside in another country. The fourth possibility is to claim asylum. Even the signatory states of the Geneva Convention require refugees to enter their territory to file asylum. However, in order to reach their territory, refugees are—safe very few exceptions, such as resettlement programmes that tend to be quantitatively insignificant—forced to rely on irregular migration channels.

A large share of irregular migrants are refugees, even though they might not qualify for a legally codified protection status. To create legal pathways for refugees is thus the most obvious option. However, it is not the only one. As people migrate because of a mix of motivations, some refugees who file for asylum might have been able to migrate using another legal category, such as employment, education, or family reunification—even though this number is likely to be limited. Nevertheless, to curb irregular migration and/or to prevent people to request asylum who have little prospects to receive protection, it is important to discuss whether and under what circumstances it might make sense to channel these people into other legal migration categories.
3. Lack of Legal Migration Channels for Refugees Poses Multiple Challenges for Europe

European migration policy faces important challenges. One is the lack of legal migration routes to Europe. Currently, there are hardly any legal migration pathways that allow refugees to access Europe in a safe and orderly way. Under the EU-resettlement scheme of July 2015, which foresees to resettle a total of 22,504 persons, until mid-July 2016, only 8,268 people had been resettled. These figures are small compared to the 1,257,030 first time asylum applications that have been filed in EU member states in 2015 or the estimated 1,015,078 refugees that arrived in Europe by crossing the Mediterranean in 2015 (Eurostat, 2016a; UNHCR, 2016b). On a global scale, there is a similar picture: resettlement numbers are insignificant as there are places only available for less than one percent of the global refugee population (Van Selm, 2014). One of the most terrifying consequence of the dearth of legal migration channels for refugees constitutes dead or missing migrants in the Mediterranean; UNHCR estimates 3,169 persons in 2016 (until 5 September 2016) (UNHCR, 2016b). In addition, there is a large number of people who have died when trying to cross the Sahara. A thriving smuggling industry and chaotic circumstances in transit and destinations countries represent further important detrimental effects.

In an attempt to curb irregular migration from Turkey to Europe, the EU and Turkey concluded an agreement which stipulates that, as of 20 March 2016, all irregular migrants crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands (and hence into EU-territory) would be returned to Turkey. For every Syrian being returned to Turkey, another Syrian is supposed to be resettled to the EU and distributed between EU member states. However, the agreement does not represent a sustainable solution to manage refugee flows from Syria. Resettlement is going slow and as of end of September 2016, only 1,614 Syrian refugees have been resettled from Turkey to Europe (European Commission, 2016j). Thus, the agreement cannot be seen as offering quantitatively significant legal routes for refugees to the EU, but rather represents a cork to stop the refugee influx.

Another corollary of lacking legal routes for refugees, and a second important challenge, is the rise of mixed migration. Migration motivations of refugees and economic migrants are not always easy to distinguish and often people migrate for a combination of reasons, or motivations are subject to change. As a result, the asylum system is often used by (economic) migrants, who, for instance, seek to escape dire poverty, because of the inexistence of alternative routes for migration. Especially in times of high asylum claims, this adds further strain to asylum systems. Betts (2013, pp. 4-6) coined the term survival migration to conceptualise the problem, that many people are forced to flee their country of origin because of reasons, such as failed states, environmental disasters, and the erosion in livelihood. Betts (2013, p. 188) defines survival migrants as “persons who are outside their country of origin because of an existential threat to which they have no access to a domestic remedy or resolution.” Neither of the above causes of migration is covered by the internationally accepted refugee concept, which was created after the Second World War to protect people in Europe from individualised prosecution by their own governments (Betts, 2013, p. 188). This means that states tend not to offer protection status for many contemporary refugees (cf. Angenendt, Kipp & Meier, forthcoming). These protection gaps often force people into irregular migration channels where they end up filing asylum claims without much prospects of being granted a legal right to stay.

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1 - For a detailed discussion of mixed migration, see Angenendt, Kipp & Meier (forthcoming).
A further challenge is the lack of an effective and fair distribution system across Europe. The Dublin system shifts the burden of processing arrivals to the southern “frontier countries”, such as Italy and Greece. In times of high asylum flows to Europe this burden amounts to a great challenge, especially for crisis-torn Greece. Plus, some asylum seekers try to avoid being registered in the first EU-country they arrive to reach a more attractive destination (for a further discussion of the shortcomings of the current CEAS, see section 4.1). Even though the structural deficits of the Dublin-system have been known for a while, EU member states have missed out on developing a fundamental alternative to the Dublin system (Angenendt, Kipp & Kosch, 2016, p. 2). As the majority of member states benefit from the current asymmetric burden sharing, they did not have the incentive to change the system. Also, more recently, the political costs of accepting relocation have risen or have even been pushed up by local politicians. In an attempt to restore Dublin transfers to Greece within the current system, the Commission has adopted a number of recommendations in February 2016, June 2016 and September 2016 (cf., for instance, European Commission, 2016k).

In addition, the EU is deeply divided on whether to accept a meaningful number of refugees at all. In 2015, Germany, Hungary and Sweden alone received 62% of asylum claims, and their share of the actual inflow of asylum seekers is even higher (Mayer, 2016, p. 6). It has to be mentioned, however, that Hungary only granted a protection status to 505 asylum seekers in 2015 (Eurostat, 2016d). Hence, only a few countries, most notably Germany and Sweden, have taken on the responsibility to accept asylum seekers in relatively large numbers. But the issue is more complex, as other states feel that especially Germany’s unilateral “open-door” policy induced more refugees to migrate, which, in turn, put strain on transit countries, such as Hungary, Slovenia and Croatia (Mayer, 2016, p. 8); this also applies to Austria, that, in addition to being a transit country, received a significant number of asylum applications. It is hard to imagine a sustainable solution to the current refugee situation that does not involve EU member states coming together to more fairly share the burden in some sort of consensus (Mayer, 2016, p. 8).

Demographic developments are likely to increase migration pressures to Europe and reinforce the issues outlined above in the years to come. According to calculations issued by the United Nations, without migration, by the year 2050, (wider) Europe’s working age population would decline by 96 million. Conversely, Africa’s working age population would increase by 919 million and Asia’s population by 517 million (Azhaf, Kober & Mayer, 2015). Thus, the need to implement a fair and effective European asylum policy now is very pressing as it might be strained in the future even more. It is important to create such a system with a strategic view and not in a modus of short-term crisis management. It is important to mention that a fair and effective European asylum policy has to be one component of a comprehensive strategy to deal with these demographic changes.
4. The Commission’s Proposals to Reform the Common European Asylum System and Establish Migration Partnerships with Third Countries – Up to the Task?

4.1 Status Quo and Context

The main legislation on asylum in the EU essentially is based on five legal pillars as well as a support agency—the European Asylum Support Office (EASO). Together, they constitute the CEAS. The five pillars consist of two regulations (Dublin Regulation and Eurodac Regulation) and three directives (Asylum Procedures Directive, Qualification Directive and Reception Conditions Directive). Regulations are binding legislative acts and must be fully applied by the member states. Directives, however, are legislative acts that only define common goals, which all member states must achieve. Their implementation falls under the responsibility of the states themselves who establish their own laws on how to reach those goals.

The CEAS was supposed to establish minimum standards for dealing with asylum processes in the EU. From the very beginning, though, some of its aspects have been criticised. Particularly, the Dublin Regulation has raised concerns for putting disproportionate pressure on the member states with external borders who have long been most affected by irregular migration.²

The fundamental shortcomings of the CEAS were fully displayed when the number of people seeking asylum in Europe increased significantly in 2015. While the Dublin Regulation practically failed, the

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² Before 2015, the majority of irregular migrants has entered in a legal way (with a visa or as tourists on short-term permits, for instance) but have overstayed.
other pillars of the CEAS have been strained as well. Recognition rates, for instance, have differed drastically between EU countries, contributing to secondary movements of asylum seekers to only a few countries in the EU (i.e. Germany and Sweden). Regarding recognition rates in 2015, Germany accepted 57% of all applications in first instance decisions, Sweden 72% and the Netherlands 80% (Eurostat, 2016c). Hungary (15%) or Poland (18%), on the other hand, recognised drastically fewer applications in comparison (Eurostat, 2016c). Most of the 174,435 first time asylum applications reported by Hungary for 2015 have never been decided as asylum seekers have moved to another country (cf. Eurostat, 2016a; 2016d).

Acknowledging the shortcomings of the current system, the European Commission (2016c) presented proposals for a major reform of the CEAS “in order to move towards a fully efficient, fair and humane asylum policy—one which can function effectively both in times of normal and in times of high migratory pressure”. The main goals of the proposals are to reduce the incentives for irregular migration as well as improve the migration management within Europe. On 4 May and 13 July 2016, the Commission presented legislative proposals to

- reform the current regulations and directives of the CEAS;
- transform the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) into a significantly more capable EU Agency for Asylum;
- establish—for the first time—a common EU resettlement framework.

Furthermore, on 7 June 2016, the Commission presented a proposal for enhanced cooperation with third countries through the establishment of Migration Partnerships.

**4.2 European Commission Proposals of 4 May 2016**

**4.2.1 Reform of the Dublin Regulation**

Prior to the legislative proposal that was presented on 4 May 2016, the Commission had outlined two potential reform options for the future of the Dublin Regulation in a press release on 6 April 2016 (European Commission, 2016a). Option number one entailed a comprehensive reform of the Dublin Regulation by introducing a permanent distribution mechanism for asylum seekers based on predefined criteria (i.e. GDP and size of population of a member state). Option number two, instead, foresaw to maintain the current system while adding to it a “corrective allocation mechanism” (Fairness Mechanism; European Commission, 2016b) to support member states in times of disproportionate migratory pressure. Likely, because of fundamental objections towards a permanent distribution key by some member states (particularly in Eastern Europe), the Commission opted for the second option in the end. It foresees that if the number of asylum seekers a member state receives exceeds a predefined benchmark, all new incoming asylum seekers will be automatically allocated to other member states. This would only be the case however, if the asylum seekers’ applications were not found inadmissible, i.e. because of coming through a first country of asylum or a safe third country. If a member state would refuse to participate in the Fairness Mechanism, the member state would be obliged to pay €250,000 per person to the member state who would handle the application of the asylum seeker instead (European Commission, 2016c).

Furthermore, the proposed amendment to the Dublin Regulation obliges all member states to first assess whether an asylum application is admissible, before actually allowing the opening of a formal asylum procedure (ibid.).

**4.2.2 Extension of the Eurodac Regulation**

The proposal of the Commission is supposed to enable a more comprehensive acquisition and storage of personal data of asylum seekers in the Eurodac system, i.e. names, dates of birth, citizenships and facial images (European Commission, 2016b).

**4.2.3 Establishing an EU Agency for Asylum**

The Commission proposes to transform EASO into a “fully-fledged European Union Agency for Asy-
lum with an enhanced mandate and considerably expanded tasks to address any structural weaknesses that arise in the application of the EU’s asylum system” (European Commission, 2016b). The new agency has been envisaged to reduce divergences within the EU concerning the assessment of asylum applications and information sharing between member states. The Commission proposal includes that the new agency may deploy asylum support teams in times of disproportionate pressure to the asylum system of a member state, putting the CEAS at risk—even if the member state concerned is against it (European Commission, 2016c).

4.3 European Commission Proposals of 13 July 2016
4.3.1 Reform of the Asylum Procedures Directive

In order to guarantee coherent asylum procedures in the EU, the Commission proposes to replace the current directive with a regulation (European Commission, 2016f). Thereby, the Commission seeks to discourage secondary movements of asylum seekers, since—so far—most of them have tried to reach only a few countries within the EU (i.e. Germany, Sweden, Austria and the Netherlands). Furthermore, the Commission proposal aims at simplifying and shortening asylum procedures in the EU (max. six months; for inadmissible applications only one to two months). Moreover, it foresees common guarantees for asylum seekers, additional sanctions and proposals to have a common definition for safe third countries, in perspective culminating in a common EU list (European Commission, 2016g).

4.3.2 Reform of the Qualification Directive

The Commission proposes to replace the existing directive with a regulation to establish common grounds for granting international protection (European Commission, 2016f). Particularly, the proposal aims at overcoming the existing divergences of EU member states’ asylum recognition rates and their varying definitions of protection statuses (i.e. regarding the duration of residence permits). To support the harmonisation, member states shall be obliged to consider country of origin-reports by EASO when assessing the legitimacy of asylum applications.

The proposed regulation also foresees a number of restrictive measures perceived to decrease the incentives for secondary movements of asylum seekers within the EU. For instance, by impeding access to long-term residence permits or by obliging member states to conduct regularly status reviews for refugees potentially leading to an end of the protection status (European Commission, 2016g).

4.3.3 Reform of the Reception Conditions Directive

The Commission proposes to amend the current directive in order “to ensure that asylum seekers can benefit from harmonised and dignified reception standards throughout the EU, hence helping to prevent secondary movements” (European Commission, 2016f). The proposal contains measures to support the integration of asylum seekers, i.e. through the possibility of accessing the labour market after a maximum of six months—if the labour market is not strained by high unemployment rates and unless the asylum seekers’ applications are “likely to be unfounded and treated in an accelerated procedure” (European Commission, 2016g).

A positive provision is that unaccompanied minors are to be assigned a guardian at the latest five days after lodging an application. At the same time, the proposal also foresees a number of restrictive measures, i.e. through residence and reporting restraints with the possibility of detention if “an asylum seeker is not complying with the obligation to reside in a specific place and where there is a risk of absconding” (European Commission, 2016f).

4.4 Proposal for an EU Resettlement Framework

On 13 July 2016, the European Commission proposed an EU Resettlement Framework to complement the CEAS and “ensure orderly and safe pathways to Europe for persons in need of international protection” (European Commission, 2016h). The new framework
is meant to assist the implementation of migration compacts (Migration Partnerships) with designated third countries (countries of origin and transit; for details, see section 4.5). This is based on the idea that third countries might be more willing to readmit people who were denied asylum in Europe if the EU pledges to take in persons in need for international protection via resettlements at the same time.

The Commission proposal introduces a permanent framework with a unified procedure for resettlements to the EU. However, the number of people to be resettled through the framework would be decided by member states themselves. Hence, member states could even decide to resettle no asylum seekers at all. This might be the Achilles heel of the proposal. Those who would decide to participate in the framework are supposed to be financially compensated with €10.000 per person through the European Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF). Critically, only people who did not (attempt to) flee to the EU irregularly within the past five years, will be eligible for resettlements (European Commission, 2016i).

