This paper gives an overview of the seven aspects of resolvability defined in 2019 by the Single Resolution Board, and then assesses progress in two key areas, based on evidence gathered from public disclosures made by the 20 largest euro-area banks. The largest banks have made good progress in raising bail-in capital. Changes to banks’ legal and operational structures that will facilitate resolution will take more time. Greater transparency would make it easier to achieve the policy objective of making banks resolvable.
This workshop will discuss recovery and resolution plans in the CEE countries
The discussions of the now-aborted merger of Germany’s two largest banks underlined supervisors’ concerns over creating banks that are too big or too complex to fail. While European banks are increasingly funded through securities that could be subject to a bail-in, transparency over how any resolutions would unfold is as yet very poor.
Europe’s largest banks have made progress in issuing bail-inable securities that shelter taxpayers from bank failures. But the now-finalised revision of the bank resolution directive and a new policy of the SRB will make requirements to issue such securities more onerous for other banks. In order to strengthen banking-system resilience, EU capital-market regulation should facilitate exposures of long-term institutional investors.
The Single Resolution Board (SRB) has had a somewhat difficult start but has been able to learn and adapt, and has gained stature following its first bank resolution decisions in 2017-18. It must continue to build up its capabilities, even as the European Union’s banking union and its policy regime for unviable banks continue to develop.
The recent Eurogroup agreement on euro-area reform foresees a greater role for the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) as a backstop to the banking union. This is a welcome step forward but important issues remain. We assess the agreement on how to fund banks after resolution and the best way to organise the fiscal role in liquidity provisioning to banks. We argue that the bank resolution framework will remain incomplete and its gaps could result in important financial instabilities.