4.5 Proposal for Enhanced EU Cooperation with Third Countries (Migration Partnerships)

On 7 June 2016, the Commission outlined ideas for an enhanced cooperation framework with third countries to better manage migration (European Commission, 2016d). The proposed cooperation will take the form of tailored compacts (Migration Partnerships) “that will be developed according to the situation and needs of each partner country, depending on whether they are a country of origin, country of transit or a country hosting many displaced persons” (European Commission, 2016d). One of the key goals of the compacts is to significantly reduce irregular migration to the EU. In the short term, migration compacts are envisaged with Jordan and Lebanon—in the intermediate and long run, also with Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Ethiopia, Senegal, Tunisia and Libya (European Commission, 2016e).

In order to actually make the Migration Partnerships work, the “full range of EU policies and external EU instruments” is supposed to be used—complemented by policy tools of member states (European Commission, 2016d). Particularly, this includes foreign, economic and development policy as well as cooperation on border control. If a third country denies to cooperate, development cooperation might be reduced. Meanwhile, the Commission proposes to increase the capacity of its external financial instruments (i.e. strengthening the budget of the Trust Fund for Africa with one billion Euro), to tackle root causes more effectively than in the past (ibid.).

4.6 Assessment of the European Commission’s Proposals

The proposals of the European Commission pursue three overarching objectives:

- Overcoming divergences between member states concerning the implementation of the CEAS, i.e. through replacing directives with regulations, transforming EASO into an EU Agency for Asylum with an extended mandate or establishing a Fairness Mechanism to allocate asylum seekers in the EU more fairly;

- Discouraging secondary movements and irregular migration via restrictions and sanctions as well as through enhanced cooperation with third countries (Migration Partnerships);

- Enhancing legal pathways to Europe via an EU Resettlement Framework.

Replacing directives with regulations is a sensible step towards harmonising asylum processes and recognition rates within Europe. Transforming EASO into a more capable EU Agency for Asylum to better support and monitor member states with the implementation of the CEAS would be an improvement as well. A Fairness Mechanism might also help ease the burden on those member states (namely Greece and Italy) who have been under enormous pressure because of irregular migration. Yet, it does not seem likely at the moment that there will be a consensus on some
of those proposals (i.e. Fairness Mechanism and the EU Agency of Asylum’s right to act against the will of a member state). Particularly, as regards the obligation to pay €250,000 per person in case of a refusal to participate in the Fairness Mechanism, it is very unlikely that there will be an agreement among member states. It is striking that the proposed EU Resettlement Framework, on the other hand, foresees to assist member states with only €10,000 per resettled person. Indeed, it might be more useful to significantly increase the financial and structural incentives to allocate asylum seekers (via relocations or resettlements).

Overall, a consensus among member states currently seems more likely regarding the introduction of restrictions and sanctions to reduce irregular migration to the EU and secondary movements within Europe. Particularly, with respect to obligatory inadmissibility checks (proposed Dublin Regulation) and the stricter application of safe third country provisions (envisaged reform of the Asylum Procedures Directive), which might effectively hinder many asylum seekers from lodging applications in the EU. Regarding the establishment of migration compacts with designated third countries (Migration Partnerships), it has to be seen, to what extent they could actually become mutually beneficial partnerships, respecting the rights of asylum seekers and migrants. There has been a broad range of critique, particularly from NGOs, which view the migration compacts as an illegitimate form of externalising migration control (cf., for instance, Amnesty International, 2016). Moreover, some members of the European Parliament voiced their concerns about the Migration Partnerships (cf. European Parliament, 2016).

The proposed EU Resettlement Framework would be a significant first step to enhance legal pathways and effectively reduce the incentives to flee to Europe irregularly. However, given the fact that member states would be able to decide on the number of asylum seekers to be resettled, it remains to be seen whether the framework will actually be successful.
This chapter presents a number of policy recommendations in order to fulfil the paradigm-shift from a reactive to a pro-active European refugee policy. The recommendations comprise a mix of national and EU-level measures and most recommendations have a national as well as an EU-level dimension. Of course, a coherent and effective EU refugee policy would be the most desirable option. However, this is difficult to achieve given the current political climate. Thus, smaller bottom-up steps on the national level (in the same direction) in combination with top-down EU-level efforts may be a more pragmatic approach that might eventually lead to an effective, pro-active and fair European refugee policy in the future. The policy recommendations are clustered in five overarching themes: create safe passages to protection, improve national asylum processing and integration systems, establish further legal pathways for mixed migration, enable protection in the region of origin, tackle the root causes of forced migration through a sustainable foreign, economic and trade policy. A final remark highlights the importance of member states’ political will to reform current refugee policies.

5.1 Create Safe Passages to Protection

5.1.1 Resettlement

Resettlement from crisis countries or refugee camps in neighbouring countries allows a safe passage to protection. In addition, as most refugees in crisis regions do not live in refugee camps, it is important to identify other places, from where refugees can be resettled. As noted above, there are by far too few resettlement programmes worldwide. Out of the resettlement places offered, the US, Canada and Australia provide 90% of the global capacity (Van Selm, 2014, p. 512). In 2015, UNHCR indicates that 81,000 individuals departed to resettlement countries with UNHCR’s assistance (UNHCR, 2016d). This figure is dwarfed by the total of 16.1 million refugees under UNHCR’s mandate at the end of 2015 (UNHCR, 2016a). EU member states should increase the numbers of resettlement places available. A possible option is the UNHCR’s resettlement programme. The EU Resettlement Framework proposed by the European Commission in July 2016 might be a further option in the future, but it does not oblige member states to resettle refugees. Thus, it is crucial to generate the political will in EU member states to boost their resettlement efforts. For this to succeed, it is important that all, or most, member states contribute to this process—according to their individual capacities. It is unlikely that only a few member states will undertake efforts to increase their resettlement places on their own. The advantages to resettlement as an effective and manageable way to cope with high refugee flows has to be continuously highlighted and discussed across the EU.

However, it is critical, that offering a limited number of resettlement places is not used to legitimise curbing refugee flows beyond resettlement programmes and to reduce the availability of other status of protection (cf. Angenendt, Kipp & Meier forthcoming; Kleist, 2016). Offering increased numbers of resettlement places can be expected to reduce incentives for individuals to use irregular routes to access protection, in Europe for example. Thus, it is unlikely that increased resettlement opportunities will come on top of current refugee flows, but rather will reroute current flows via irregular routes. Nonetheless, it has to be mentioned that an effective but fair border management is imperative for EU member states to step-up their resettlement efforts.

5.1.2 Humanitarian Visas

Humanitarian visas represent a further option for refugees for a legal and safe route to Europe. Such visas could be provided by individual states unilaterally, and Brazil and Switzerland have recently offered humanitarian visas—although in limited numbers (cf. Betts, 2015; Thränhardt, 2016). Even better would be
Improving the Responses to the Migration and Refugee Crisis in Europe

an EU-wide solution. Part of such an EU-effort could to be to create small consular outposts outside the European Union, for instance, in Turkey or Libya (Betts, 2015). These outposts could be moved when migratory routes shift. Such outposts would allow people to be screened, for instance, by an EU Agency for Asylum, and those meeting the criteria would be granted a humanitarian visa. Another option could be to empower member states’ consulates to issue EU-humanitarian visas. Persons with a humanitarian visa could then travel to Europe by plane or ferry at their own expense, which would be cheaper and much safer than paying smugglers for a journey to Europe. Upon arrival, the visa holder would need to file an asylum claim. An EU-humanitarian visa would require an EU-wide distribution mechanism. Humanitarian visas would work best if offered to nationals from countries with high protection rates. This could counter the argument, critics of such an approach might put forward, that humanitarian visas might represent a further pull factor for individuals with little chances of being recognised as refugees to seek protection in Europe. A slight increase of refugees from the most crisis-torn regions would certainly be an acceptable price to pay for one further step towards a fair and effective EU refugee policy (Betts, 2015).

The idea of humanitarian visas for refugees has historical precedent: the Nansen Passports used by the League of Nations. Between 1922 and 1942, the scheme was recognized by over 50 countries and enabled around 450,000 people, including Assyrian, Armenian and Turkish refugees, to travel safely to Europe (Betts, 2015; Wallaschek, 2016). In recognition of its achievements, the Nansen International Refugee Office received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1938.

5.1.3 Private Sponsorship of Refugees

Private sponsorship programmes for refugees provide for another safe way to reach a country offering protection and offers many advantages, also for paving the way for refugees to integrate in the host society. Private sponsorship can supplement traditional refugee resettlement programmes, by means of communities and other nongovernmental entities directly supporting the arrival and integration of persons in need of protection (Collett, Clewett, & Fratzke, 2016, p. 22). To be successful, the design of such sponsorship programmes is crucial: Guidelines should present the purpose of private sponsorships, who is eligible to sponsor and be sponsored, the responsibilities of sponsors, and the safety net in place should problems arise (Kumin, 2015, p. 1).

A well-developed good policy-practice has been implemented by Canada. It allows private citizens to play a role in Canada’s refugee policy. A sponsorship usually starts with a group of friends, family, neighbours or colleagues who get together and decide they want to be sponsors. The group often already knows a refugee who they want to sponsor. Sponsors close a contract with the Canadian government and sponsors commit to providing emotional, material and financial support for one full year (Omidvar, 2015).

The programme builds social capital and is an effective tool for settlement. Refugees who are privately sponsored have better employment outcomes than those who are sponsored by government or who claim asylum in Canada: In the first two years of arrival, private sponsored refugees in Canada earned or exceeded a salary of C$20,000—higher than any other refugee group (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2012, p. 8).

There is not one single model for private sponsorship programmes and they need to be adopted to the specific country context. But a well thought through implementation of such programmes in the EU and its member states would be an important supplement to resettlement programmes and constitute an effective way to provide legal routes for refugees to Europe, in combination with good integration prospects.

5.2 Improve National Asylum Processing and Integration Systems

5.2.1 Effective National Asylum Systems

In the absence of a fully-fledged EU-asylum procedure, EU member states need effective national systems for processing asylum claims and dealing with asylum seekers. They need to possess the capacity to process asylum claims efficiently, provide adequate housing, integrate those with protection status into society, and keep careful track of the identities of asylum seekers in the country. It is important that national authorities demonstrate their ability to act. This still requires significant efforts across the EU because opportunities to improve capacity in recent years were missed. It is equally important to keep asylum systems flexible so they can cope with fluctuating demand—also with support by an EU Agency for Asylum (Mayer, 2016, pp. 7-8).

5.2.2 Labour Market Integration of Refugees

Labour market integration of refugees is as essential part of a sustainable refugee integration in host societies as well as a life in dignity. The UN Development Report (2015, p.1) states: “Ultimately, work unleashes human potential, human creativity and the human spirit.” Effective labour market integration of refugees is consequently a crucial part of a sustainable refugee policy. However, labour market outcomes of refugees tend to be poor. On average, it takes refugees up to 20 years to have a similar employment rate as the native-born (OECD, 2016, p. 21). Support measures can help refugees to find an employment commensurate to their qualifications and skills.

Most refugees do not have formal qualifications or the documents that prove they do. But often refugees possess competencies that they have acquired non-formally or informally. A flexible skills assessment and possibilities for modular qualifications are needed (for refugees, but also in general). This could also meet the expectations of refugees to be employed early (Aumüller, 2016a).

As many refugees will not be able to access the regular labour market because of lacking formal qualifications and language proficiency, concepts are needed to avoid future long-term unemployment of refugees. Job opportunities outside the private labour market which are combined with language tuition, skills development, job application training etc. might represent one possibility. Possibilities of a social labour market should be explored—otherwise there is the danger, that refugees might move into the informal labour market instead (Aumüller, 2016b). If well managed, such publicly funded not-for-profit jobs can also bring symbolic returns to society that in turn might increase acceptance of asylum seekers amongst the population.

It is important that labour market support measures start early, i.e. already during the application process. Labour market integration of asylum-seekers and refugees should be handled as a flexible process which focuses on the individual requirements of the persons concerned. A long-lasting linear process—first step: language proficiency, second step: skills assessment, third step: getting vocational orientation and so on—should be avoided. Instead, the different elements of labour market integration should be paralleled. Refugees should benefit from an individual coaching which also takes into account the needs of social integration—passing the legal asylum procedure, accommodation, family unification, coping with trauma etc. (Aumüller, 2016b).

5.2.3 Voluntary Return

The focus on recent policy proposals, such as the New Migration Partnership Framework4 or the regulation on a European travel document for the return of illegally staying third country nationals5 proposed by the European Commission, has been on the return of persons who are not eligible for a protection status. While this is an important feature of an effective refugee policy, also the return of persons with protection status needs to be part of a forward-looking EU

refugee policy. If the causes for refugee migration in the country of origin subside, return to the country or region of origin may be an important option for refugees. Return has to happen voluntarily to be a safe process—in accordance with the principle of non-refoulement (Bohnet & Rudolf, 2015, p. 2; United States Institute for Peace, 2016).

Re-establishing economic livelihoods, political capital, and social networks can pose serious challenges (Hammond, 2014, p. 508). The EU and member states should provide assistance to facilitate the return process of refugees. For return to be a smooth process, a few principles need to be kept in mind: Post-conflict situations are transitory processes and cannot be equated with the end of all conflict and significant levels of violence might continue to exist (Bohnet & Rudolf, 2015, p. 1). Return and local integration should not be set against each other. The experiences and competencies acquired in the country offering protection might be helpful for re-integrating in the country of origin (Bohnet & Rudolf, 2015, p. 4). Thus, investments of receiving countries in refugees’ integration can also be investments in stabilising the region or country of origin economically and politically. Moreover, returning refugees may serve as channels for invisible transfers of modernity, social and political changes, and learning processes at the family, community and citizenship level (cf. Garson, 2015, p. 19). Also the experiences and competencies acquired in the country offering protection might be helpful for re-integrating in the country of origin (Bohnet & Rudolf, 2015, p. 4). Finally, relief and development efforts should be part of any sustainable return programme (Bohnet & Rudolf, 2015, p. 5).

In Germany, the Centre for International Migration and Development (CIM) runs the Migration for Development Programme which offers support to returning experts (Heimer & Münch, 2015, pp. 46-47). The programme includes individual counselling regarding return and career planning, information on the origin country’s labour market, job-placement services, continuing support in re-entering a career within the home country, and the provision of local contacts. In certain cases, financial grants by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) are provided, toward travel, transportation, and the establishment of a workplace. Another programme helps migrants to start a business in their home country. While these programmes do not have a refugee focus, they offer important insights for return programmes targeting refugees.

5.2.4 Reform of the Dublin System

The structural deficits of the Dublin system have to be overcome in order for national asylum procedures to function effectively and fairly. The responsibility to grant protection to those individuals in need has to be shared across EU member states—taking into account different national resources and histories. One step towards a fairer distribution of asylum seekers represents the Commission’s “corrective allocation mechanism” proposed on 4 May 2016; however, it might be useful to step up incentives to distribute asylum seekers (cf. section 4.6). Initially, the Commission’s considerations included a more wide-ranging option of a permanent distribution mechanism presented on 6 April 2016, which was then abandoned in favour of the more modest “corrective allocation mechanism” (cf. section 4.2.1). Given the current political climate, a fundamental overhaul seems impossible to realise in the near future and smaller steps of reform are preferable to a standstill. Nonetheless, a more ambitious reform of the Dublin system should remain a medium-term objective.

Countries without borders with third-countries, such as Germany, have for a long-time benefitted from the Dublin system. Even though its shortcom-

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6 - More information on the programme can be found here: http://www.cimonline.de/en/61.asp.

7 - More information on the programme can be found here: http://www.cimonline.de/en/2593.asp#top.
ings were obvious and the southern “frontier countries” had to shoulder most of the burden. Now, the situation has changed and Germany is amongst the greatest supporters of a new EU-wide distribution mechanism for refugees. To convince other countries to accept any form of such a system, this history has to be taken into account. Hence, the way towards any serious EU-distribution mechanism is likely to proceed in small steps and to entail concessions to countries carrying the largest burden under the current Dublin system.

5.3. Establish Further Legal Pathways for Mixed Migration

As discussed above, migrants often migrate because of a mix of motivations. Many individuals who claim asylum migrate out of economic necessity and do not qualify for a status of protection. Expanding the opportunities to migrate to the EU through new economic migration channels might contribute to disentangling mixed migration flows and to reducing the pressure on asylum systems. Even though, the quantitative potential of this way is likely to be limited. There are a number of ways to migrate to EU member states for employment reasons, but these pathways tend to be restricted to skilled and highly skilled workers (seasonal workers programmes can be an exception). In order to separate economic from refugee migration, the establishment of new migration channels for unskilled workers needs to be discussed. Currently, this is largely unpopular in EU countries and politically not to be realised. But it might be an option in the future, when demographic aging and shrinking in Europe has progressed further. It is crucial, however, that this is supplemented by efforts to improve labour force participation of the domestic population and the upgrading of working conditions of currently rather unpopular professions, such as caretaking.

5.4 Enable Protection in the Region of Origin

5.4.1 Temporary Protection in Refugee Camps in the Regions of Origin

Protection in the region of origin can serve as an intermediate solution to cope with refugee flows. Refugee camps in neighbouring countries, for instance, can offer individuals in need of protection a safe place in relative vicinity to their home country, thereby avoiding to embark on dangerous journeys to other safe countries; a further beneficial side-effect comprises reduced revenues for smugglers. Refugee camps can be a reasonable policy option in particular if it is unclear how long a particular crisis situation will persist. In case the situation is resolved, refugees will be able to return to their home country soon and contribute to rebuilding and stabilising the country, for example.

In order for refugee camps in crisis regions to be a viable option, it is important that they are well funded. Chronic underfunding of organisations, such as the UN World Food Programme led to reduced food allowances for refugees in Jordan and Lebanon in early 2015. These deteriorating circumstances drove many refugees to seek better living conditions elsewhere (Mayer, 2016, p. 4). This was one of the chief drivers that caused the massive refugee inflow in Europe in 2015 that the EU and its member states found difficult to manage. Hence, well-funded refugee camps in neighbouring countries can be an important buffer—especially in times of high refugee migration from one region of origin—and should be part of a pro-active EU-refugee policy. From there, refugees could travel to other places offering sustainable protection, for instance, through resettlement programmes, private sponsorship programmes or humanitarian visas. It is important that the time refugees spend in camps is used properly; just offering protection without anything else is not enough. Education, qualification measures, and work opportunities can both improve the labour market integration prospects in later host countries as well as contribute to stabilising their home country in case of return. Refugee camps should only serve as intermediate solutions to refugeehood and should not
externalise the responsibility for a sustainable EU-refugee policy to countries in crisis regions.

5.4.2 Local Integration in the Region of Origin

Local integration in neighbouring countries is another source of protection for refugees. Estimates indicate that, in Turkey for instance, around 20% of all refugees live in camps and around 80% in Turkish cities (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2015). In Jordan, around 80% of all Syrian refugees live outside camps, mostly in the cities of Irbid and Amman (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016a). In Lebanon, the government seeks to avoid establishing camps for Syrian refugees. Thus, most Syrian refugees live in improvised tent settlements, garages, unfinished houses, or even flats (if they can afford it) (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016b).

Refugees in neighbouring countries mostly live in precarious situations without the right to work or to receive social benefits and often do not have access to healthcare. European governments need to work with countries in crisis regions to improve and legalise the status of refugees. This will necessitate significant investments. A further option comprises the support of civil society initiatives that can provide food or education.

5.5 Tackle the Root Causes of Forced Migration through a Sustainable Foreign, Economic and Trade Policy

A sustainable solution to the large asylum inflows to the EU must address the root causes of forced migration. This is an extremely challenging task and might require EU member states to make concessions. Tackling the root causes includes ending the conflict in Syria and putting a stop to the terror of the Islamic State group. Moreover, it involves helping refugees’ and migrants’ home countries to develop. In addition to development cooperation, trade and economic policy must be viewed in a differed light—beyond the traditionally narrow notion of national interests.

Article 208 of the Lisbon Treaty states, “[…] The Union shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries.” This principle needs to be incorporated better in policy-making of the EU and its member states. Short-term gains of certain economic and trade policies need to be replaced by a more long-term and holistic view of policy-making. For instance, jobs in developing countries need to be decent. The long-term costs of underdevelopment will dwarf any short-term gains through cheap production sites of European corporations in developing countries. Another field of action could be reducing subsidies for agricultural production in Europe or improving the prospects for businesses in developing countries. In addition, simplifying remittance transfers and targeted investments by the diaspora community should be part of a sustainable development policy for countries of origin (Mayer, 2016, p. 9).

Serious investments in developing countries of origin constitute an important part of tackling the root causes of forced migration. For instance, states attending President Obama’s Leaders Summit on Refugees in September 2016 have committed to increase their 2016 financial contributions to UN appeals and international humanitarian organisations by around $4.5 billion over 2015 levels (The White House, 2016). When compared to the funding gap for humanitarian action of estimated $15 billion, this is clearly not enough and even higher spending is necessary (cf. High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing). It might also be worthy to discuss the role private sector organisations might be able to play to supplement those funds.

Asylum policy can no longer be reduced to dealing with the people who arrive at our doorstep. Rather, it must acknowledge the connectedness of the world and the fact that people emigrate out of desperation. It is time that the EU and the world’s other developed economies tackle the root causes of migration flows. If they do not, the number of migrants to Europe is bound to increase further (Mayer, 2016, p. 9).
5.6 Final Remark: Establish Political Will for Reform

The above recommendations require member states’ political will. However, since the significant inflow of asylum seekers in 2015 added another difficult situation to the EU’s list of challenges, member states have been unable to find any sustainable concerted European solutions. A key challenge for the EU and member states to manage migration effectively and pro-actively represents the question of how member states can align their national interests and find common ground to tackle this massive challenge together. Certainly, there is no silver bullet to create political will amongst member states, however, a few steps towards similar national policies might help and might lay the foundation of a more comprehensive European refugee policy. For instance, member states need to have a shared foreign policy vision. This means, that they have to establish a common understanding of the political situations in origin countries of refugees. Only if this can be achieved, a harmonisation of national protection rates—or even EU-level asylum procedures—are thinkable.

Migration policy needs to be based on a forward-looking and coherent strategy. It cannot consist of short-term and reactive crisis management. Migration flows need to be monitored, and large spikes need to be forecasted as far ahead as possible (Mayer, 2016, p. 8). The EU and member states need to demonstrate that they are in control of refugee flows. In addition, an effective and fair asylum policy should be insulated from populist debates, but at the same time not left for elites to shape on their own. This is a delicate task, and to strike the right balance, a strong civil society and transparent policy-making are needed (Mayer, 2016, p. 8). Constant dialogue about refugee policy between and within member states is imperative.
References


Beyond Crisis Management: The Path Towards an Effective, Pro-active and Fair European Refugee Policy


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Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank all the members of Working Group 2 of the Vision Europe Summit 2016 who provided very useful comments during different stages of producing the policy discussion paper. In addition, the authors would like to acknowledge the extensive support and feedback on the draft of the paper from colleagues at the Bertelsmann Stiftung. Thanks is also owed to the colleagues at Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation for their support with publishing this paper.
Improving the Responses to the Migration and Refugee Crisis in Europe

Europe’s migration crisis erupted against a backdrop of persistent integration challenges. Over the last few decades, most European countries have grappled with disappointing socioeconomic and civic engagement outcomes for some immigrants and their children, despite huge investments and a fair amount of experimentation. Meanwhile, social cohesion—in many ways the essence of successful integration—has been eroded by anxiety about rapidly changing communities and the perceived effects this change has on national and cultural identities. The most recent flows have fuelled these anxieties further, and have made integration issues even more pertinent.

As a result, the prognosis for efforts that seek to successfully integrate newcomers is uncertain. The diversity and scale of inflows, large numbers of unaccompanied minors, and significant (mental) health needs of newcomers is putting further pressure on already stretched public services. In addition, many of the newest arrivals face additional difficulties entering and succeeding in local labour markets due to limited education, poor host-country language proficiency (and, in many cases, illiteracy in their own language), and skills and experience that do not meet the needs of local employers.

The stakes for economic, social and cultural integration could not be higher. Countries need to both support people on the pathway to work, especially work that holds opportunities for skills development and upward mobility. They also need to create the conditions for intercultural and intergenerational relationships to flourish. And they need to ensure that newcomers feel a part of the collective ‘we’, while encouraging existing communities to feel part of the collective project of receiving and settling new arrivals.

Although the paths to pursuing these goals will differ, the following principles should stand most countries—and communities—in good stead not just for this crisis, but the next one:

1. **Adopt a work-focused approach to integration that also supports social integration.** Work is the most direct route to broader integration. Newcomers should be encouraged to enter employment as soon as possible, filling skill gaps as they gain valuable host-country experience (through part-time, flexible, and distance learning options where appropriate).
However, traditional jobs will not be the right vehicle for everyone. Voluntary work may be more fitting for people caring for family members, while self-employment (including through digital platforms) and entrepreneurship can shortcut the path to employment for both the high- and low-skilled. Government agencies and service providers will need to collaborate to ensure that labour market integration policies further social integration and vice versa.

2. Systematically engage the “whole of society” in integration efforts. Civil society and the private sector are indispensable partners to government. The last year has seen a flurry of activity from these sectors, including from new actors such as the tech industry (an important driving force behind the private-sector summit that followed the UN Refugee Summits in September 2016). To translate this energy into real outcomes, governments need to work closely with key partners to ramp up their efforts. For businesses, this means moving beyond ‘corporate social responsibility’ to build lasting partnerships that align with their long-term economic interests. For social entrepreneurs, it means working with individuals and companies to see the best of their bright ideas develop into mainstream integration services, not just small projects. Harnessing the ideas and enthusiasm of social partners writ large, both old and new, could help solve complex social challenges, create and cultivate new forms of social capital, and encourage communities to feel a sense of ownership in receiving and supporting newcomers.

3. Manage social change and regain public trust. With large numbers of the most recent newcomers thought to share cultural and religious norms out of the mainstream, it is important that the concerns of receiving communities are not belittled or sidelined. Governments of all levels should provide space for members of the public to discuss their concerns. Countries that frame immigration as a core part of the national narrative—part of who ‘we’ are, not just something happening ‘to’ us—are more successful in defusing natural anxiety about the pace of change. But communication is not everything: governments will also need to ensure that policies and programming are attuned to broader societal needs, so they are not perceived to favour newcomers over other members of the community.

The lull in flows has allowed countries to catch their breath, but now is the time for strategic planning and experimentation, not complacency. Policymakers need to develop and articulate goals, setting out their plans and how they will implement them, and agreeing on how they will measure progress. It is also vital that governments start producing and sharing high-quality evidence, particularly if they wish to encourage new players to shoulder some of the burden. Finally, they will need to experiment and innovate in a more rapid, dynamic way—both to generate new ideas and to bring the most effective programmes to scale.

While the recent migration crisis deepened and broadened existing integration challenges in Europe, it has also attracted the political, social, and economic capital to finally address these issues and set countries on new paths. The decisions being made now will shape not only the integration outcomes for the most recent newcomers, but the ways we think about and experience integration for decades to come. As superdiversity and hypermobility become the water in which we all swim, countries will have to develop responses that have flexibility and adaptation—‘learning-by-doing’—at their core. These characteristics are also at the heart of resilience which, in turn, contributes to community robustness and a more inclusive future.
Europe is mired in a period of deep uncertainty and fragmentation. The UK referendum vote to leave the European Union cast light on widening polarisation across Europe—between cosmopolitan urbanites and residents of suburban and rural communities, between young and old, and between the winners and losers of globalisation (writ large). In recent years, the rise of populist, anti-elite, and far right movements and parties has revealed deep frustration, and even anger, with the European project. Meanwhile, flashpoints over cultural tensions and the cost of—and, in some countries, competition for—scarce resources have been tied (not always accurately) to the social and economic impacts of immigration. With some countries still plagued by sluggish economies and the continued effects of austerity policies, the causes of people’s discontent are complex and far-reaching. But immigration has become the mast to which an array of concerns is pinned.¹

This is the stage on which the biggest migration crisis² since the Second World War is playing out. With the lull in numbers of asylum seekers crossing the Eastern Mediterranean following the closure of the Balkan route and the EU-Turkey deal, there is a sense that the fever has broken. But symptoms of the crisis continue to unfold and deepen across the region. Countries of arrival and transit on Europe’s periphery, already struggling economically, are facing processing backlogs. The countries that have received most newcomers are contending with bottlenecks in their social services as they strive to house, care for, and educate needy populations. And communities across the region are grappling with the fast pace with which their neighbourhoods are changing.

In some quarters, there is hope that newcomers will bring dynamism and vital skills, especially to regions with rapidly ageing populations and a shrinking new worker pipeline. But history teaches us that supporting new arrivals (especially those from rural backgrounds or with limited education) into good jobs is hard—and costly. These newest cohorts are entering labour markets at a time of intense flux: most advanced industrial societies are likely to require better skilled and fewer workers in the future, due in part to innovations in labour-saving technologies.

This policy brief examines the challenges and opportunities both for the most recent cohorts of migrants and refugees and the countries and communities in which they settle.³ It begins by analysing what is known about integration, and then considers the implications for the most recent migration crisis. It then analyses three promising policy approaches and makes concrete recommendations for where there is a clear case for government action. It concludes by setting out some additional interventions that policymakers should consider, regardless of whether they subscribe to the three overarching approaches.

1 - For a discussion of the drivers of anxiety about immigration, see Papademetriou & Banulescu-Bogdan (2016).
2 - Since the crisis is both a ‘migrant crisis’ and a ‘refugee crisis’, this brief uses the phrase ‘migration crisis’ to best capture the fact that these are mixed flows.
3 - Although this brief focuses on newly arrived refugees, the latest arrivals in Europe are mixed flows. Moreover, many of the challenges faced by humanitarian arrivals are shared by migrants arriving for family unification.
2. Integration: Challenges New and Old

Integration is a highly contested policy terrain. This is reflected in the extensive debates about the appropriate focus, scope, and even goals of integration policy. Yet despite widely divergent immigration histories, most countries have had to contend with a core set of cultural, social, and economic integration challenges.

Most of these challenges were exacerbated, but not caused, by the migration crisis. Many countries were facing rising social tensions, erupting in flashpoints over cultural and religious symbols and practices, before arrivals across the Mediterranean began to increase. With many communities still recovering from the global recession, the sovereign debt crisis, and prolonged austerity programmes, the scale and pace of the migration crisis put pressure on already-strained public services and increased competition for scarce resources. And the highly concentrated nature of migration flows—with asylum seekers visible in stations, streets, and city centres—deepened the perception that the impacts of globalization and immigration are asymmetrical and that social change is proceeding at a relentless and uncontrollable pace.

2.1 What We Have Learned — Europe’s Integration History

Perhaps above all else, Europe’s experience with post-World War II migration shows that integration takes time. Some of the most significant challenges have included:

- **Slow progress into work.** Foreign-born migrants in the European Union are disadvantaged across numerous indicators, including employment rates, labour market participation, and job quality. Although newcomers make progress in entering work the longer they are in the host country, they remain overrepresented in low-skilled work even after a decade of residence—and employment gaps do not disappear for certain groups (namely women and people who come through humanitarian and family routes). Visible minorities are also particularly disadvantaged in the labour market; people with a combination of these characteristics (e.g., Muslim women) are thus highly vulnerable.

- **Underemployment and brain waste.** Skilled migrants often face systemic barriers to accessing work for which they were trained. Migrants with a university degree are over 10 percentage points less likely to be in work relative to similarly educated natives in Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden (OECD, 2015a). Despite progress recognising qualifications, newcomers face limited opportunities to plug gaps where home- and host-country education systems do not easily map onto one another. These challenges are not limited to Europe; in the United States, almost a quarter of college-educated immigrants are underemployed (Zong & Batalova, 2016).

- **Intergenerational disadvantage and social exclusion.** Almost a quarter of young people in Western Europe now have a migration background (a similar proportion to in the United States). Ultimately, the real test of integration is
whether these children of immigrants have the tools to thrive. Young people of migration background are more susceptible to being NEET (not in education, employment or training); to leaving school early; and to being underrepresented in higher education. A significant concern in recent years has been the role of social exclusion in ‘home grown’ extremism among the second generation. Although the links between socio-economic deprivation and vulnerability to radicalisation are complex, the marginalisation of young people of migrant background is cause for deep concern—and a factor exacerbating anxiety about immigration.

- **Anxiety about changing national identity and culture.** Large-scale immigration has rendered questions of national identity more salient—and perceived threats to it more destabilising. This is particularly true in the case of influxes of visibly or religiously different minorities, who bring cultural norms that are seen as incompatible with European values and the societal ‘ethos’. Governments have wavered on how best to approach cultural and civic integration, experimenting with outright restrictions on certain practices (including the most recent burkini bans in France) to more lenient forms of accommodation—but no country has yet succeeded in diffusing the anxieties that these changes bring. Segregation of ethnic and religious communities in neighbourhoods, schools, and prisons is both a driver of anxiety and a factor hindering the success of those cut off from the benefits that social interactions can bring.

2.2 The “Migration Crisis” and Integration

Against this backdrop, the migration crisis that began in earnest in 2015 intensified many of these social, economic, and cultural cleavages. Initially, there was considerable optimism that newcomers would bring in-demand skills, in response to largely anecdotal reports that their educational levels were higher than previous cohorts of refugees. Angela Merkel’s high profile message that Germany was open to refugees, for instance, was seen by many as a win-win, signalling the country’s role as a humanitarian leader while helping meet its rising demographic and skills needs. But emerging evidence suggests that many newcomers lack the education, skills, and experience that are in demand in European knowledge economies. The political backlash in Germany has undermined the remarkable sense of unity in offering a welcome to refugees, illuminating a simmering resentment among many, especially in certain areas of the country.

The migration crisis has deepened integration challenges in a number of ways:

- **Scale.** The scale, pace, and persistence of the crisis pose large challenges to traditional countries of immigration and new destinations alike. Major receiving countries such as Germany and Sweden saw their populations increase by over 1.5%.

8 - In 2015, nearly 1.1 million people registered their intention to claim asylum in Germany, equivalent to more than 1.25% of its population. However, registration numbers can double count some people if they register in more than one place, or if they have since moved on. In fact, the German Interior Ministry has indicated that the total number for 2015 stood at slightly under 900,000. Sweden received 162,550 asylum applications (equivalent to 1.7% of its population). Hungary, whose government has been openly anti-immigration, received 177,135 applications in 2015, equivalent to 1.8% of its population (Migration Policy Institute, 2016).

9 - For instance, Finland saw an increase in first-time asylum applications from 3,620 in 2014 to 32,345 in 2015, an increase of nearly 800%. See Saukkonen (2016).
tured of these flows and the fact that, until recently, there seemed to be no end in sight, has exacerbated public anxiety about immigration further.

- **Capacity and processing challenges.** In many countries, the scale and pace of the flows has overwhelmed the capacity of asylum processing and integration institutions. Insufficient housing for new arrivals means that asylum seekers are often initially housed away from economic centres (and job opportunities). Or, if they choose to house themselves, they crowd into substandard accommodation designed for far fewer people, contributing to neighbourhood tensions. Disagreements over capacity issues have also strained relationships between national and local governments, and overturned fragile burden-sharing agreements. 10

- **Additional health and protection needs.** Having undertaken protracted and arduous journeys, many asylum seekers arrive with significant health needs. The large number of unaccompanied minors, in particular, brings considerable challenges. With specific protection, supervision, and housing needs, young people travelling alone can’t be supported through traditional integration services. Migrants who arrive as teens, often with limited or interrupted schooling, struggle to catch up with their peers. 11 And many children go missing in the system and are vulnerable to exploitation. 12

- **Mixed economic prospects.** Since non-labour migrants to Europe, for the most part, come from countries with underdeveloped education systems, the relatively high education levels of many Syrians was initially a cause for optimism. However, the stereotype of the highly qualified Syrian engineer may be simplistic. Recent studies from Austria and Germany have reported that between one-third and slightly more than half of Syrians have at least an upper secondary degree. 13 However, many newcomers—and almost half of Afghans—have almost no education at all. 14 This diversity of education levels makes it all the more important for countries to have early systems for identifying skills and needs. And since some newcomers lack basic numeracy and literacy skills even in their own language, they face limited chances in host-country labour markets without huge investments in skills training.

This analysis of the most recent arrivals, coupled with Europe’s existing integration challenges, points to a number of priorities for policymakers: narrowing the gap between arrival and work (while ensuring that job opportunities have potential for upward mobility and don’t contribute to brain waste); ensuring that those unable to work have other opportunities to contribute; and regaining public trust and restoring community cohesion.

10 - These tensions came to a head in Sweden, where a controversial new law makes distribution among municipalities mandatory. The system in Sweden was traditionally voluntary, but as of 2016 all municipalities are required to pull their weight and a distribution formula will be introduced from 2017.

11 - For instance, unaccompanied minors increased by 400% in Sweden between 2014 and 2015 (Migrationsverket, 2016).

12 - In January, Europol reported than 10,000 unaccompanied minors had gone missing, and potentially been exploited by trafficking networks (Townsend, 2016).

13 - According to the Displaced Persons in Austria Survey, 53% of Syrians had a post-secondary or upper-secondary qualification, compared to 29% of Afghans and 46% of Iraqis (Vienna Institute of Demography, 2016). The most recent cohorts of Syrians to Germany appear have lower levels of education and limited work experience. In Germany, 31% of asylum seekers who arrived in 2014 and supplied ‘voluntary information’ about their education had a post-secondary or upper secondary education (OECD, 2015b). Of course, self-reporting is always highly problematic.

14 - In Austria, around 30% of Afghans have only a primary level education (Bernstein, 2016).
3. Policy Approaches

For all of the reasons described in the previous section, Europe is facing greater integration challenges than ever before. Addressing these will require intensive, up-front investments that balance evidence and evaluation-led approaches with experiments to find new solutions—and partnerships with new actors.

This section outlines a number of the big questions policymakers are facing and highlights promising approaches to overcome these challenges. While not every country will be able to do everything, adherence to these broad principles will put them on the right path to weather this and future crises in their own way.

3.1 Developing Work-Focused Policies that Support Social Integration

The greatest challenge facing European countries is narrowing the gaps between arrival and economic self-sufficiency. Work is a direct route to broader integration, and public confidence on immigration and integration systems—not to mention the long-term sustainability of welfare systems—depends on a greater number of newcomers entering work quickly.

In many countries, the structure of initial integration programs encourages newly arrived refugees (and often family arrivals) to attain a minimum level of linguistic and cultural fluency before actively seeking work. This approach to investing in newcomers is well-meaning and takes seriously the risk of underemployment and brain waste—which can, in turn, undermine social integration when high-skilled migrants feel frustrated by their inability to practice in their field or build a meaningful professional network. But the balance will need to be struck much closer to ‘work first’, even if this means that newcomers have to learn the local language (and close skills gaps) on the job.

This approach will not be right for everyone. Policies that aim to create incentives to work can have perverse consequences for social integration. Restricting high quality training programmes to jobseekers, for instance, can exclude women caring for children from learning the language. ‘Activation’ policies (that make receiving benefits conditional on certain behaviour, such as active jobseeking or participation in training) can make people destitute or push them into the informal economy. Governments may thus need to manage their expectations vis-à-vis recent arrivals. They will also need to ensure that labour market integration policies support social integration goals, and vice versa by improving governance mechanisms for coordination.15

To make a ‘work first’ approach most effective, policymakers should consider the following:

- **Develop early systems for identifying needs.**
  Most countries reserve the most intensive services for legal migrants and those granted protection to avoid investing in people who are then required to leave. Still, it is important to develop systems that at the very least map skills and experience for all newcomers and provide access to creative methods for assessing competence for people who lack (or can’t prove) formal qualifications exist.16

- **Make it possible to develop skills on the job.**
  Many migrants and refugees are keen to enter work as soon as possible, even if this means taking a job at a lower skill level than their education and training. Improving the availability of

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15 - Promising governance structures include Austria’s strategic plan for the integration of asylum seekers, which suggests ways to align services—such as by providing parents with language classes while their children are at kindergarten (Austrian Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs, 2015). Portugal has also prepared for the arrival of newcomers by setting up an interministerial and multilevel working group to coordinate the reception of resettled refugees.

16 - The most effective practices include assessment techniques and on-the-job assessment, but these are costly in both time and resources.
part-time, flexible, and distance learning—as well as creating incentives for employers to invest in their newcomer workforce—is essential to avoiding low-skilled work becoming ‘sticky’. Bridging programs, which provide opportunities to gain experience at the bottom of the ladder in a sector consistent with one’s training while plugging gaps in skills and experience, are the gold standard in this regard.\textsuperscript{17}

- **Prepare service providers to advise about alternative forms of work.** Voluntary, freelance, remote, and part-time work are all valid (if shorter-term) alternatives to a traditional job, and may provide greater opportunities for social integration (including language learning) than low-skilled work. These routes may be less immediately obvious to service providers, and may conflict with other goals (such as protecting existing workers).\textsuperscript{18} Supporting newcomers into voluntary work—especially where it mitigates pressures on public services, such as elder care—can be a win-win for communities under strain from ageing populations, nurture intergenerational and intercultural relationships, and improve the skills and language proficiency of new arrivals.

- **Remove the barriers to self-employment.** Entrepreneurship can act as a fast track to self-sufficiency for both newcomers and those with limited prospects in local labour market. But starting a business is often beset with challenges, not the least of which is accessing credit and navigating complex bureaucracy. Governments can provide mentoring, incubator and accelerator support, and financing.\textsuperscript{19}

### 3.2 Building a “Whole-of-Society” Integration System

Top-down integration policies have limited potential to genuinely shift the needle when it comes to the integration of newcomers. Governments can’t solve complex social challenges alone, and initiatives driven by non-governmental actors (including refugees and migrants themselves) are more likely to be seen as a collective project rather than something imposed from above. Harnessing the energy and enthusiasm of civil society, communities, and employers is therefore critical both to the long-term resilience and wellbeing of societies, and to ensuring that significant government investments in newcomers bear fruit.

The 2015-2016 period saw an explosion of energy and enthusiasm from civil society, ranging from large numbers of people volunteering or offering newcomers their spare rooms to private companies offering donations, both financial and in-kind. A number of large U.S. firms have pledged to donate considerable sums of money, or to match donations, through the White House partnership programme. And the recent private sector pledges around the United Nations General Assembly Summit for Refugees and Migrants were impressive, with 51 companies pledging more than $650 million (though $500 million of that was the

\textsuperscript{17} - For instance, Canada has pioneered bridging courses for newly arrived migrants (enabling them to get experience in the bottom of the ladder in the vocation for which they have been trained, while plugging gaps in their qualifications). In Sweden, bridging courses for professionals, including health professionals, teachers, and lawyers, have had a positive impact on employment outcomes and wages (Niknami & Schröder, 2014). See Desiderio (2016) for an overview of bridging and fast track courses in different countries.

\textsuperscript{18} - Uber, for instance, has attracted controversy for encouraging precarious work while undercutting local taxi firms. Still, such jobs can combine a fast-track to work with the opportunity to speak to locals, and are often flexible enough to allow migrants to pursue education or training programs.

\textsuperscript{19} - Promising policy interventions in this area include mentoring and training (such as the start-up classes run in German and Arabic by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Berlin) and incubators and accelerators (that provide support identifying funding and office space). For instance, This Foreigner Can is a 16-week migrant business accelerator that selects talented entrepreneurs for a training program to develop and scale their businesses in return for equity. See Desiderio (2014) for an overview of the barriers, and Desiderio (2016) for an overview of the latest efforts to overcome these.
commitment of a single individual). But integration programmes to directly hire migrants are still largely small scale and connected to employers who see hiring refugees as their corporate social responsibility, rather than a genuinely business-savvy/cost-effective proposition. Policymakers thus face the challenge of institutionalizing much bigger partnerships and enlisting the big players as a way to offer thousands instead of dozens of high value apprenticeships.

The huge amount of social and technological innovation in recent months also shows promise for overcoming barriers to accessing services for vulnerable groups or engaging communities. Unlike traditional government (or even civil society) actors; tech and social entrepreneurs respond quickly, collaborate easily across borders and seek to involve refugees and migrants in the design and delivery of new innovations. However, the speed of the innovation community response has been a double-edged sword, with numerous tools developed that don’t meet user needs, connect with mainstream services, or adhere to minimal security and privacy requirements. As a result, policymakers face the challenge of fostering experimentation and engaging these groups while encouraging greater evaluation and sharing of what works.

To ensure that whole-of-society efforts are high value and at a scale that matters, policymakers will need to:

- **Broker new partnerships with investors and employers.** The most effective initiatives encourage employers to engage beyond their corporate social responsibility arms and recalibrate the calculus for hiring newcomers. A promising model in this area is Social Impact Bonds (SIBs), which combine private investment (often in areas where it is difficult to find the political will for public investment), delivery by non-governmental actors (who are given the freedom to experiment), and public payments only if certain results are achieved (which reduces the risk for governments).

- **Engage social entrepreneurs in designing and delivering integration services.** Governments can engage a wider constituency in generating ideas through social challenge prizes or open competitions, and support and scale what works through follow-on funding and incubation. Giving the best solutions the chance to win public contracts to deliver services will be the most robust pathway to realizing these alternative models on any significant scale; supporting young companies to grow can also help fuel economic growth.

- **Encourage promising initiatives to measure their own impact.** Since many non-governmental programmes are extremely small scale, they

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20 - This pledge was made by financier and philanthropist George Soros, whose focus is on supporting businesses and social enterprises founded by refugees and migrants.

21 - For instance, Siemens in partnership with the city of Erlangen, Germany has a program offering paid internships to degree-holding asylum seekers with good English or German proficiency, which includes workplace orientation, skills assessment, and training.

22 - Digital tools have been created for translation, language training, navigating public services, connecting refugees with people with spare rooms, earning money without identity documents or a bank account, and learning to code. See Benton & Glennie (2016) for an overview of these across the migration continuum.

23 - For instance, many of the new intensive coding schools have built their business model around recruiting refugee program graduates to return as mentors or teachers.

24 - For instance, the Finnish Ministry of Employment and the Economy is partnering with the foundation Sitra to improve immigrants’ training opportunities. The programme will involve on-the-job, language, professional skills, and cultural training. It aims to get participants into work within four months after training has begun, and the government will only pay if this goal is met—with investors carrying the risk (Sitra, 2016).

25 - Examples of where challenge prizes have been used in the field of immigrant integration include the European Commission Social Innovation Competition, which in 2016 focused on refugee and migrant integration; and the IKEA Foundation Design Challenge, a partnership between IKEA and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to encourage designers and creatives to develop innovative solutions for receiving and integration refugees in urban areas.
often lack the resources (and often inclination) to undertake proper impact investment, and any assessments of impact are often skewed by selection biases (because participants tend to be more motivated or better qualified to begin with). Governments could support promising initiatives to measure their own impact, understand what good evidence looks like, and disseminate lessons more widely and systematically.

3.3 Managing Social Change and Regaining Public Trust

Successful integration is critical to improving public trust in the management of immigration and its consequences. Across Europe, the persistent belief that government is unequal to the task of managing immigration well—exacerbated by the perception that the asylum process is being misused, local infrastructure is being overwhelmed, and long-cherished cultural and societal norms are being questioned—has poisoned the well of policy innovation (Papademetriou, 2016). Even countries with a long and proud tradition of welcoming refugees, such as Sweden, have had to confront the question of whether there are limits to their generosity.

Part of the challenge is that the most recent migration flows have not affected all parts of Europe—or even all parts of a single country—evenly.\textsuperscript{26} Countries like Hungary that have received large volumes of non-labour migrants suddenly have had to contend with little preparation and the fact that such migration was in direct contradiction to stated policy goals of immigration control. As a result, Hungary has felt imposed upon and seen strong reactions to migration. The fact that Hungarian prime-minister Viktor Orbán has seen political opportunity in talking up the issue has contributed further to many Hungarians’ sense of loss of control. On the other side of the spectrum, extraordinary shows of generosity have been seen in countries like Portugal (or subnational regions like Catalonia), which feel they have untapped capacity to welcome more refugees, and are actively trying to find more pathways to receive them.

On difficult and divisive issues, such as immigration, it is always important to listen to the public and give them an opportunity to air their views. The following guidance is important in that regard:

- Create an inclusive national narrative around immigration. Countries that frame immigration as a core part of the national narrative—part of who ‘we’ are, not just something happening ‘to’ us—are more successful in defusing natural anxiety about the pace of change.

- Avoid targeted programmes that can be perceived as unfair. Policymakers must be careful to avoid the appearance that immigrants are receiving more support than native-born individuals by ensuring that everyone is positioned for success. Many of the smartest investments for newly arrived migrants and refugees will also hold value for other disadvantaged groups. For instance, public employment services that are equipped to give advice about retraining to meet the needs of

\textsuperscript{26} - The challenges and responses discussed in this paper focus on the national dimension. The 1951 UN Convention on Refugees, the global protection system, and the extensive global efforts needed to address this challenge is beyond the scope of this discussion. But it is worth noting that clearly these trends are happening against the backdrop of more muscular efforts to build a multilateral response, with the UN General Assembly Summit on Migrants and Refugees taking place in September 2016. President Obama’s Leader’s Summit on Refugees on the margins of this meeting was also was an important step to increasing the attention and resources in the global protection system, raising a further $4.5 billion over 2015 levels and doubling the number of resettlement places offered worldwide. However, it remains to be seen how much difference it will make. The precedent set by previous donor conferences is that some of the money pledged had often already been committed, and promises are not always fulfilled. See Papademetriou & Fratzke (2016) for an analysis of the
the local jobs market (instead of largely serving low-skilled jobseekers and performing the function of gatekeeper for benefits) are likely to benefit older workers who have lost their jobs, young people who are unable to gain a foothold in the labour market, and migrants and refugees alike.

• **Make the public feel its concerns have been heard.** Acknowledging concerns and creating political space for members of the public to express doubts about immigration and migration policies—in mainstream rather than just extremist circles—can go a long way towards tempering frustration. Moreover, politicians need to cease treating integration and protection as two separate priorities, and be much clearer in their public statements about the core tradeoffs that are being made. Managing public expectations and tapping into the public’s moral consciousness and sense of solidarity instead of feeding the flames of polarisation and division—and confronting issues head on and explaining why certain choices are being made—is particularly important.
4. Conclusions and Recommendations

The migration crisis brought into sharp focus significant difficulties European countries face in receiving and processing newcomers. These challenges have often seemed to exhaust the capacity of national and local governments to craft thoughtful, forward-thinking integration programmes. The number of daily arrivals has abated—at least for the moment—but in many ways the real work has only begun. Instead of breathing a sigh of relief, policymakers should be using this time to make choices: about where to make investments in the next two to three years, how muscular they wish to be in their approach, and, most crucially, what kind of societies they wish to operate in 15 to 20 years’ time.

This is also the time for realism. Policymakers need to decide what their priorities are, and what ‘good enough’ strategies for integration look like. For some of the most disadvantaged groups in recent cohorts, convergence with natives on socioeconomic outcomes may not be an attainable goal. But perfection should not be the enemy of good: these groups should still have the opportunity to learn the language of their new homes, have flourishing lives and families, and benefit from the opportunity to participate in and contribute to society. Opportunities for realising social integration even in the absence of traditional labour market integration should be top of the agenda for such discussions and initiatives.

Three concepts should inspire these efforts:

• **Strategy.** This period of calm following the ebb in arrivals should be one of reflection, not complacency. Policymakers should clearly develop and articulate goals, and identify collective milestones to evaluate progress across different policy areas and on different timescales. The choices governments make now will shape how strong societies will be in the coming decades.

• **Evaluation.** Many countries have become better at measuring and understanding what works, but more extensive evaluation—including with high quality evidence that uses a control group—and data sharing is needed to ensure that investments today succeed and are cost effective over the long run. Governments must thus strike a balance between responding quickly and responding thoughtfully. Collecting and evaluating evidence—and, critically, adapting systems based on this—must become an integral part of the policymaking ethos.

• **Innovation.** New technologies offer promising ways to speed the integration process—from tools that offer newcomers a chance to plug skills gaps quickly to digital platforms that mobilise the energy and resources of the public. The main challenge is how to extend what works to a much, much larger scale. Greater collaboration between employers, civil society, tech entrepreneurs, the wider public, and governments (at all levels) is essential to deepen and strengthen Europe’s ability to address—and even solve—integration challenges today and in the future.

Integration policy as we know and speak about it is constantly evolving. This evolution is hinted at by, but goes way beyond, mainstreaming: superdiversity and hypermobility will likely define all of our futures. With this adjustment will come a number of linguistic and policy shifts. We are set to move away from narrow concepts of integration and community cohesion, and towards a richer and more inclusive, yet perhaps more realistic, objective in which a constantly changing ‘we’ creates ever more robust and resilient communities.
Improving the Responses to the Migration and Refugee Crisis in Europe

References


From Fragmentation to Integration: Towards a “Whole-of-Society” Approach to Receiving and Settling Newcomers in Europe


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Acknowledgements

The authors thank Hugo Seabra and Gonçalo Moita from the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation for support and guidance. This study benefited from intellectual input and feedback from the Visions Europe working group, which comprised Katharina Barié, Grete Brochmann, Pedro Calado, Naïka Foroutan, Jenna Lähdemäki, Irene Ponzo, and Pasi Saukkonen. Thanks are also owed to Natalia Banulescu-Bogdan and Susan Fratzke for their insightful comments, Lauren Shaw for skilful edits, and to Taylor Elwood, Dhario DeSouza, Louis Metcalfe, and Bart Bachman for their valuable research assistance.
This study presents a discussion and some policy suggestions on how to tackle the refugee crisis in Europe. Beyond an analysis of the literature and data, the paper is based on the results of an online survey we conducted in the Spring—Summer 2016 with front line organizations, belonging to not profit sector, private profit organizations and the public sector, directly involved in the management of the crisis in several EU countries. We complemented the surveys with a number of interviews with renowned experts in the field confined to four profiles: Academics; Policy Makers; Intelligence/security officers, and Integration officials. Although the survey was characterized by limited response rates, a number of points emerged from the answers that are somewhat novel and offer suggestions for policy reforms. The survey interviews allow us to clarify the state of the affairs on the migration crisis within the European Union. A separate paper will present the results of the survey and the interviews.

We begin with an overview of the main facts we know about immigration in general and with the specific challenges created by the refugee crisis in the EU. A first element that emerges is the large heterogeneity across European countries that reflect specific differences in migration history. European countries differ in terms of the percentage of foreign-born and the characteristics of immigrants in terms of ethnic groups, religion, skills and languages. Furthermore, while the number of foreign born have been increasing in all countries in the last decade, the speed has been different, with a much larger flow in immigrants in countries such as Italy, Spain and Germany than in any other EU countries. European countries also differ in terms of social and cultural attitudes toward immigration. While the bulk of economic research tends to underline the beneficial effects of immigration, popular perception is often very dissimilar. For instance, while most studies suggest that immigrants are typically complements rather than substitutes to natives in the labour market, and that immigrants are net payers to the welfare system rather than net receivers, native citizens have often a quite different view. Strikingly, as shown below, while about 50% of respondents in Nordic countries value the immigrants’ presence as good in the country’s economy, less than the 10% of the population from Southern and Central-European countries hold the same view.

These differences across countries are reflecting
the way in which the present refugee crisis is being managed. In 2015, the number of first time applicants for asylum in Europe exceeded 1.2 million, as opposed to about half million of the previous year. Moreover, the ports of entry moved to peripheral southern countries and migratory flows altered from individuals to families and scaled up to large crowds of migrants. It is also unclear whether the emergency is over, as it also depends on the continuous application of political decisions (i.e. the EU agreement with Turkey) and on the evolution of conflict in the origin countries. For instance, if we compare the data from the first quarter of the 2016 with the same quarter in 2015, the number of first time asylum applicants increased by more than 50%. However, it has reduced by -33% relative to the last quarter of 2015. The EU countries have been differently affected by the refugee crisis. The growth rate of applicants in the period 2013-15 increased in all countries, exceeding almost everywhere 100%, but reaching 300% in the case of Germany and Austria. More specifically, in the first quarter of 2016, Germany received the 61% of total applicants in the EU-28, followed by Italy (8%), France (6%), Austria (5%) and the United Kingdom (4%). The distribution of applicants for ethnic groups was also very different across countries. In the same period, for example, Germany received roughly 90% of the Syrians who applied for the first time for asylum in the EU, while it had a much lower share of first time applicants from other origin countries (Afghanistan and Iraq, Sub-Saharan countries), who instead largely selected other countries. Faced with this sharp increase in asylum requests, countries also reacted in different ways. Austria and Germany are by far the countries that registered the higher acceptance rates (77% and 68% of total asylum requests, respectively). Italy and UK presented much lower acceptance rates, around 33% of total requests, followed by France that in the first quarter of 2016 conceded the refugee status to less than 30% of the total asylum seekers. There are also remarkable differences in the type of status assigned to refugees. In Germany, the vast majority of positive responses were given under the umbrella of the Geneva Convention status. In Italy, France, and Austria roughly the 9-12% of asylum requests were granted in the form of subsidiary protection status. Finally, in Italy and the UK, the Humanitarian status was granted to 19% and 5% of asylum seekers, respectively.

This heterogeneity in responses matched the heterogeneity in procedures and timing needed to get a decision across countries, a point stressed by one of the umbrella organizations that replied to our survey. More fundamentally, the refugee crisis was never seen as a European crisis. Migration and asylum remain part of national policies and no EU government considered abdicating from those obligations in favour of broader policies. Although national governments tend to think about the asylum issue in domestic terms, this is at the minimum a pan-European problem. The efforts made by the European Commission to harmonize procedures seem to have had little success so far. The result, as stressed by interviewees, was an assortment of national and European policies not running coherently and in some case denying previous common EU agreements, leading to misuse of EU conventions and agreements. For instance, in 2001, the European Union adopted legislation laying down common standards to all Member States for giving temporary protection to persons fleeing their countries in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons in the Union (Directive 2001/55/EC), but no country called for this directive when facing recent massive influx of migrants.

Furthermore, large differences exist in the integration policy followed by countries. Segregation risks remain in several countries. The effort to provide early support—in terms of language training, job training, skills recognition, legal assistance—vary a lot across countries and throughout the time. Moreover, in spite of the strong empirical evidence showing that time spent waiting reduces the refugees’ chances of successfully integrating in the future the years-long waiting period before decisions are not being shortened sufficiently. In turn, integration policies are made more difficult by the lack of information on refugees char-
acteristics collected from the port of entry and shared in between states, another point strongly stressed by respondents to the Survey. There is no systematic information collected on comparable bases (across European receiving countries) on refugees, for instance concerning skills and education levels, nor on the special requirements they should have on integration or relocation. The effort in registration was almost exclusively made for security requirements and induced by border controls and law enforcement and, in the words of interviewees from frontline, failed to collect main information on personal individual characteristics that could allow a smooth integration process throughout destination countries.¹

We are aware of the difficulty to verify information on each registered individual and the extremely difficult conditions of refugees’ welcome and first aid. However, the failure of the first phase registration make very difficult to design an integration policy for the refugees that receive asylum, particularly in terms of a coordinated and shared European response to the crisis. One piece of information that we have is that refugees are typically very young, much younger than the existing stock of immigrants, and with a strong overrepresentation of males in the population of asylum seekers, although these too with marked differences across receiving countries. Age and gender biases impose further and specific challenges to the welcome and integration policies.

The European Union has made several efforts to address the refugee crisis. According to our interviewees, the creation of dedicated agencies such as: the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX) or the European Asylum Support Office European Asylum Support Office (EASO), although with insufficient and unbalanced budgets and staff, were a step further in the Europeanization of the asylum and migration policies. As for common legislation in the field of asylum and migration, progress is slow, even by EU standards, and in different occasions proved to be ineffective. The main reason is, in the words of our interviewees, the lack of political will to modify a very sensitive and nationalized topic and give up sovereignty. EU national governments tend to resist to the transference of control on migration and migrants to EU institutions and this defiance as proven to be part of the migration management challenge. As an example, in 2003, a directive was passed aiming at creating a coherent and homogenous system across Member States for granting and withdrawing international protection. However, as the new directive is active only from July 2015, so it is too early to judge on its effectiveness. Other initiatives have even been less successful. In particular, the decision taken in September 2015 to relocate 120,000 people from the member countries more affected—notably Greece, Italy and Hungary—to the other member countries, is clearly not working and has met the strong opposition of several EU countries, in particular in Eastern Europe. More successful has been the attempt of improving the control of external borders with the final approval of the European Border and Coast Guard in September 2016. Finally, the deal with Turkey in March 2016—allowing Greece to return to Turkey “all new irregular migrants” —was successful in reducing the pressure on the Eastern route to central Europe.

However, it also raised several concerns on spill-over effects on other routes, as well as concerns on legal, humanitarian and human rights grounds. Interestingly, while all respondents to the Survey signal a break in the evolution of the crisis after the approval of the bilateral deal with Turkey, there is also unanimous concern and criticism towards the Dublin Regulation Procedures, accused to impose an excessive burden.

¹ - Fingerprints are usually taken from all asylum seekers on the day that the application is registered and they are subjected to EU asylum fingerprint database (Eurodac) queries on a routine basis. Typically Eurodac queries initiate Dublin procedures. In certain ports of entry (but not all) an official from local border police or from EASO registers the asylum applications, takes the picture, fingerprints and conducts a preliminary interview to collect information on the applicant’s identity, nationality, travel route, etc.
on the countries of first entry. Initially intended to answer individual asylum claims, Dublin Regulation Procedures proved to be ineffective in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons in one of the EU member states. As stated by many interviewees, from different EU countries, the yearlong failure of Dublin Regulation Procedures (amplified and accelerated by the media and extreme right political parties) provoked a social alarm and put European social cohesion at risk. Many solutions have failed in response to encouraging member states to participate in European Asylum; there has effectively been a solidarity breach. Finally, there is also the issue of money. Estimations on the cost of the refugee crisis varies (between 0.1 to 0.5% of GDP, according to the Commission, depending on how much a country is affected), but this only covers the cost of welcoming. If reallocation across countries of refugees would not result possible, there is then the problem on how to compensate the countries more affected by the crisis even in the longer run. There is also an issue whether this extra cost should be paid with money raised by the national treasuries, or alternatively the EU budget, or if one could think of a specific European tax imposed on Member countries, for example a commonly agreed tax on fuels, as proposed by Germany. These permanent sources of funding—and borrowing out of this tax revenues, if needed—might also be important in the long run. In particular, it should be recognised that the recent crisis, although it is the result of contingent factors (war and conflicts in several neighbouring countries), is likely to continue in the next decades, given the persistent divergence in birth rates and economic conditions between Europe and its neighbours.
Improving the Responses to the Migration and Refugee Crisis in Europe

Policy Proposals

Building on the above, we propose the following:

First, in spite of all difficulties, due also to the emergence of anti-immigrants and populist political movements in many countries, and the countries heterogeneity in economic conditions and stock of immigrants, maintaining an overall common European approach to the crisis appears essential. Border control, security, defence, unified management of immigrants and refugees, are obvious public goods for an integrated area such as the EU that has abolished internal borders and created an internal market. It is also very unlikely that national countries acting independently could offer these public goods efficiently. However, failing to provide these public goods would weaken enormously the economic value, European social cohesion and the political consensus towards the European project.

Second, although numerically relevant, the current crisis should also not be overstressed. For Europe as a whole, both the numbers of refugees with respect to the population, and the resources involved in providing welcome and integration, are entirely manageable. As shown in the report below, flows of people have indeed increased, but they are still in the same order of magnitude of the immigration flows that different European countries have successfully faced in the last decade.

An integrated approach should address both shorter term challenges—as the present refugee crisis—as well as longer term problems, as it is very likely that the pressure of immigration towards the EU will only become more intense in the decades to follow. The EU has already taken a number of important steps in recent years—the reform of Common European Asylum policy, the establishment of the European Border Guard—that need to be developed further, in particular with agreements and financial exchanges with potential origin countries. Along the lines suggested, for instance, by the Italian Migration Compact, further discussed in the last chapter of the present report. The issue of specific funding and of a double approach combining protection of the external borders with financial help for the development of the countries of origin should not be disregarded in this context.

Further attempts to share the burden across EU countries should be pursued. For instance, if there is no enough consensus to revise the Dublin regulations, and if furthermore there is no consensus on relocation of refugees, then adequate financial support must be given to first entry countries, both in terms of welcoming and integration policy. Ensuring long term funding is crucial. Taking the example set by the European Social Fund (ESF), the European Integration Fund (or a similar one) should be capitalized with adequate funds to promote full integration of those individuals and families accepted as refugees in one of the EU member states. This should also take into account the characteristics of the refugees in terms of skills, education and more general cultural elements, as these features also affect the cost of (effective) integration policies.

As far as welcome and integration policy is concerned, while there is no silver bullet or magical recipe, the literature is unanimous in suggesting a number of actions and best practices. These practices should be monitored and supported by the Union in any country involved, taking stock of the successful experience accumulated in some countries.

First, long waiting times should be avoided, particularly for those asylum seekers that are more likely to stay (i.e. coming from countries with a high rate of success in obtaining the asylum permit). They should be provided as soon as possible language training and integration support (i.e. skills assessments and civic integration courses). They should also be allowed to work as soon as possible, as not working can have detrimental effects on refugees’ ability to integrate and quickly deteriorate their skills and diplomas. We have to focus on community-building, through tailor-made
civic integration. Integration and civic integration should be based upon rights and obligations, both for newcomers and the host community.

Second, refugees’ segregation should be prevented. This can be firstly done by means of a thoughtful and well-designed allocation across the country. Three areas seem critical: education; housing; employment. This allocation should pass through an assessment of the type of jobs, which are available in a particular region, which match the skills of migrants. Providing education for children and youth is essential, but adult education should also be made accessible. The availability of housing is another important ingredient. While segregation should be prevented, creation of parallel societies should be avoided at all costs as past experiences proved it to be a disastrous integration practice.

Third, early attention to vulnerable refugees’ categories should be paid. In particular, unaccompanied minors, other minors and refugees with mental and physical health issues, minorities within minority ethnic groups, women or elderly refugees.

Fourth, a long term monitoring of refugees’ integration path should be maintained. Integration might take a long time, particularly for people with low levels of education. While long-term support is expensive, it pays off in the long run, even benefiting the refugees’ offspring who might have integration problems themselves.

The integration of refugees may also pay on the economic grounds, particularly for the aging European societies, both in terms of supporting public finance and welfare expenditure and in terms of labour market specialization. This is what broadly suggests the economic literature on immigration. However, the level of skills and cultural attitudes of refugees might be very different from the economic immigrants that Europe has welcomed in recent years. This requires an additional effort in terms of integration policy, which might however be helped by the relative younger age of many refugees.

As perceptions influence voter’s attitudes and therefore policies, an effort, backed by the Union, should be made in order to explain citizens the real dimension of the phenomenon, the resources actually at play and the future possible returns from immigration, as well as the economic and social contribution of immigrants to the host country. Anti-immigrants and anti-refugees attitudes are often supported by insufficient or misinforming knowledge. How the migration movement is portrayed has significant impact on the political support it has and thus ensuing decision-making. Migration is, by nature, highly political and might create division within and between EU member states. Communication is thus critical. What is missing in the present communication is limited evidencing in response to the fears associated with migration.

1.1 Economic Migrants and Refugees: Definitions

In Europe, where the asylum and immigration debates have grown particularly heated, economic migrants and refugees seem to be part of the same problem. Migrant is an umbrella term, which covers all individuals that leave their country of origin to reach a different destination. Migrants are individuals that move voluntarily, attracted by prospects of more favourable economic conditions in the country of destination. These people, before they decide to leave their country, gather information about their destination, plan their journey, and acquire skills and competences, which they deem to be important in the destination. In any moment in time, these “voluntary” migrants are free to return home. Migration is thus part of a rational choice and to migrate or not is, in normal periods, an individual decision.

However, migrants are also individuals that moved to a different country, not on a voluntary basis, but because they risked or were exposed to forms of persecutions e.g. for political, religious or racial reasons. Their main concern is not an economic advantage but the respect of human rights and safety. These people have none or little information about their destination. For them, the migration experience is far from being economically rewarding. Their migration choice is associated with a request of international protection, and the claim of a refugee status in the country of destination. The individual applications of these asylum-seekers are then examined. If applications are accepted, these people acquire the refugee status in the country of destination. Migrants, especially economic migrants, choose to move in order to improve the future prospects of themselves and their families. Refugees have to move if they are to save their lives or preserve their freedom.

It is not always easy to distinguish economic migrants and asylum seekers in practice, even though these are inherently different migrant categories. The idea that refugees are being conflated with migration is very misleading. There are, of course, nuances in the tone of the debate and the policy framework in different EU member states. But the stress everywhere has been on reducing the recent migratory flow, while trying to distinguish genuine asylum-seekers from purely “economic” migrants. This is a harsh issue. First of all, in most cases the economic and humanitarian reasons for the individual migration decision overlap, so that one person may fall into both of these categories at the same time (ODI, 2015). More importantly, natives’ attitudes about migrants depend on the individual perception whether migrants are more likely to contribute to the economy and the culture of the destination country, regardless of their migration status.

1.2 Economic Migrants and Asylum Seekers in Europe: Some Aggregate Figures and Facts

Figure 1 presents the inflow of foreign population into the OECD countries from 2003 to 2013. We observe a substantial constant inflow of population for almost all countries. There are three exceptions to this trend: Italy, Germany and France. Italy presents a constant descending trend with a sensible increase during the years 2007-2010. Spain presents a different trend: a sensible increase in the years 2004-2007 with strong decrease from 2008. Germany is a peculiar case: almost constant (descending) inflows until 2008 and a sharp increase in the following years.

As a result of these constant migration inflows, the size of migrants’ population has substantially increased, almost everywhere in EU15. Between 2000 and 2013, the share of migrants on the total population
increased by 6 percentage points or more in countries like Spain, Italy, but also Belgium and Austria. The share of migrants on the total population increased less sharply, in the range 1-3 percentage points in other Continental European and Nordic countries (e.g. France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark. See the OECD International Migration Outlook, 2015).

Figure 2 shows the evolution of first time asylum requests in the selected set of European countries, available from the OECD. The time span covered by the data is between 2003 and 2013 according to OECD. The data shows that, after some peaks experienced by some countries in 2003, inflows have been steadily increasing from around 2005 onwards. These trends have been marked in countries like Germany and Italy, much less so in Belgium, Austria and Spain.
Table 1 goes more in detail by showing the growth rates in the inflows of asylum seekers. The first column reports the growth rates between 2003 and 2013, based on the OECD data. Also from the growth rates a mixed situation emerges. Countries like Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Italy are characterized by growth rates well above 50%. Some other countries (France, Greece, Netherlands) present roughly constant inflows (i.e. growth rates close to zero). Other countries, notably Austria, Belgium, and Spain even experienced a reduction in the number of immigrants, as shown by negative growth rates between 2003 and 2013.

In the face of this evidence it is striking to notice the effects of the so called "refugee crisis", and the changed geopolitical condition mostly determined by the Syrian civil war, and the uprisings that followed the Arab Spring in North Africa and the Middle-East in recent years. In 2015, the number of first time applicants exceeded 1.2 million, as opposed to about half million of the previous year, i.e. a growth rate of over 100%. The effects of this phenomenon in the various EU countries are evident from the 2013-2015 growth rates reported in column [2] of Table 1. The data shows a sensible increase in all countries, with growth rates in inflows of asylum seekers that well exceed the 100% (exceptions being Greece and France), touching the 300% in the case of Germany and Austria.

Where do these individuals requiring asylum in Europe actually come from? Making a general statement is difficult. The composition by origin of the inflows of asylum seekers in the European Union has continuously changed overtime, depending on the main geopolitical evolutions taking place in and outside Europe. This linkage between the geopolitical condition of society and the origin of the asylum claimers in Europe must be stressed. Empirical data show a direct correlation. Conflict-stricken countries do not let these individuals in, and do not help them once they are in, then they may be condemning them to death, or an intolerable life in the shadows, without sustenance and without rights. Figure 2 below expresses the change experienced to the distribution of (first-time) asylum seekers by country of origin between 2014 and 2015. Overall, the number of asylum seekers increased by about 700,000, compared with 2014 (from over 560 thousand in 2014 to about 1.3 million in 2015). The figure shows a remarkable change in the composition of the inflows by nationality, which was triggered by the Syrian crisis. The main contributions to the increase were indeed higher numbers of applicants from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq and to a lesser extent from Albania, Kosovo (UNSCR 1244).

Are asylum seekers different from economic migrants in terms of their individual attributes and characteristics? Table 2 below compares the gender and age composition of immigrants and asylum seekers in three major EU countries, who are among the main destination of migratory flows in the European Union: Spain, France and Italy.2 Asylum seekers account for a non-negligible share of total immigrants in 2014. Two facts stand out. First, extra EU28 asylum seekers are relatively younger

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Table 1. Growth rates in inflow of asylum seekers (first time request) into European countries (in thousands). Calculations made by the authors based on data from International migration outlook 2015-© OECD 2015, and Eurostat data 2015.

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2 - Unfortunately data for UK and Germany are not available.
than immigrants: In Italy, over the 90% of asylum seekers have less than 34 years old, as opposed to 63% of immigrants. In Spain asylum seekers with less than 34 years old are the 77% of the total, against the 60% of immigrants. This difference seems to be mostly determined by the share of people in the age band 18-34, which is 84% the asylum seekers population in Italy in 2014. In France, instead the age composition of asylum seekers and immigrants seems quite similar. The second important fact that emerges is that males are overrepresented in the asylum seeker population relative to females. This is probably related to the perceived danger of the journey, which makes women much more vulnerable to the refuging experience. Another possible explanation can be found in the prevalent, coercive and mandatory military forces incorporation for young males in the origin countries of the asylum claimers that push them to leave origin countries in a young age.

While being informative of the general demographic differences between immigrants and refugees, these data do not allow us to address the skills and education dimension of refugees compared to migrants. While being available for immigrants, this information is not gathered for refugees. This is partly due to the extremely difficult conditions of refugees welcome and first aid in the frontline. It is also motivated by the impossibility to actually verify the information collected at the moment of the registration and to confirm the original document’s authenticity when those are provided. The verification procedures are time consuming tasks and are dependent on collaboration among agencies (e.g. EASO or FRONTEX) and other security and in-

Figure 2. Countries of origin of (non-EU) asylum seekers in the EU-28 Member States, 2014 and 2015 (thousands of first time applicants).
Source: Eurostat, Asylum Statistics explained (migr_asyappctza)
telligence institutions working at national, regional or global level. Recent terrorist events in Europe led to a slowdown in registration procedures and delayed the optimization of a common and more accurate registration upon arrival. Political concerns also exist in the destination countries, as having precise information regarding education, skills, qualifications and professions of the migrants may engender fears of labour market competition among natives. National, local and regional authorities are in the forefront of the current refugee crisis, facing serious difficulties in managing migration flows and integrating immigrants. Whatever the reason, the lack of data and information regarding the education and skills of asylum seekers remains a key point for the design of policies aiming at the labour market and social integration of refugees in the country of destination.

The OECD Report *Making Integration Work* stresses that different refugees require different levels of support, e.g. those with degrees have very different training requirements that those lacking basic qualifications. Refugees should be treated differently, depending on their backgrounds, their specific needs, and the specific challenges posed by their initial condition to their integration in the destination country.

### 1.3 The Most Recent Trends from the “Asylum Seeker Crisis”: A 2015-2016 Comparison

Eurostat data from Eurostat’s *Asylum Quarterly Report* shows that in 2016 the asylum emergency is still on going. Still, it is difficult to evaluate the most recent trends of this phenomenon. If we compare the data from the first quarter of the 2016 with the same quarter in 2015, the number of first time asylum applicants increased by more than 50%. However, it has reduced by -33% relative to the last quarter of 2015. Over 287,000 people from non-EU countries asked asylum in the EU28, during the first quarter of 2016 i.e. 97,500 more than in the same quarter of 2015 (see Eurostat, *Asylum Quarterly Report*).

Along the same lines observed for 2015, also in the first quarter of 2016 the top three nationalities of people who sought asylum for the first time in the EU were Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. Eurostat data report 102,400; 35,000 and 34,800 applications respectively.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Of whom:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0-14</td>
<td>14-17</td>
<td>18-34</td>
<td>Females</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants in 2014</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>305,454</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>339,902</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>277,631</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra EU28 Refugees in 2014</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>5,615</td>
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<td>4%</td>
<td>56%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3%</td>
<td>51%</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>64,625</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Migrants and asylum seekers: gender and age composition. Source: Eurostat, migration and migrant population statistics; asylum statistics

3 - In this first quarter, it seems that Syrians added most to the overall increase in first time asylum applicants in absolute terms, followed by Iraqis and Afghans. In a contrast case are asylum applicants from Kosovo, which have notably decreased by 46,400 less (Eurostat, 2016).
As for the destination, Germany stands out as the main recipient among EU-28 countries: in the first quarter of 2016, it received roughly the 90% of the Syrians who applied for the first time for asylum in the EU (over 88,000), the 73% of Iraqis (over 25,000), and the 57% of Afghans (about 20,000) of Afghans.

On average, Germany received the 61% of total applicants in the EU-28. Germany was followed by Italy (8%), France (6%), Austria (5%) and the United Kingdom (4%). These 5 Member States together account for over 80% of all first time applicants in the EU-28 (Eurostat, 2016).

Decisions on Asylum Applications, Table 3, reports first instance decisions on applications in the first quarter of 2016, in the five main recipients of asylum seekers inflows in EU-28. There are remarkable differences in the behaviour of the five countries in terms of decisions taken. Austria and Germany are by far the countries that register the higher acceptance rates (77% and 68% of total asylum requests, respectively). Italy and UK have much lower acceptance rates, around 33% of total requests, followed by France that in the first quarter of 2016 conceded the refugee status to less than 30% of the total asylum seekers.

There are remarkable differences also in the type of status assigned to refugees. In Germany, the vast majority of positive responses were given under the umbrella of the Geneva Convention status. In Italy, France, and Austria roughly the 9-12% of asylum requests were granted in the form of subsidiary protection status. Finally, in Italy and the UK, the Humanitarian status was granted to the 19% and 5% of asylum seekers, respectively.

Acceptance rates are also rather heterogeneous across nationality of the asylum seekers (Eurostat, 2016): Syrians received by far the highest number of protection statuses in the EU Member States, (99% acceptance rate), followed by Eritreans (94%) and Iraqis (73%). Conversely, acceptance rates from non-EU28 countries from Central Europe were extremely low: of the 15,300 first instance decisions issued to Albanians only 400 were positive (or 3% rate of recognition). Similarly, only the 1% and 3% of the final decisions issued to respectively Serbians and Kosovars were positive.

Interestingly, while many respondents of the survey mention lack of information and difficulties in communication across local, national and EU authorities as a stumbling block to the process of registration, the large majority do not believe that information is the main problem. Rather they blame delays in the organizational registration procedures and the problems caused by the application of the Dublin agreement to a massive migratory flow.
2. The Challenges Posed by the Current “Refugee Crisis”

The data in Table 3 seems to suggest that countries belonging to the European Union have considerable difficulties to act together and address the asylum seekers’ emergency. This is evident by looking at cross-country differences in policy decisions regarding the concession of the refugee status. The concession rate is about twice as big in Germany and Austria as compared to Italy, France and UK. What are the factors behind these striking heterogeneities?

One major issue in dealing with the growing migratory flows in a unified perspective is that the European Union consists of structurally diverse countries, subject to opposing political and social incentives. We now review some of the dimensions of these striking heterogeneities.

2.1 Individual and Societal Perceptions

A first dimension worth investigating are the societal attitudes towards migration. These are the individual and societal perceptions regarding the contribution of immigrants to the culture and the economy of their country of residence. These perceptions are well described in cross-country survey data from the European Social Survey as individual extent of agreement to the two statements “a country’s culture is undermined or enriched by immigrants” and “immigration is good for the economy of the country” (European Social Survey). Figure 4 below, is drawn from the OECD report Indicators of Immigrant Integration 2015: Settling In and shows how unequal and dispersed is the average societal judgement regarding immigrants’ cultural contribution (upper panel of Figure 4) and economic contribution (lower panel of Figure 4).

Generally speaking, Nordic societies display more positive attitudes towards immigration: more than 50% of respondents that value immigrants as enriching the culture of the country they live in countries such as Germany, Switzerland and Denmark. The shares are approach 80% of the respondents in Finland and Sweden. As opposed to this people have relatively negative attitudes towards immigrants in several countries from Southern Europe (e.g. Greece, Cyprus) and Central-Eastern Europe (e.g. Czech Republic, Latvia, Slovakia), where less than 30% of respondents express a positive evaluation regarding the cultural impact of immigrants in the host country. Even though cross-country preferences seem less polarized, it is very similar the countries’ ranking when it comes to the economic evaluation of immigrants: about 50% of respondents in Nordic countries value the immigrants’ presence as good in the country’s economy, as opposed to less than the 10% of the population from Southern and Central-European countries.

2.2 The Costs of Emergency and EU Countries’ Public Finances

There has been limited attempt up to now to quantify the cost of the refugee crisis to European public finances. Short-term expenditure required to provide support to asylum seekers can be substantial. It includes humanitarian assistance to deliver food and shelter and basic income support; up-front expenditures associated with necessary language training and schooling; steps to identify the skills of migrants and the expenditures associated with processing asylum claims and enforcing returns. Monthly allowances provided to asylum seekers vary significantly between countries and according to housing conditions. It can go from about €10 for single adults housed in reception centres to more than €300 for those without accommodation. Typically, the total cost for processing and accommodating asylum seekers can be in the range of €8,000 and €12,000 per application for the first year, although the figure may be much lower for fast track processing (see Migration Policy Debates, 2015).
It readily follows that, in the absence of well-functioning coordination mechanisms, the burden of the welcoming process weighs more on the countries that are exposed to asylum seekers’ arrival. As mentioned above, Germany, Italy, Austria, France and UK alone account for over 80% of all first time applicants in the EU-28. According to recent estimates provided by the European Commission, additional spending related to
the refugee crisis will amount to 0.3% of GDP for Europe as a whole, and about a 0.5% for the countries that are the most welcoming to refugees. In some cases, country member states (e.g. Austria in February 2016) asked the European Commission extra emergency funding, to tackle the costs of the refugee crisis.

2.3 Heterogeneity in Asylum Procedures and Decisions: the “Asylum Procedures Directive”

As the degree of legal integration between European countries is still rather limited, policy procedures in key aspects of welcoming and asylum request procedures are still noticeably country-specific. Some efforts have been devoted by the European Commission to harmonize procedures and bureaucracies. In 2005, the “Asylum Procedures Directive” (2005/85/EC) was delivered, with the objective of ensuring consistency in refugee status determination procedures across the 27-member European Union. It sets out procedural guarantees for asylum procedures, including for instance the rights to a personal interview, to appeal a decision and to receive information on the outcome of an asylum claim.

While a first step in the right direction, this effort from the EC was not enough. As a matter of fact, an in-depth report carried by the UN refugee agency showed still numerous differences in the way 12 European Union (EU) member states assessed asylum applications still in 2010, i.e. five years after the EU’s Asylum Procedures Directive has been applied in these countries. Researchers studied more than 1,000 individual case files and asylum decisions, observed hundreds of interviews of applicants and interviewed asylum officials, judges, lawyers and other stakeholders. The study found not only that member states are applying the Asylum Procedures Directive in diverging ways, but in some cases, in ways that may breach international refugee law. Researchers reported that applicants were not always given personal interviews, or did not have enough time to prepare for interviews or to explain their claims. Interpreters were not always available or qualified. Reasons for decisions in individual cases were not always given, while many categories of claims were channelled into accelerated processes with reduced safeguards. Lists of so-called safe countries of origin varied widely and the process for this designation was not always transparent. These and other practices, the study concludes, create the risk that protection needs are not properly identified and people may be sent back to countries where they face persecution or grave personal harm.

The 2013/32/EU Directive on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection addresses many of these issues. It aims at creating a coherent system, which ensures that asylum decisions are made more efficiently and more fairly and that all Member States examine applications with a common high quality standard. It sets clearer rules on how to apply for asylum: there have to be specific arrangements, for example at borders, to make sure that everyone who wishes to request asylum can do so quickly and effectively; it prompts faster and more efficient procedures; it advocates adequate support to people needing special help, e.g. because of age, disability, illness. It calls for special procedures, e.g. for unaccompanied children.

As the new directive is active only from July 2015, at the moment it is difficult to understand whether this new directive was effective in homogenizing asylum procedures across countries, reducing the risk of misjudgements. Carrying out an accurate evaluation in these respects is going to be one of the main challenges for the EU in the next years.

2.4 Initial Integration and Difference Across Countries

The importance of designing policies, which favour the integration of refugees, from the very beginning in
their host country is recognized by two leading international organizations, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR). In two recent reports (see the references at the end of the report) they recognize the contribution that these migrants can give to European economies and societies, calling on government intervention to favour the integration of refugees in the host country. Their argument goes that well designed integration policies favour refugees developing the skills needed in the medium-run to work productively and safely in the country of destination.

As these reports point out, there are benefits that refugee inflows can bring to the economies and societies of developed countries, if integration policies are well designed and effectively implemented. A number of challenges exist in these respects. First, **long waiting times should be avoided**, particularly for those asylum seekers that are more likely to stay. The efficiency of the asylum system is key. If it takes two, three, even five, years to review an asylum claim, the door is wide open to exploitation by people who know they are not refugees. If the system is fast, fair and efficient, then there is a strong disincentive for non-refugees to enter it in the first place. Time spent waiting reduces their chances of integration. Conversely, they should be provided as soon as possible language training, and integration support, e.g. skills assessments and civic integration courses. This is particularly true for those categories of asylum seekers who are more likely to stay. Those people should be legally entitled to find a job, soon after they arrived in the destination country while bureaucratic costs (e.g. waiting periods) should be reduced. Not working can have detrimental effects on refugees’ ability to integrate as their skills may deteriorate in the medium-run.

The second challenge is to **prevent refugees' segregation**. This can be firstly done by means of a thoughtful and well-designed allocation across the country. This allocation should pass through an assessment of the type of jobs, which are available in a particular region, which match the skills of migrants. The availability of housing is another important ingredient. Allocation in regions/areas with good housing availability is a way to reduce the risk of social segregation. Generally speaking, it is important to promote equal access to integration services to asylum seekers across the country and offset as much as possible regional differences in levels of support. If the levels of support vary drastically across regions, their integration prospects are determined by which part of the country they are settled in. Also, it is important to make sure that foreign qualifications and work experience count in the country of destination. Local employers often discount and dismiss foreign qualifications and work experience, with the result that humanitarian migrants with foreign credentials often struggle to secure jobs appropriate to their levels of experience. This is compounded as many fled their home countries with no proof of their qualifications. Countries can help here by assessing and documenting newcomers’ education, skills and experiences.

The third challenge is to **pay early attention to vulnerable refugees’ categories**. These are for example unaccompanied minors who arrive around the age at which compulsory schooling ends (14-17) but have little or no formal education, and need specific, appropriate support in order to catch up and integrate. Another very vulnerable category is refugees with mental and physical health issues. Health problems hinder a migrant’s ability to get a job, learn the local language, interact with public institutions and acquire education. All these factors reduce the probability of a successful integration in the country of destination, with refugees particularly prone to mental health issues such as anxiety and depression, following their often traumatic and violent experiences back home and in flight. Host countries should assess the mental health of newcomers alongside physical evaluations, grant humanitarian

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5 - An example is the US Unaccompanied Refugee Minors programme, which provides intensive case management by social workers, educational support, English language training, career and educational counselling, mental health care, and social integration support.
migrants access to regular healthcare and ensure they are able to use it.

The fourth challenge is the long term monitoring of refugees’ integration path. It should be acknowledged that integration can take a long time, particularly for people with low levels of education. While long-term support is expensive, it pays off in the long run, even benefiting the refugees’ offspring who might have integration problems themselves. To this objective, it is important that the monitoring and integration support effort is not left to governments’ alone. The civil society, e.g. employers, charities, immigrant associations, community based organisations and trade unions should accompany the government to integrate humanitarian migrants. They should cooperate to the implementation of government policies, develop effective mentorship programmes, appraising refugees’ skills and welcoming newcomers to the community.

Generally speaking, the performance of European countries along these four challenges is very heterogeneous. It is not very surprising that best practices in welcoming, support and integration policies were introduced in Nordic and Continental European countries. For example, Norway is one of the countries that made the biggest effort to provide early support. Norwegian governments offer up to 250 hours of language training to asylum seekers, when they are still in the reception centres. This kind of early intervention is likely to be very effective, considerably cutting the time-to-first-job of those that will stay and start a new working life there. Along similar lines, the Danish “Step-model” policy gradually leads new arrivals and longer-term immigrants into regular employment via intensive language training, an introduction to the workplace, and subsidised initial employment, which can be combined with further on-the-job language training and up-skilling.

Sweden is one of the best performers when it comes to policies to prevent /attenuate the risk of segregating the refugees. Immigrants in Sweden are carefully surveyed, their overall profile identified, and matched to localities based on their individual characteristics, including their education level and work experience. Similarly, Germany introduced an “early intervention” scheme to assess the professional skills and competencies of asylum seekers through samples of their work, building on their declared work history.

Less farsighted seem to be the integration policies that are implemented in Mediterranean European countries. A typical case is Italy, where the dominant model is one of “molecular integration” (Censis, 2016, p.13): after an initial allocation of refugees carried out by the central government, integration policies are left to the sensitivity and resources of the local communities. Such a decentralized approach is very risky. Leaving the migration management to local authorities, i.e. municipalities can certainly create virtuous cases in communities managed by progressive politicians, but also cases of segregation in the geographical areas in which they have some significance more conservative political forces. The central hand of the state as social planner when dealing with immigrants is necessary. The lack of this central role played by the government raises alarmism, and fosters social misperception regarding the role of immigrants in the destination country. As an example, data from the Eurobarometer 2015 show that Italians overstate the actual number of immigrants to be three times larger than the effective (9%, not 26%). This overestimation of the number of immigrants is rather widespread in Europe.
3. What do We Know About the Effects of Migration on the Receiving Country?

Over the years, a growing literature tried to discuss the contribution of migration to the receiving country’s economy. Ortega and Peri (2014) find a positive effect of openness to immigration on long-run income per capita, which is driven by total factor productivity, reflecting increased diversity in productive skills and innovation. Peri and Sparber (2009) discuss the complementarity between immigrants and native workers. They show that, to the extent that low-educated immigrants and natives specialize in different tasks, and have different competences, they will allocate their labour supply in different labour market segments. This will reduce direct labour market competition between natives and workers. Actually, immigrants will fill up manual intensive and relatively unskilled jobs, while natives will be employed in jobs that are relatively more intensive in communication-language tasks. Peri and Foged (2015) show that the inflow of low-skilled migrants even encourage natives to upgrade their skills. Natives can take advantage of immigrant-native complementarity to end up in higher quality and better-paid jobs. The interplay of these complementarities between natives and migrants will allow companies to expand, and create jobs that also natives will take. Through this job creation effect, immigration has a positive effect also on wages, particularly of less educated native workers, with no negative consequence on native employment (Docquier, Ozden & Peri, 2014). While these and other studies show that economic benefits are associated with the inflow of foreign workers, both skilled and unskilled, a related question is about the reaction of natives to foreigners’ immigration. The existing literature discusses three dimensions of individual attitudes towards immigrants.

First is perception of labour market competition: immigrant and native labour supply are not perceived as being complementary but substitutes. Immigrants are perceived to compete for the same set of jobs as natives, which are then perceived to be displaced by immigrants’ presence in the labour market of the destination country. This “labour market competition” channel is particularly important during economic crises, negative downturns or in the presence of high unemployment. (Scheve & Slaughter, 2001, Mayda, 2006; Facchini & Mayda, 2012)

A second set of determinants of natives’ perceptions towards refugees regards the sustainability of welfare state: the main OECD destinations are characterized by large welfare states. Negative attitudes towards immigration may be induced by fears regarding the sustainability of the welfare state. Individual perceptions about migrants depend on whether migrants are perceived as net welfare state contributors or receivers. Hanson, Scheve and Slaughter (2007), Boeri and Brucker (2005), Facchini and Mayda (2012) discuss these factors. However, as argued by the World Bank (Golden Aging, 2016), the age structure of immigrants in Europe is generally skewed towards people with less than forty years, while the share of immigrants which reached the retirement age is still very limited in several countries (e.g. Italy. See Censis, 2016). This evidence suggests that immigrants are to be considered net contributors to the welfare state of the destination, rather than net receivers.

A third set of natives’ concerns is associated with the perceived change in compositional amenities. OECD destinations are characterized by a high intensity of compositional amenities that natives derive from neighbourhoods’ schools and workplaces. Card, Preston and Dustmann (2012) investigate whether anti-immigrant sentiment in Europe is triggered by fears about the changes in these compositional amenities. Their results suggest that compositional concerns are roughly four times larger than wage or welfare con-
cerns in explaining variation in opinions on immigration policy. Such compositional concerns account for about the 70% of the gap between low and highly educated, older and younger respondents.

Political, cultural factors, and prejudice matter too: Burns and Gimpel (2000), use data from American NES 1994-1996 to evaluate the influence of a number of possible sources of opinion first on negative and positive stereotypes of groups, then on attitudes toward immigration policy. They find that stereotypical thinking (e.g. about intelligence, and work ethics) is a very important dimension of individual attitudes towards immigrants. They compare results for California in 1992 and 1996, and show how the change in the political stance in migration policy in California (see e.g. Proposition 187 in California, accompanied by a gubernatorial election that prominently featured differences between the candidates on immigration policy) motivated a relevant change in individual attitudes, which became more salient and to some extent polarized. Hainmuller and Hiscox (2007) use data from the European Social Survey, to investigate the role of cultural factors in shaping individual attitudes. They show that multiculturalism, having immigrant friends and a “anti-hate” culture are associated with pro-immigration attitudes. Dustmann and Preston (2004) use seven waves of the British Social Attitude Survey 1983-1990 to study economic vs. non-economic determinants of negative attitudes towards immigration in the UK. They show that economic determinants matter for attitudes toward immigrants, but racial prejudice is definitely the most important factor. Questions related to labour market concerns include fear of job loss, perception of job security, perceived ease of finding a new job, and expectations of wage growth.
4. A European Approach to Immigration

4.1 Why is it a Common European Strategy Necessary to Manage Immigration?

As discussed, the European Union has had considerable difficulties to act together and address the asylum seekers’ emergency. One major issue in dealing with the growing migratory flows in a unified perspective is that the European Union consists of structurally diverse countries, subject to different political and social incentives. As also shown above, this is evident by looking at cross-country differences in policy decisions regarding the concession of the refugee status.

The absence of a single European policy on immigration implies that countries that have diverse needs adopt positions and make choices on immigration only based on national interests. This may also come at the expenses of other countries. This is an example of a typical externalities problem studied in the economic literature; countries make choices without taking into account the spill-over effects to other countries of their policies, and the result may be inherently inefficient for Europe as a whole. In the context of Europe, these choices might not only be inefficient but also violate some founding EU principles, such as the existence of a common European policy concerning the mobility of people.

The dialogue on a “migration compact”, which started with a contribution by the Italian government, seems to head in the right direction. It is above all the recognition that immigration policy cannot be left in the hands of national governments, but must be internalized by Europe. Interestingly, it also seems that 68% of the European population agree with the fact that there should be a common policy on immigration (see Eurobarometer, 2016). Adapting a common policy is more a problem of the national governments than the result of a lack of consensus among European citizens. There is need for an integrated approach by considering four main aspects: legal migration, asylum, the integration of nationals of third countries and partnerships with non-EU countries.

4.2 The Current Proposals

The main benefit of the Italian proposal is the suggestion of the need of a common European approach to immigration. In particular, two elements at the basis of the proposal seem to be hard to dispute. First, that (a): migratory flows experienced in recent years is “unprecedented”; and that (b) the migration phenomenon is likely to last for decades, given the economic and demographic differences across Europe and other neighbouring continents. These two statements together imply that the strategy to face this new challenge must necessarily be innovative and, above all, long-term oriented.

In this direction, there are also two fundamental points in the Italian proposals that seem to be going in the right direction. First, that there has to be a shared control of the external borders of the EU and that there has to be a unified European treatment concerning asylum requests. Both these elements are essential to avoid opportunistic behaviour by member countries. For example, eliminating incentives for transient countries not to policy the border, or avoiding that destination countries use too strict requirements for asylum in order to discourage requests. As we discussed above, steps have been made in both directions that need to be further developed.

The second important point is the idea of cooperation with countries of origin of immigrants, by making operational and renewing some agreements such as EU-ACP. It is clearly impossible to handle the problem of immigrants or refugees flows by looking at it only as an internal problem of Europe, without trying to understand what happens in the countries of origin. More specifically, some points seem to be more convincing than others are.
• The idea to start a relationship based on “more-for-more principle” with the main countries of origin seems promising. This principle has already proved to be effective in the past, for example in relationship with Eastern Europe. However, beyond infrastructures, trade liberalization between the EU and countries of origin (see for example ECOWAS in Africa) could also be favoured in exchange to a closer bilateral cooperation in the management of flows.

• The description of the migration phenomenon also as “an opportunity for legal immigration” is ambitious and far-sighted. Compared to the traditional defensive view that looks at migrants only as a danger, one should start to look at the migration also as an opportunity, not only for migrants but also for Europe itself.

• A point that is still vague in the Italian proposal regards the funding of the measures. Clearly, as this is a common European policy, funding should come from European sources, not from national ones—for instance the budget of the European Union. But there might be some merit even in considering the introduction of a specific and permanent tax source whose proceeds were reserved to finance the program (such as for example a tax on fuels) and that could also be used as collateral for loan and investment programmes. This would become a clear indication that migration is a primary theme of European Union policy.

4.3 A European Authority for Immigration?

The main objective of the proposal discussed above is to create a common front at the European level for the management of migration flows. A further step could be the creation of an Authority for Immigration to deal with the management of migratory flows in a pro-active way, recognizing the immigrants are not only a cost or a burden, but also a potential benefit to the European economic system. In particular, there two things that such an Authority could immediately do:

• Informing citizens of the fact that migration flows are mitigating the problem of an aging population in Europe. This is a very serious problem in many European countries. In Italy, for instance, the population of residents in 2016 has been declining for the first time in 90 years. The intergenerational imbalances that may follow from aging are very worrying, both with regard to participation in the labour market and the sustainability of public finances and the welfare state. Indeed, studies show that immigration in recent years in Italy has helped to offset (partially) this negative demographic transition (Rosina, 2016). The recent Golden Aging report (World Bank, 2016) analysing “demographic transitions” in Europe notes that the presence of constant and regulated migration flow might avoid the continent the “trap of ageing”. In recent centuries, European population has increased at a steady rate of around 1% annually. The same trend is now declining among natives. Constant flow of migration can lead to a long-term stabilization of the European population (World Bank, 2016).

• Start an effective European-level evaluation process of refugees’ skills and competences to guide integration policy. As already stressed, there is remarkably little information of these issues. For example, some earlier suggestions mentioned that the majority of refugees from Syria, who headed for Germany, were high skilled types (e.g. engineers). Recent analyses have shown that this is not true, and that in terms of skills the flow of immigrants from Syria is not substantially different from those coming from North Africa. It is rather incredible that in spite of all debate, there is no European-wide ground for evaluating the skills of immigrants, or information about their skills, or their qualifications are not collected on a regular basis.
References


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